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 Preface: Introduction to the series 
The West African Politics and Society (WAPOSO) series is the result of an 
agreement between the African Studies Centre, Leiden, and the French Institute 
for Research in Africa / Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA-
Nigeria), based at the University of Ibadan and at the Ahmadu Bello University, 
Zaria.  
The series aims at publishing original, cutting-edge research work produced 
by West African, especially Nigerian, scholars in different fields within the So-
cial Sciences and the Humanities, including Political science, History, Anthro-
pology and sociology. Nigeria will occupy a central position in the series, but 
publications on transnational and regional issues will also be included.  
The series emerged as one of the outcomes of the implementation of new edi-
torial policies of IFRA-Nigeria, aiming at ensuring a better visibility to and fa-
cilitating global access to scientific publications made in West Africa. This se-
ries, in adding the African Studies Center’s record of excellence to the strong 
academic reputation of IFRA-Nigeria, backed by a network of hundreds of up-
coming scholars, is a new opportunity to project and valorize scholarship in Af-
rica. 
Both the quality of the academic content and the accuracy of the language in 
which it is delivered will be ensured by a combined process of peer-review and 
thorough professional editorial screening. All books within the series will be 
available in print and online. 
The publication of the series is made possible by funding from the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique 
(CNRS). 
 
Gérard Chouin (IFRA-Nigeria) 
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Foreword 
The last two decades have been marked by a phenomenal increase in the inci-
dence of corruption in many countries of the developing world and a growing na-
tional and international commitment to fight it. This, in turn, has produced a gen-
eral re-orientation in the global perception of the causes of corruption and the 
best ways to deal with it, especially in the regions where it has become a pan-
demic obstructing development, political stability, and global security. Recent 
scholarly work devoted to the analysis of graft in public institutions often blames 
widespread corruption on deficient state policies – in the form of public monop-
oly, opaque administrative rules and procedures, and poor incentive structures – 
and weak institutions or, in extreme cases, total institutional collapse (multiple 
governance failures). This logically calls forth neo-liberal economic and adminis-
trative reforms incorporating, among other remedies, policies of privatisation and 
deregulation, aimed at reducing the role of the state in the economy and the re-
moval of state monopolies and official discretion, and improved remuneration for 
public officials. A second aspect of these reforms has aimed at the reinforcement 
of institutional capacities – strengthening existing institutions such as civil soci-
ety organisations (SCOs), judiciary, and the media – or the creation of new insti-
tutions, such as independent anti-corruption commissions (ACCs). 
Thanks to growing domestic pressure and the active support of a few vocal in-
ternational non-governmental organisations (NGOs), development aid agencies, 
and financial institutions, these policies have managed to find their way, in one 
form or the other, into the policy agenda of virtually every developing country 
affected by widespread corruption. But what has been the actual result of their 
implementation? To what extent have they helped in reducing the incidence 
and/or perception of official corruption? What have been the main challenges? 
While evidence points to some progress in terms of a progressive fall in the level 
of corruption in many East European and Central Asian states such as Georgia, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, Moldavia, and Tajikistan, in the great majority of 
cases, notably those from Africa, the application of these policies has not pro-
duced convincing results.  
The case of Nigeria is very instructive. While the endemic nature of corruption 
has never been in doubt (as studies conducted over several decades have shown), 
it took three recent events in the late 1990s to force the issue onto the global 
agenda. The first was the revelation of massive plunder of state resources under 
the Sani Abacha dictatorship; the second was the global fight against money 
xviii 
laundering connected with international terrorism; and the third was the soaring 
rate of poverty in many developing countries despite billions of dollars in over-
seas aid. Since 1999, when Nigeria completed a transition from military dictator-
ship to democratic rule, international pressure has intensified on its leaders to 
adopt radical reform measures to fight corruption. Indeed, the fight against cor-
ruption and criminality in Nigeria has become a major preoccupation, not only 
for major Western powers threatened by the money-laundering activities of in-
ternational terrorist networks, but also for the international development institu-
tions working to reduce global poverty.  
This book highlights the major steps taken by the Nigerian leadership, under 
the Olusegun Obasanjo civilian administration (1999-2007), to deal with corrup-
tion in Nigeria. Focusing more generally on activities at the federal level of gov-
ernment, but with occasional insights from some of Nigeria’s 36 states and 774 
local government councils, this book will seek to provide some answers to the 
following pertinent questions: How effective have market and institutional re-
forms been in checking corruption in Nigeria since 1999? Why has corruption 
remained pervasive in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic (1999 to date), despite 
an avalanche of policies and programmes designed to fight graft and the often-
restated commitment of Nigerian presidents to bring corrupt officials to book? 
What else could be done to achieve a significant reduction in the level of corrup-
tion in Nigeria? This book is an attempt to address these related questions in a 
systematic manner. 
The primary motivation for writing this book is the shortage of literature on 
anti-corruption projects in Africa, despite the proliferation of such programmes 
in the continent. The book itself is a product of several years of study undertaken 
with the generous financial support of the French Institute for Research in Africa 
(IFRA), Ibadan, the Leventis Research Corporation, the University of London 
(Centre of African Studies/School of Oriental and African Studies), and the Afri-
can Studies Centre, Leiden. The study involved several months of fieldwork in 
Nigeria, which allowed me to conduct series of interviews with cross-sections of 
people, study library and archival materials, and retrieve and analyze dozens of 
official publications on the subject under study. This research was originally 
submitted in 2006 as a PhD thesis to the Institute d’Etudes Politiques, University 
of Bordeaux. It was later updated and translated into English from its original 
French version at the Centre of African Studies/School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London, where I worked as the Nigerian Leventis Fellow 
from January to March 2009, and reviewed finally at the African Studies Centre, 
Leiden, where I spent three months (September-November 2009) as a Visiting 
Research Fellow. 
xix 
In terms of scope, this book is essentially about the war against corruption 
launched and executed by the Obasanjo administration during the period May 
1999 to May 2007. It is therefore not a study on corruption per se. In order to 
properly engage with and analyze the issues raised in the study, the book has 
been carefully divided into eight chapters, all arranged in a logical sequence. The 
first chapter presents an introduction to the study. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 offer an 
outline of the three broad strategies or policy instruments designed to achieve the 
goals of the Obasanjo anti-corruption policy. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 look at the ac-
tual application of these strategies and the three key challenges that have contrib-
uted to defeating the goals of the anti-corruption policy. The book ends with 
Chapter 8, which offers a brief conclusion to the study.  
xx 
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 1 
Introduction: Corruption in  
Nigeria - A historical challenge 
Introduction 
On 29 May 1999, Nigeria concluded a successful transition to civil democratic 
rule with the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo as the country’s sec-
ond popularly elected president. The election of President Obasanjo, himself a 
former military dictator, came after sixteen years of uninterrupted military rule, 
during which corruption and financial crimes1 were more or less installed as state 
policies (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1977, 1978, 1980, 1987, 1990, 1994 & 
1999). Although corruption is a major challenge for several other developing 
states (Haarhuis 2005; Nadiz 2004), very few countries have been so ravaged by 
graft as Nigeria. This fact was duly underlined by the voting of Nigeria as the 
world’s most corrupt nation in 1999, just weeks before Obasanjo was elected. 
                                                 
1  Nigeria’s anti-corruption legislation provides straightforward definitions of the twin concepts of cor-
ruption and economic crimes. To begin with, the ICPC Act defines corruption to include “bribery, 
fraud and other related offences”. The word bribery is used interchangeably with gratification, which 
the Act defines, under Section 8, to mean “money, donation, gift, loan, fee, reward, valuable security, 
property or interest in property being property of any description whether movable or immovable, or 
any other similar advantage, given or promised to any person with intent to influence such a person in 
the performance or non-performance of his duties”. According to Section 46 of the EFCC Act, “eco-
nomic crime means the non-violent criminal and illicit activity committed with the objective of earn-
ing wealth illegally either individually or in a group or organized manner thereby violating existing 
legislation governing the economic activities of government and its administration and includes any 
form of fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and any 
form of corrupt practices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human trafficking and child labour, oil bun-
kering and illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of cur-
rency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes and pro-
hibited goods, etc.”. (Federal Republic of Nigeria: Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Commission Act 2000a, Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Act 2004). For 
more details on available definitions and theories of corruption, see Heidenheimer (1989) and Andvig 
& Fjeldstadt (2001). 
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This conclusion, produced by Transparency International (TI), the global corrup-
tion watchdog (1999), could itself be corroborated not only by the findings of 
dozens of official inquiries set up by successive Nigerian governments before 
and after 1999 (see Annex I), but also by several academic studies. These re-
search studies have been unanimous in their conclusion that in Nigeria corruption 
has become the norm (Odekunle 1986; Joseph 1987; Daloz 2002; Lewis 1996; 
Bayart 1989, 1997; Erubami & Young 2003).  
It would be difficult to estimate exactly how much Nigeria has lost to corrup-
tion since its independence from Britain in 1960. One source has estimated the 
loss to be in the region of $400 billion for the period 1966 to 1999 (The Econo-
mist, October 21, 2006). This would of course consist of income from Nigeria’s 
vast oil resources – but also international aid. The looting of billions of dollars by 
General Sani Abacha, who ruled Nigeria between 1993 and 1998, is perhaps the 
best illustration of this corruption. Investigations launched by Abacha’s succes-
sors have so far led to the recovery of $2 billion from the Abacha family alone, 
while another $2 billion remains frozen in Western countries such as Switzer-
land, Luxemburg, and Liechtenstein (Daniel 2004: 102).  
Yet corruption has a much longer history in Nigeria. If Abacha’s record can be 
considered appalling, his criminal path had been nurtured to a large extent by the 
actions of his predecessors, both civilians and military dictators, who were no 
less culpable. As the eminent historian Stephen Ellis has argued, political corrup-
tion in Nigeria was incubated during the colonial era, especially in the crucial 
1940s and 1950s, when the then emerging Nigerian political elites were thrust 
into positions of political power without any independent financial base with 
which to finance their political careers. The British colonial policy of discourag-
ing indigenous private entrepreneurship ensured that there were very few entre-
preneurs. State coffers were the only available source of funds, and so these elites 
had little choice but to grab them.2  
Numerous commissions of inquiry established in the late 1950s and early 
1960s after Nigeria secured independence from Britain have confirmed the long 
history of corruption in the country. In 1962, a commission of inquiry, popularly 
known as the Justice Coker Commission, showed vividly how politicians in Ni-
geria’s Western Region used the then marketing boards to divert millions of 
pounds into their political party, the Action Group (AG), while deploying the 
same funds for their personal use (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1962). Earlier, 
similar official inquiries had established that such corrupt practices had become 
widespread in the Eastern Region, governed by the National Congress for Nige-
rian Citizens (NCNC) (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1956; 1957). Widespread 
                                                 
2  Personal discussion with Professor Stephen Ellis took place on 9 October 2009 during a meeting at the 
African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands. 
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mismanagement, rampant corruption, tribalism, and nepotism were some of the 
reasons cited by the leaders of a coup which overthrew this set of civilian leaders 
on 15 January 1966 (Dudley 1982).  
All the regimes that followed saw a much higher level of corruption and mis-
management. According to the reports of some panels of inquiry established fol-
lowing the overthrow of the Yakubu Gowon regime in 1976, senior members of 
the Gowon regime indulged in a massive diversion of state resources (Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1977, 1978; Dent 1978; Apter 2005). Subsequent govern-
ments, particularly the civilian regime of President Shehu Shagari (1979-83) 
(Odekunle 1986; Joseph 1987) and the military governments of Generals Ibrahim 
Babangida (1985-93) (Lewis 1996; Erubami 2003), Sani Abacha (1993-8), and 
Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-99), took corruption to higher levels. Immediately 
after the Shagari regime collapsed, following a 31 December 1983 military coup, 
a tribunal was set up to try some of the worst offenders and recover their ill-
gotten wealth. At least 51 public office holders were convicted of embezzlement 
and other abuse of public office on a grand scale (Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1986). Elsewhere, an audit inquiry instituted into the finances of the Nigerian 
Central Bank in 19943 indicted Babangida and his administration of filtering 
away some $12 billion of ‘excess’ oil revenue which accrued to the nation during 
the first Gulf War (Agbese 2005). In 2000, an official inquiry, commonly known 
as the Christopher Kolade Panel, set up in 1999 following return to democratic 
rule, also indicted the preceding military regime of General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar (1998-99), for “massively inflating and flagrantly awarding contracts, 
licences, awards, etc., usually to firms in which top members of the regime had 
substantial interests, often at very exorbitant prices, thereby causing a sharp drop 
in the country’s external reserves” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999b). 
This level of corruption explains much of Nigeria’s other social and economic 
problems, weak economic growth, decaying public infrastructures, endemic pov-
erty, and chronic political instability and violence. This is in spite of its abundant 
natural resources, including petroleum and gas reserves estimated at some 36.6 
billion barrels and 1840.6 billion cubic feet respectively (Africa Confidential, 25 
June 2004), and its large and talented population. The extent of its socio-
economic challenges has been documented in several official reports. In a 2004 
report on socio-economic conditions, for instance, the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) estimated that the country was the worst 
affected by capital flight in sub-Saharan Africa, with over $100 billion in private 
capital held overseas in 1999, representing around 70% of total private capital 
                                                 
3  The report of this audit (Pius Okigbo Report) has never been published officially, but many aspects of 
it have been published by the local media (Alli 2005) and internet sources: 
http://www.dawodu.com/okigboreport1.htm 
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(The Punch, 24 July 2004). This amount excludes some $63 billion in non-
monetary assets held by Nigerians abroad (ThisDay, 20 October 2003). Until re-
cently, Nigeria was a large debtor nation and attempted to be considered one of 
the ‘highly indebted poor countries’ deserving of debt cancellation. In 2006, after 
accumulating $36 billion in external debts,4 she managed to secure a favourable 
treatment from the Paris Club, which wrote off $18 billion. This pardon, how-
ever, came after she paid a colossal $12.4 billion and agreed to continue a broad 
range of economic and anti-corruption reform policies (The Guardian, 23 March 
2005).  
Endemic corruption in Nigeria has also nurtured widespread poverty and low 
human development indices. In 1999, when Nigeria transitioned from military to 
civil rule, an independent estimation of poverty – that is, the percentage of those 
living on less than a dollar a day – stood at 70% (Xavier & Subramanian 2008). 
Although the figures are now much lower, standing at 54.4% in 2004, this is still 
very high compared with past figures. The poverty rate was only 27.2% in 1980, 
46.3% in 1985, and 42.7% in 1992 (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2005). Poor 
governance also translated into a largely illiterate population. According to offi-
cial sources, the national literacy level for men in Nigeria, as recently as 2004, 
was only 50.6%. The percentage is even worse for women: 37.7% (ibid. 100). 
Other indices of human development follow similar trends. According to the 
World Bank, per capita income in Nigeria stood at $390 in 2004, well below the 
African average ($600) in the same period and even Nigeria’s per capita income 
in 1980 ($1,000). Life expectancy at birth did not fare any better: Only 47 years 
in 2000 (World Bank 2004).  
The impact of endemic corruption on public order is another area that has at-
tracted considerable attention. According to a 2005 World Bank report, Nigeria 
figures among 25 countries classified as ‘Low-Income Country Under Stress’ 
(LICUS). A LICUS is a state characterised by ‘weak security, fractured societal 
relations, corruption, breakdown in the rule of law, and lack of mechanisms for 
generating legitimate power and authority’ (World Bank 2006b). Ethno-religious 
conflicts were particularly widespread, as politicians frequently exploit mass ig-
norance and poverty as well as ethnic and religious differences for political gains. 
These conflicts often left thousands dead or displaced, engendering a general at-
mosphere of social insecurity and disorder (HRW, April 2006). Official and reli-
able data on victims of violence are rarely published in Nigeria. However, a 2005 
study by the Human Rights Watch suggests that Nigeria may have lost up to 
10,000 citizens between 1999 and 2005. The figure for displaced persons hovers 
                                                 
4  According to figures published by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2000, Nigeria’s external debt was 
only $2.2 billion in 1978, before rising to $13.1 billion in 1982 and then $33.1 billion in 1990. (Fed-
eral Republic of Nigeria 1999-2007a). 
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around 500,000, according to an aide to President Olusegun Obasanjo, Moremi 
Soyinka-Onijala, who was in charge of migrations and humanitarian affairs 
(ThisDay, 27 April 2006). 
It would probably be disingenuous to claim that corruption is the sole cause of 
all Nigeria’s development problems. However, this ailment, fostered by a mix-
ture of surviving traditional norms and colonial legacies and subsequently lubri-
cated by the influx of massive petroleum resources and persistent authoritarian 
rule, has hardly been a blessing in Nigeria (Ndih 2003).  
The Fourth Republic: A new era of reform? 
As soon as President Obasanjo was sworn into office as President and Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, a series of reform measures 
were rolled out in quick succession in a bid to tackle the cancer of corruption 
which has tarnished the image of Nigeria and undermined socio-economic and 
political development. During his inauguration on 29 May 1999, Obasanjo, a 
longstanding critic of corrupt military regimes and founding member of Trans-
parency International (TI), the global anti-corruption watchdog, promised that 
“corruption, the greatest single bane of our society today, will be tackled head-on 
… There will be no sacred cows … Nobody, no matter who and where, will be 
allowed to get away with the breach or perpetration of corruption and evil” (Oko 
2002). Indeed, this campaign remained Obasanjo’s number-one policy priority 
throughout the eight years he was in office. The campaign was pursued through 
different methods and directed at achieving a number of objectives, three of 
which are most perceptible. 
The first was to bring about a sharp drop in the incidence of corruption, 
through the speedy arrest and prosecution of corrupt public officials. This was to 
be achieved through the establishment of new anti-corruption agencies, the Inde-
pendent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC), inaugurated in 2000 and 2003 respectively. Previ-
ous experience has shown that such institutions, which have produced relative 
successes in some countries, were not easily adaptable to Africa – never mind to 
Nigeria specifically, where the necessary administrative capacity (adequate 
funds, quality manpower, strong laws, and efficient judicial systems) and strong 
political support are often lacking, and prevailing political logic tends to favour 
the abuse of office and misappropriation of public resources. 
The second objective was to reduce or remove incentives for corruption 
among public officials, via a comprehensive reform of the public sector (includ-
ing the judiciary). Specifically, the reforms aimed at the following: eliminating 
monopoly, by privatisation and deregulation; reducing discretion, by the stream-
lining of functions and reinforcement of controls; and removing administrative 
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opacity, by the increasing of transparency and accountability, particularly in pub-
lic revenue collection and expenditure. The aggressive implementation of these 
policies, it was hoped, would reduce the opportunities for corruption among pub-
lic officials. Some aspects of these reforms – privatisation, reform of the man-
agement of public finance, and the adoption of a new policy on employment and 
compensation (also known as ‘professionalisation’ and ‘rightsizing’) in the pub-
lic service – were pursued with considerable vigour. But their cumulative effect 
on corruption has proved difficult to see.  
The third objective was to redress some of the worst consequences of past cor-
ruption on the economy and improve the financial health of the nation. This goal 
was to be achieved through the identification of some of the offshore bank ac-
counts and assets – landed properties, companies, shares, and so on – owned by 
corrupt Nigerians and ensure they were duly confiscated and the proceeds repa-
triated. The corollary to this well-publicised campaign was a well-coordinated 
diplomatic offensive directed at persuading the (usually Western) governments 
whose financial institutions are key instruments of this fraud to also initiate re-
forms to help check the practice. Obasanjo’s effort led to the recovery of only a 
fraction (less that $1 billion) of Nigeria’s $300 to $400 billion of stolen assets, 
although it appeared to have had some effect on the behaviour of office holders 
in Nigeria as well as leading to the adoption of several international anti-money-
laundering initiatives.  
Why was the Obasanjo government interested in pursuing such an ambitious 
anti-corruption war in a country where the privatisation of public resources has 
been the norm among the political elite and where all previous anti-corruption 
projects had failed so woefully? Did the strategies announced by the Obasanjo 
government truly help reduce corruption in Nigeria? Was President Obasanjo’s 
campaign against corruption a genuine anti-corruption crusade or mere political 
grandstanding? If indeed it was genuine, was the President able to muster the 
necessary political will and support to implement his war against corruption?  
In 2005, President Obasanjo provided some clear insight into the considera-
tions that informed his administration’s anti-corruption policy. During one of his 
numerous speeches dwelling on transparency and accountability in government, 
the President revealed:  
Our avowed zero-tolerance for the scourge of corruption derives from our conviction that 
countering corruption and promoting public integrity are critical to economic rebirth and sus-
tained development … The globalized world in which we live today has become hostile to 
corrupt nations and their citizens. The first consideration in receiving support or assistance 
from the international community today is the level of corruption in that country. The impli-
cation is that we have no choice but to change our ways. (The Punch, 6 September 2005) 
This statement by President Obasanjo raises two key aspects of the motivation 
for launching a campaign against corruption. The first is that Obasanjo and those 
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who worked with him were patriotic and rational leaders who wanted to see their 
country develop. These leaders correctly diagnosed the cause of their country’s 
underdevelopment and were determined to remove what they perceived as the 
major obstacle to achieving that goal: Corruption. The second issue raised by 
Obasanjo is the fact that the decision to embrace anti-corruption reforms was 
partly, if not entirely, driven by the need to escape international sanction or isola-
tion.  
Anti-corruption campaign and the logic of rational leaders 
At face value, Obasanjo’s comments would seem to confirm the validity of the 
‘rational choice theory’, according to which public policy makers act on the basis 
of cost-benefit calculation (Downs 1958; Elster 1986). Two major inferences can 
be drawn from this perspective. The first holds that decision makers are rational 
people guided by national or public interest, who can and are willing to select the 
best solutions to society’s problems among several competing alternative courses 
of action. The second suggests that these decision makers also act to preserve 
their own narrow, selfish interest – that is, to become ‘boundedly rational’ 
(Simon 1982) – in an attempt to escape political sanctions, whether from voters 
(in advanced liberal democracies, for instance) or from the international commu-
nity (donors to countries largely dependent on foreign aid). Thus, when decision 
makers act, it is because sanctions will presumably be put in place if they do not 
embrace reforms (Haarhuis 2005: 177). How true are these assumptions? 
The first argument has not been supported by recent events in many Africa 
countries, notably Nigeria. Many studies, including our reading of Nigeria’s his-
tory, show that anti-corruption campaigns have not been motivated by public in-
terest alone (Médard 1986). In fact, very often they have been motivated by the 
personal political interests of political leaders, who, for instance, instrumentalise 
the struggle to legitimise their regime, gain access to power, eliminate their po-
litical rivals, and reconstruct a crumbling political hegemony. Indeed, despite be-
ing credited with exceptional personal political will during the early days of his 
government – a fact which was largely informed by his long-standing opposition 
to corrupt military regimes, involvement in some international anti-corruption 
NGOs, and adoption of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy on assumption 
of office – Obasanjo’s anti-corruption fight itself, as we will soon discover, be-
came a vital instrument for targeting political rivals. 
The second argument appears even less compelling, to say the least. First, the 
prevailing political context in Africa in general, and in Nigeria particularly, is 
largely unfavourable to any serious democratic exercise of power as suggested 
above. Elections and voters are for now ineffective tools for controlling African 
political leaders. Similarly, donor pressures have little meaning for countries 
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such as Nigeria that receive little or no foreign aid (World Bank 2005, 2006), just 
as the huge debt write-off the country won in April 2005 did not lead to the 
abandonment of the anti-corruption policy, contrary to expectations. Indeed, as 
K. Haarhuis has argued, there is no evidence that African leaders who receive aid 
will implement measures against corruption imposed from outside, particularly if 
their implementation has potential to undermine their strategic interests. African 
governments have tended to busy themselves with paper reforms, aimed princi-
pally at satisfying the demands of voters, but more especially the international 
community (Haarhuis 2005: 162). During the period under review (1999-2007), 
for example, political elites in Nigeria successfully resisted several reform meas-
ures, pushed by civil society and the international community, which they con-
sidered potentially dangerous: Strong anti-corruption agencies, public declaration 
of assets by public officers, and privatisation of the larger and more lucrative 
public corporations, such as the Nigerian Electric Power Authority (NEPA), the 
oil refineries, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). On the 
other hand, reforms and measures perceived as less risky or aimed at individuals 
outside the political class received a more enthusiastic reception. 
It could be reasoned that the effectiveness of domestic (voter) and interna-
tional (donor) pressure for a cleaner government will ultimately depend on the 
specificity of each country and/or region; that is to say, the adoption of reforms 
will depend both on whether the electorate is perceived to be prepared to move 
against the political regime if pressures for reforms are ignored and on the extent 
to which donors are prepared to go to force reforms on recipients of aid (Knack 
2000; Tavares 2003; Burnside & Dollar 2000; Alesina & Weder 1999; Rodrik 
1996; Dollar & Pritchett 1998). While these conditions are difficult to apply in 
the case of Nigeria because the country has been largely free from voter and do-
nor pressure, other external and internal factors were as important in shaping 
Obasanjo’s anti-corruption campaign. The adoption of an anti-corruption policy 
in 1999 and its implementation were influenced by some recent dramatic interna-
tional changes (which are still affecting the global attitude towards corruption), 
as well as by the history of the country, which points to the necessity of embrac-
ing some forms of campaign against corruption to stave off unpalatable conse-
quences (such as a military coup). 
Historical dynamics of anti-corruption reforms in Nigeria 
The analysis and understanding of recent anti-corruption measures in Nigeria re-
quire a study of the country’s history and internal socio-political dynamics. This 
will help us understand the extent to which the anti-corruption drive is path-
dependent in this country (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000). The crusade against 
corruption proposed by President Obasanjo at the hour of his election in 1999 
9 
 
may be the first under a civilian or democratic government in Nigeria. It can also 
be described as the most ambitious ever seen in the country. Nevertheless, it is 
far from being the first in its history. Corruption and anti-corruption fights have 
been at the heart of national political discourse and actions in Nigeria since inde-
pendence in October 1960. Almost all the regimes that have come to power in 
Nigeria strongly denounced corruption, without any form of external pressure, 
while also proposing measures against it. It is true that most of these measures 
(inauguration of commissions of inquiry to probe specific allegations and suggest 
remedies, adoption of new anti-corruption laws (Kolajo 2002) and even the set-
ting up of anti-corruption agencies) did not yield positive results.5 It is also true 
that regimes with radical anti-corruption agenda have been overthrown after only 
a few months in office: Murtala (1975-76) and Buhari (1983-85). Yet, it is also a 
well-known fact that many regimes, including the two previous civilian regimes 
– Balewa (1960-66) and Shagari (1979-83) – fell largely because they failed to 
take action to check corruption in their governments. But in what way did these 
past experiences really influence the decision to launch an anti-corruption war in 
1999? In our view there are at least two ways in which historical antecedents in-
fluenced President Obasanjo’s decision to launch the current anti-corruption war.  
The first way obviously was through ‘imitation’ or ‘cloning’. This occurs 
when newly arrived regimes attempt to understudy how their predecessors prof-
ited from their anti-corruption projects, in order to do better in this regard. It is a 
well-known fact that despite the many catastrophic consequences of corruption 
on Nigeria’s development, very few regimes in Nigeria have been interested in 
fighting it.6 Several popular measures offered by these regimes – such as dis-
missal of some corrupt officials, confiscation of illicitly acquired assets, estab-
lishment of commissions of inquiry, adoption of anti-corruption laws and agen-
cies, and even ad hoc tribunals set up to try offenders – all failed to produce tan-
gible results, largely because they were driven by ulterior motives. These motives 
usually involved the legitimisation of unpopular military dictatorships and the 
need to deal with political rivals in a country where struggle for political power is 
usually intense, if not violent. 
                                                 
5  These laws included the Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunal Act Cap. 389), Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 (as amended in 1999), Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts and Finan-
cial Malpractices in Banks), Decree 1994 (as amended in 1999), Criminal Code (applicable in south-
ern Nigeria), Penal Code (applicable in the north), and the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, 
Cap. 56 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. Some of the anti-corruption agencies established in 
the past included the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, proposed by the Murtala Mohammed 
administration in 1975, and the Code of Conduct Bureau, established in 1979 by the Second Republic 
Constitution left behind by the Obasanjo military regime.  
6  With respect to application of sanctions against corrupt officials, the Murtala Mohammed (July 1975 – 
February 1976) and Mohammadu Buhari (December 1983 – August 1985) regimes were rare excep-
tions, although tendencies toward the instrumentalisation of the anti-corruption war to punish rival po-
litical factions were also observed.  
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Secondly, and more importantly, past governments in Nigeria have, through 
massive looting of the public treasury, promoted abject poverty among an over-
whelming majority of the population, while also widening the gap between the 
rich and the poor. The Babangida (1985-93) and Abacha (1993-98) regimes, un-
der which corruption became almost a state policy, are arguably the most culpa-
ble. The behaviour of these military regimes changed Nigerian political economy 
in two ways. The first way was somewhat direct, in the sense that appointment to 
public offices, especially the more lucrative ones, became transformed into a vast 
system of patronage guaranteeing the maximisation of political support for what-
ever regime was in power (Gboyega 1996). The second consequence was more 
indirect, to the extent that the grand corruption of political leaders and top func-
tionaries led to the impoverishment of lower-level officials, who now embraced 
the same practices without any fear of sanctions. Consequently, the spread of 
corruption clogged almost all the machinery of public administration, making ba-
sic social services almost inaccessible to the poor. In this context, popular pres-
sure and demand for more anti-corruption measures cannot but increase under a 
popularly elected government.  
Anti-corruption reform and  
the new global good governance agenda  
Despite the huge negative impact of corruption on the socio-economic and politi-
cal development of many Africa countries, notably Nigeria, anti-corruption pro-
jects in the continent had initially received little or no attention from the interna-
tional community, who considered it the internal affair of relevant sovereign 
states. Since the second half of the 1990s, however, anti-corruption reforms have 
been increasingly supported by the international community, which now consid-
ers it as a major preoccupation to be promoted under the framework of the global 
push for ‘good governance’ and poverty reduction (Galtung & Pope 1999; Had-
jadji 2002). Everyone in this context, including researchers, international finan-
cial institutions (notably the World Bank and the IMF), development agencies, 
donors, NGOs, and national governments, have now adopted the fight against 
corruption as a battle cry. What explains such a dramatic change? And what has 
been its impact in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular? 
The first explanation for the dramatic change in the orientation of the interna-
tional community and the emergence of the ‘global coalition against corruption’ 
which followed it comes from the collapse of the Soviet Union, which signalled 
the demise of the Eastern Bloc and accelerated the processes of globalisation. 
The end of the Cold War, at the beginning of the 1990s, brought an unimaginable 
amount of diplomatic pressure to bear on countries or governments perceived as 
corrupt and repressive (Bresson 1998). Secondly, the interest shown by the inter-
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national community in corruption has also been raised by ‘global corruption 
eruption’, that is the growing revelation of serious cases of fraud and bribery in-
volving senior public officials around the world. These corrupt acts have often 
occurred with the complicity of the largest commercial enterprises, who in the 
face of rising competition resorted to corruption. Thirdly, this global corruption 
eruption then led to an increased academic interest in the study and analysis of 
corruption. The outcome of these studies revealed that despite billions of dollars 
provided as development aid, the effects of corruption, especially on poor coun-
tries, were growing and could no longer be ignored by decision makers (Keefer 
& Knack 1995; Brunetti et al. 1997; Clarke & Xu 2002; Mauro 1995, 1997).  
The interaction of these three factors culminated in the proliferation of anti-
corruption programmes in Africa and other parts of the developing world, most 
of them imposed and supervised by the major international financial institutions 
(notably the IMF and the World Bank), the United Nations (UN) or its agencies 
(United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC)), and Western donor agencies. These programmes 
initially centred on neo-liberal economic reform policies such as privatisation 
and deregulation. Better known in Africa as Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAP), these policies were presented as necessary solutions to the economic cri-
ses which rocked many African states in the 1980s and early 1990s, but more 
importantly as conditions for future international development aid. In the mid-
1990s, a second type of anti-corruption policy, rooted in neo-institutional theo-
ries, appeared on the stage. These policies called for the reform of the administra-
tive apparatus of the state and the creation and strengthening of democratic insti-
tutions, including institutions of civil society (Haarhuis 2005). The presence and 
proper functioning of these institutions, referred to as ‘indicators of good govern-
ance’, would also qualify a country for foreign aid, cooperation, and support 
from the international community (ibid. 21).  
The impact of international involvement in the war against corruption has 
been very noticeable in Africa, where corruption is considered endemic (Kempe 
2000; Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman 1997). The first evidence of this is perhaps 
the continent’s prominent position in virtually all international prescriptions 
against corruption. The second is the actual spread of reform measures, such as 
anti-corruption agencies, in many African states. But what has been the effect of 
these changes on Africa? If these reform agencies have in some instances helped 
stave off growing local activism and external pressures, there is hardly any evi-
dence that they have changed the behaviour of public officials in Africa in any 
significant way. With very few exceptions – notably Botswana – the inauguration 
of anti-corruption agencies and other forms of anti-corruption reform have 
clearly not been accompanied by an effective war against corruption in Africa.  
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Some scholars have argued that this failure is occurring owing to the fact that 
anti-corruption reforms are often designed and imposed by foreign institutions on 
unwilling recipients (Hadjadji et al. 2002: 30; Fjeldstadt 2002); that is to say, the 
failure of international anti-corruption programmes in Africa is principally due to 
the absence, at the helm of affairs, of political leaders who favour reforms (Fjeld-
stadt 2002; Kpundeh 1998). Robin Theobald formulates this thesis more clearly: 
“reforms require reformers” (Theobald 1986: 258). In other words, successful 
reforms require the presence of strong and courageous leaders – what Peters & 
Savoie (1998: 5) called a “political champion”, in apparent allusion to Britain 
under the reformist Margaret Thatcher regime. It is perhaps for this reason that 
the arrival of President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was widely portrayed as a ‘re-
formist leader’, raised unprecedented interest and hope. 
Anti-corruption war: The role of reformers 
The return to democratic rule on 29 May 1999, and its ‘consolidation’ four years 
later with the national elections in April 2003, offered Nigerians a new opportu-
nity, not only to elect a reform-minded government but also to exercise some 
pressure on those they elected to institute effective anti-corruption measures. The 
election of President Obasanjo seemed to reflect this logic, given that corruption 
was a dominant theme during his election campaigns. Although Obasanjo had 
promised an all-out war against corruption if elected, as had other candidates, 
many Nigerians reasoned that his anti-corruption credentials were far more solid 
than those of his rivals. Aside from his past record as a founding member of 
Transparency International, Obasanjo was a long-standing critic of corrupt mili-
tary regimes. President Obasanjo himself even acknowledged the role of corrup-
tion in his election. During his first post-election speech, he noted that he consid-
ered “this election as a mandate from the people of Nigeria and a command from 
God Almighty that I should spare no effort in rebuilding this nation. I understand 
the clear message of the Nigerian people. In giving me their mandate, they have 
asked me to … restore our dignity … they want me to alleviate their poverty and 
reduce corruption” (ThisDay, 9 May 1999). In other words, his election was 
largely due to the public perception that he was the candidate most capable of 
fighting corruption.  
Once elected, Obasanjo moved to justify his reputation as a reformist by roll-
ing out a number of anti-corruption initiatives, including the adoption of an anti-
corruption law and institution of a specialised anti-corruption agency, retirement 
of military officers who had held political appointments, review of several pro-
jects initiated by past regimes and believed to be tainted with corruption, and in-
auguration of dozens of inquiries into the activities of public institutions (see 
Annex I) (Bello-Imam 2005). Initially, during his first tenure, the President was 
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largely isolated in this fight, having filled his cabinet with the old political guard 
(a move that was widely believed to be compensation for their roles in his elec-
toral victory in the February 1999 elections). But following his re-election in 
2003, several individuals regarded as ‘committed reformists’ with solid interna-
tional reputations were appointed to his government to head key institutions. 
These individuals included Dora Akuyili (National Agency For Food and Drug 
Administration and Control (NAFDAC)), Obi Ezekwesili (Budget and Price 
Monitoring Intelligence Unit (BPMIU)), Nuhu Ribadu (Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commissions (EFCC)), Nasir El-Rufai (Bureau for Public Enterprises 
(BPE)), Charles Soludo (Chief Economic Adviser to the President, later Gover-
nor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)), and Ngozi Okonjo-Iwalla (Minister 
of Finance and Head of Obasanjo’s economic reform team until 2006). One 
common feature shared by these personalities charged with driving the reforms 
was that they were all technocrats with no previous political affiliation, mainly 
educated abroad, and/or with substantial ties to major international institutions. 
Although such foreign connections occasionally raised some eyebrows in Nige-
ria, these concerns were brushed aside by Obasanjo, who provided these techno-
crats with political shielding. In the years that followed, Obasanjo’s anti-
corruption programme benefitted from the presence and initiatives of these per-
sonalities.  
The Western background of these technocrats or reformers led to a major ideo-
logical shift in Obasanjo’s anti-corruption war. Unlike the situation that had ob-
tained in the past, when corruption was viewed as a personal moral failure of po-
litical leaders and public officials, corruption was now considered as a systemic 
and structural crisis, resulting from “excessive state intervention in economic and 
commercial domains” and a “failure of governance”. The new thinking now was 
that corruption required the adoption of a multi-dimensional strategy, including 
the deregulation of the national economy and privatisation of public enterprises, 
reform of the civil service (downsizing and review of recruitment, remuneration, 
and procurement policies), and legal and institutional reform (including the en-
actment of new laws and creation of new regulatory agencies and the strengthen-
ing of existing institutions, such as public services, the judiciary, the parliament, 
and civil society). At the same time, it was recognised that this multi-dimensional 
struggle did not exclude public reorientation via public enlightenment and puni-
tive measures such as arrest, confiscation of illegally acquired assets, and crimi-
nal proceedings.  
This strategy draws from two of the most dominant approaches or perspectives 
in contemporary literature on anti-corruption: The market and neo-institutionalist 
approaches. The former, which is rooted in neo-liberal economic theories, views 
corruption as largely resulting from excessive intervention of the state in eco-
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nomic and commercial domains (Toye 1987; Grindle 1991; Evans 1995). Ac-
cording to this view, this state involvement breeds unlimited opportunities for 
corruption by public officials. The solution to this malaise must, therefore, in-
clude structural economic reforms that eliminate state monopolies, discretion, 
and opacity and that increase transparency in the management of public resources 
(Klitgaard 1995, 1996; Rose-Ackerman 1997; Kaufmann & Siegelbaum 1997; 
Ades & Di Tella 2000; Mbaku 2002). The latter, that is the neo-institutional the-
ory, underlines weakness or failure of governance and state institutions as causes 
of corruption. This is why it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of exiting in-
stitutions and to put in place new institutions to complement existing ones. 
Conclusion 
The reasons behind the adoption of an anti-corruption campaign will most likely 
continue to be a question of intense political debate (Holmes 2003). What is 
clear, however, is that the Obasanjo campaign against corruption in Nigeria was 
substantially influenced by domestic and external political dynamics, and to 
some extent by Obasanjo’s own personal vision and past anti-corruption com-
mitments. These past commitments are indeed rarely found in Nigeria, so that not 
surprisingly Obasanjo’s anti-corruption policy was greeted with widespread ap-
probation instead of suspicion as was the case in the past. Public support is usu-
ally regarded as an essential precondition for the success of public policies. So, 
how much success did Obasanjo’s anti-corruption campaign register in the end? 
Did the reforms address the key issues? What were the major highlights of this 
campaign? To what extent did the elevation of anti-corruption struggle into a ma-
jor policy priority and the groundswell of local and international support translate 
into success in Nigeria’s anti-corruption drive? In other words, what factors have 
influenced the outcome of the Nigerian campaign against corruption? There are 
other logical questions that are bound to follow the announcement and imple-
mentation of any anti-corruption policy or strategy anywhere in the world. For 
instance, how prepared was the Nigerian political class, and indeed civil society, 
for a genuine struggle against corruption? Given the plethora of failed anti-
corruption programmes around the world, what factors could have led to the suc-
cess of the anti-corruption battle in Nigeria? The above are some of the questions 
addressed in the following chapters that make up this book.  
 
 2 
The establishment of  
anti-corruption agencies  
Introduction 
While he was in power, President Olusegun Obasanjo conceived and imple-
mented several measures aimed at advancing his anti-corruption policy, one of 
them being the creation of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Commission (ICPC) on 29 September 2000 and the Economic and Fi-
nancial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in April 2004, viewed as the single most 
important step taken by the President to tackle corruption. These institutions 
were collectively charged with the responsibility of implementing Nigeria’s nu-
merous anti-corruption laws, including their own respective enabling Acts, the 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 and the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004. The institutions were 
expected to operate from their respective headquarters in Abuja, the nation’s 
capital, through a network of branch offices spread across the whole federation.  
The conception of an independent, specialised commission against corruption 
as an indispensable tool for fighting corruption is an idea that has proved suc-
cessful in some countries (notably Hong Kong and Singapore) and is now well 
rooted in global academic discussions on corruption. Nevertheless, its emergence 
in Nigeria immediately raised at least two important sets of questions. Firstly, is 
the idea transferable to countries such as Nigeria, with its multiple experiences of 
weak or failed institutions? If yes, under what specific conditions? Secondly, 
given the fact that a considerable number of other institutions dealing with cor-
ruption in one form or the other were already in existence at the time these insti-
tutions were created, what role exactly were these new institutions expected to 
play? And what would their relationship be with the hitherto existing institu-
tions?  
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Response to the first set of questions would obviously require a detailed com-
parative study on the functioning of such bodies across a number of countries, 
which is outside the scope of this book. However, having said that, it is important 
to note that in setting up the ICPC and the EFCC, the Obasanjo administration 
appeared to have succumbed to international pressure or bought into the argu-
ment of the leading international organizations that these institutional bodies can 
indeed be recreated in almost any country with the right amount of political will. 
Thus, while responding to questions from a journalist on why the government 
had chosen to put in place a specialised institution to fight corruption, the Attor-
ney General and Minister of Justice Kanu Agabi, Obasanjo’s adviser on good 
governance and transparency, noted: 
The United Nations has for many years now been studying the problem of corruption. In the 
light of experience it has recommended that nations seeking to eradicate corruption should 
set up specialised agencies to do so. The nations that have succeeded to eradicate corruption 
did so by employing specialised bodies. We should be seen to be complying with the United 
Nations global programme for the eradication of corruption. We cannot afford to be indiffer-
ent to the views and feelings of others about our efforts at eradication of corruption while 
expecting them to do business with us. (The Guardian, 1 September 1999). 
The second set of questions can be adequately answered by reviewing provi-
sions of the two enabling anti-corruption Acts, the Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offences Act 2000 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(Establishment) Act 2004, which positioned these organs as the pre-eminent in-
stitutions for fighting corruption and financial crimes in Nigeria. In this chapter, 
we shall briefly discuss each of these institutions, with emphasis on their powers, 
functions, and administrative structures. The discussion will enable us to under-
stand why these agencies were widely regarded as the driving force behind 
President Obasanjo’s anti-corruption crusade and to understand the political 
stakes that later shaped their progress. 
The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Commission (ICPC) 
On 13 July 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo submitted an executive bill titled 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Bill to the National Assembly for 
passage into law. This was barely six weeks after he was sworn into office. The 
bill aimed to outlaw all forms of corruption in the public sector and give legal 
backing for the creation of the ICPC to coordinate the war against corruption in 
Nigeria. Even though the bill was not the first of its kind in Nigeria1 and repre-
                                                 
1  In 1975 a similar law, known as the Corrupt Practices Decree (No. 38) 1975, was adopted by the Mur-
tala Mohammed military regime. This legislation, which also created an anti-corruption agency, the 
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), was subsequently replaced by the Code of Conduct 
Act of 1979. The latter Act envisaged the establishment of two bureaucratic  institutions, the Code of 
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sented a sort of conformity with Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution, which provides that 
“the state shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power” (Federal Repub-
lic of Nigeria 1999), it nevertheless raised considerable concern in several politi-
cal quarters. 
The first concern came from the federal legislature, which raised at least two 
major objections to the anti-graft law as proposed by President Obasanjo. The 
first objection concerned some provisions of the bill, which the lawmakers said 
constituted grave violations of the fundamental rights of Nigerians as guaranteed 
by the 1999 Constitution. This was specifically in respect to the powers of the 
commission to ‘invade’ the privacy of suspects in the course of its investigation. 
Secondly, the National Assembly was also not comfortable with a bill which 
granted the President, the Vice-President, the state governors and their deputies 
immunity from investigation and prosecution on grounds of corruption, at least 
while they were in office.  
Based on these objections, the two federal legislative chambers, the Senate 
and the House of Representatives, refused to pass the bill in its original version, 
choosing instead to subject it to their revision, ejecting the clauses which they 
had identified as ‘anti-democratic’ or not in conformity with universally accepted 
democratic principles. The lawmakers also made sure that they inserted some 
clauses to ensure that the President, the Vice-President, state governors, and dep-
uty state governors would not be immune to investigation (The News, 4 June 
2001: 18). After stormy and lengthy debate, spanning a full year (July 1999 to 
June 2000), the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 was fi-
nally passed into law by the two federal lawmaking houses as constitutionally 
required. The law was passed on 13 June 2000. The new anti-corruption law, 
which effectively paved the way for the inauguration of the ICPC, was subse-
quently signed into law during a very elaborate ceremony by President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, also on 13 June 2000 (The Guardian, 9 June 2002: 37).  
The changes introduced by the National Assembly did not change the charac-
ter of the ICPC law in any fundamental way. The ICPC Act still retained almost 
all of the offences proposed by the original executive bill. Similarly, the powers 
and structures of the commission, as envisaged in the original bill, remained ba-
sically unchanged. In consequence, as soon as the anti-corruption Act was signed 
into law, and especially after the commission was inaugurated, criticism and op-
position began to mount concerning certain provisions of the Act that conferred 
on the body powers that were deemed to be unconstitutional or a gross violation 
                                                 
Conduct Bureau and the Code of Conduct Tribunal, which were its  enforcement arms. In addition, in 
1990 a presidential committee on corruption and economic crimes set up by the Babangida admini-
stration prepared a draft bill on corruption. The bill, among other items, called for the establishment of 
a Corrupt Practices Tribunal. This bill, however, was not implemented by the regime.  
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of the principles of federalism (The Guardian, 8 October 2000: 19).. Of particular 
interest here was the notion of ‘a public officer’, which the Act in its interpreta-
tion section defined as: 
… a person employed in any capacity in the public service of the federal, state or local gov-
ernment, public corporations and private company wholly or jointly floated by any govern-
ment or its agency, including the subsidiary of any such company whether located within or 
outside Nigeria and including judicial officers and serving magistrates in area/customary 
courts or tribunals. (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2000a). 
The implication of the above provision in the Act was to bring public officers 
employed in the services of the states and local governments directly under a 
body (as far as corruption probe is concerned) which is essentially a ‘federal 
agency’, being the creation of the central government. The question then arose: 
Can a state governor, for example, who in any case enjoys constitutional immu-
nity against criminal prosecution while in office, be investigated and prosecuted 
through an agency of the federal/central government on the strength of Section 
52 (27) of the Act? This section provides that when a petition against a governor 
or his deputy or the President or the Vice-President is received by the commis-
sion, they can be investigated, and where they are found to have contravened any 
section of the Act, the commission can call on the Chief Justice of the Federation 
to institute an independent council to investigate the indicted official, the report 
being then forwarded to the state House of Assembly or the National Assembly 
(in the case of the President and his Vice-President), which have powers to deal 
with the matter according to the relevant constitutional procedures (which may 
involve impeachment) if the grounds exist to do so. 
Some articulate sections of the Nigerian population, including leading legal 
luminaries, vehemently opposed this provision, which they considered a gross 
violation of the spirit of federalism as guaranteed by the Nigerian Constitution. 
Prominent among these legal experts were two foremost constitutional lawyers, 
Chief Rotimi Williams and Professor Ben Nwabueze, who spearheaded the op-
position to sections of the anti-graft Act. Chief Williams noted that the anti-
corruption law “paid no regard whatsoever to the limited scope of the legislative 
powers conferred on the National Assembly by the Constitution”, while arguing 
that the National Assembly cannot make provisions for dealing with corruption 
throughout Nigeria (ThisDay, 6 July 2000: 4). He recalled that in the past, the at-
tempt of the federal legislature to give itself power to set up a tribunal of inquiry 
during the Balewa administration (First Republic, 1960-66) was nullified by the 
courts, expressing the hope that the same fate would befall the anti-graft law. 
Professor Nwabueze was more forceful and critical in his arguments: 
… more than being an infraction of the Constitution, it is subversive of one of the foundation 
pillars of Nigeria’s governmental system, federalism, whose two cardinal principles it totally 
disregards, namely, the principles of the autonomy of the state government vis-à-vis the fed-
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eral government and the exclusiveness of the power of each over certain matters as demar-
cated in the Constitution. (The Guardian, 1 August 2000: 9). 
For Nwabueze, the Act “read like a Decree of the Federal Military Govern-
ment, of which General Obasanjo was head from 1976-1979, a government with 
powers unencumbered and unlimited by the autonomy of the State governments, 
by a federal system of division of powers or by a supreme constitution” (ibid.). In 
the opinion of the learned scholar, therefore, “President Obasanjo’s anti-
corruption crusade deserves our applause and full support, but not at the expense 
of the cardinal principles of our federal system on which depends, to a consider-
able extent, the stability and unity of the country” (ibid.). 
It was against the background of these harsh criticisms, especially from re-
nowned legal experts, that fears were raised about the possibility that such legal 
loopholes or shortcomings might deadlock the application of the Act and, by ex-
tension, the operations of the anti-graft commission. Fears were further raised 
when, in a further challenge to the powers of the commission, Ondo State, a state 
in southwest Nigeria, led eight other states in mounting a challenge in early 2000 
in Nigeria’s highest court, the Supreme Court, challenging the constitutional 
powers of the federal government to extend its anti-corruption dragnet to Ondo 
State, or to any other state for that matter. At the Supreme Court, Ondo State and 
the other allied states, through their lawyer, Chief Rotimi Williams, raised two 
fundamental questions for determination before the court. One was whether or 
not the National Assembly can competently enact laws in furtherance of, or in 
effectuation of, Section 13(5) by virtue of Item 60 (a) of Part One of the exclu-
sive legislative list, in the second schedule to the 1999 Constitution. The second 
was whether or not the provisions of the Act (the anti-graft law of 2000) had im-
peded, encroached upon, or removed the legal rights of the plaintiffs, and if so, 
whether the provisions of the Act were thereby rendered unconstitutional (The 
Guardian, 9 June 2000: 37). 
This legal challenge created considerable problems for the ICPC, as many 
state governments refused to recognise the institution’s existence. Ondo State 
was, of course, one of them. The state had earlier commenced legal proceedings 
against one of its top functionaries, accused of defrauding the state. The accused, 
a commissioner (equivalent to a cabinet minister), tried at the Ondo State Chief 
Magistrate Court, was alleged to have cheated the state by inflating a contract 
from N12 million to N35 million. And barely three days after the case was re-
ported in the media, another senior official of the state government was indicted 
for corrupt practices and accused of paving the way for the grounding of the fleet 
of buses of the state-owned Owena Mass Transport Corporation (OMTC). The 
managing director of the transport corporation was subsequently ordered to re-
turn N8.7 million to the government’s coffers, another full-time director of the 
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company was ordered to refund N230,000, and yet another official was ordered 
to refund N100,000 (The Punch, 2 September 2001: 18). Surprisingly, when the 
ICPC expressed interest in the case, in line with its legal responsibilities as spelt 
out in its enabling law, the Ondo State government refused to transfer the ac-
cused commissioner’s case file for further investigations. In fact, while the legal 
tussle at the Supreme Court lasted, Ondo State government refused to cooperate 
with the commission and even went ahead to bar the anti-graft agency from oper-
ating in Ondo State.  
This kind of open hostility towards the ICPC also came from other states. Im-
mediately after he was sworn into office as chairman of the ICPC, Justice Musta-
pha Akanbi sent letters to each of the 36 state governors to inform them about the 
operations of the commission and solicit their co-operation in this regard. Some 
of the state governments in their reply “said the commission was an unconstitu-
tional body”, while others promised to respond to the commission’s letter in due 
course but never did (Vanguard, 24 May 2002: 16). Thus, even if the critics and 
opponents of the anti-graft law were not rejecting the law in its entirety or oppos-
ing the war against corruption in the country under the Fourth Republic, their ac-
tions and utterances were enough to throw a spanner in the works of the commis-
sion, which became moribund, so to speak, while the legal tussle lasted.  
On 7 June 2002 the Supreme Court, in a highly celebrated and landmark rul-
ing, delivered its verdict in favour of the ICPC, thereby ensuring that the com-
mission made a triumphant exit from the legal shackles which were threatening 
to paralyse the war against corruption. After reviewing the arguments of the pro-
ponents and antagonists, as it were, the Supreme Court ruled that the anti-
corruption Act was validly enacted by the National Assembly. Applying the Blue 
Pencil Rule, it also ruled that only offending sections, viz. Section 26(3) and Sec-
tion 35 of the Act, were invalidated. Section 26(3) prescribes a time frame within 
which all prosecution of criminal offences under the Act must be concluded. The 
section was struck down because it “infringes on the principle of separation of 
powers and therefore is unconstitutional” (The Guardian, 18 June 2002: 76). Sec-
tion 35 was struck down because it empowers the anti-graft commission to arrest 
and detain any person who failed to obey a summons directed to him “until the 
person complies with the Summons” (ibid.). This Section implies that a person 
may be detained indefinitely, contrary to the provisions of the 1999 Constitution. 
The authority of the Attorney General of the Federation or any person authorised 
by the anti-corruption commission to lawfully initiate or authorise the initiation 
of criminal proceedings in any court in Ondo State (a fortiori any part of the 
Federation), in respect of offences created by the Act, was also upheld. By this 
ruling, the court sifted the good from the bad. 
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Armed with this final and conclusive judgment in its favour, the anti-cor-
ruption commission was now expected to forge full-speed ahead in its war to rid 
the country of corrupt practices.  
The powers and resources provided to the ICPC to achieve its mission deserve 
to be highlighted in some detail. 
 
The administrative structures of the ICPC 
The ICPC was inaugurated on 29 September 2001, with Hon. Justice Mustapha 
Akanbi, a well-known jurist and former Appeal Court President, as chairman. 
Specifically, Section 3(4) of its enabling Act provides that “the Chairman shall 
be a person who has held or is qualified to hold office as a judge of a superior 
court of record in Nigeria” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2000a). Similarly, Sec-
tion 4(6) provides for the position of a Secretary appointed by the President, 
whose duty is to keep the records of the commission, and take care of the general 
administration and control of staff. The commission also has as members another 
12 men and women of no less integrity, all nominated by the President, 2 from 
each of the 6 geo-political zones in the country. The commission has its adminis-
trative headquarters in Abuja, the federal capital, and was expected to establish 
branch offices in all the 36 states of the federation in due course. Under Section 
3(12) of the Act, the commission was conferred with the powers to appoint, dis-
miss, and exercise disciplinary control over its staff. 
Being a new organization which was greeted with public pressure from its 
immediate take-off, the commission was faced with some very tough structural 
limitations upon its birth. These included the vital questions of how and from 
where to pool its foundation staff and the issue of office and residential accom-
modation of its key staff. The commission therefore had to commence operations 
initially with a skeletal staff deployed from, among others, the Offices of the Sec-
retary to the Government of the Federation (SGF), the Head of Service, the Po-
lice, and the State Security Service. Lawyers or prosecutors were also seconded 
from relevant institutions to join the commission to enable it commence opera-
tions. The almost unavoidable dependence on the services of staff of some of 
these institutions, which had been grossly tainted with corruption in the past – 
especially the Nigerian Police – became a source of concern for many people. 
However, in the years that followed, the commission moved to effect the re-
cruitment of its own workforce, based on its needs and the level of resources 
available to it. In one such exercise, the commission engaged consultants from 
KPMG, one of the world’s most renowned management firms, to recruit its own 
personnel in 2001.  
Office and residential accommodation were other challenges which the ICPC 
confronted upon its birth in 2000. The commission first began its operation from 
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a temporary site, the boardroom of the defunct Family Economic Advancement 
Programme (FEAP), before gradually moving to take over the offices of the de-
funct Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) (Akambi 2001). In a similar vein, members of 
the commission had to reside in hotels for some time before the commission later 
moved to secure rented residential accommodation for the chairman and mem-
bers of the ICPC’s board, as no government quarters were available when it be-
gan its work. The absence of a well-equipped office and residential accommoda-
tion for the top echelon of such a very important commission, at inception, is an 
indication of the level of official preparedness. As for logistics, the commission 
began with some few refurbished vehicles, inherited from the defunct PTF. How-
ever, the ICPC later acquired its own vehicles for the use of members and staff of 
the commission. 
 
Powers and responsibilities of the ICPC 
The powers and responsibilities of the commission, as defined by the enabling 
law – in this case, The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 – 
are far-reaching. Before the enactment of the 2000 Act, there were other laws 
which dealt with corrupt practices in the country. These laws included the Crimi-
nal Code (which is applicable in the southern states) and the Penal Code (which 
is applicable in the northern states), the Recovery of Public Property (Special 
Military Tribunal Act Cap. 389, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, as 
amended in 1999), the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts and Financial Malprac-
tices in Banks) Decree 1994 (as amended in 1999), and the Code of Conduct Bu-
reau and Tribunal Act, Cap. 56, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. How-
ever, as varied as these laws were, they were believed to be outdated, to the ex-
tent that there are now modern methods of corruption used by the perpetrators of 
corruption which were not contemplated by the lawmakers at the time the older 
statutes were enacted. Detecting these modern methods of corruption, it was 
thought, required state-of-the-art legislation. Furthermore, among other issues, 
these statutes were said to be scattered rather than grouped together conveniently 
and were not comprehensive (Onuogu 2002). The anti-corruption Act of 2000, 
therefore, was able to bring about some orderliness in the laws, putting them in a 
more comprehensive document, and to also fill the lacuna created by the inade-
quacy of the existing laws. 
But what exactly does the Act say about the scope of the ICPC’s powers? And 
how sufficient are these powers? It will not be necessary to examine every aspect 
of the Act here; we will attempt to highlight some of the most important provi-
sions only, with emphasis on those provisions that touch on the powers and re-
sponsibilities of the commission. To begin with, the ICPC Act’s definition of 
corruption, as we have noted, “includes bribery, fraud and other related of-
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fences”. It also defines gratification, under Section 8, to mean “money, donation, 
gift, loan, fee, reward, valuable security, property or interest in property being 
property of any description whether movable or immovable, or any other similar 
advantage, given or promised to any person with intent to influence such a per-
son in the performance or non-performance of his duties”.2 The aim of these 
definitions is obviously to catch within the Act’s ambit all forms of dishonesty 
related to corruption and allied offences. The interpretation section is also impor-
tant because it guides the court in its interpretation of certain words and phrases 
used in the Act, while assisting the commission in determining what conduct 
constitutes corrupt practice.  
The powers and responsibilities of the commission are found in Sections 6(a) 
to (f) of the Act, and they include the following: To receive and investigate com-
plaints from members of the public on allegations of corrupt malpractices and, in 
appropriate cases, prosecute the offenders; to examine the practices, systems, and 
procedures of public bodies, and where such systems aid corruption, to direct and 
supervise their review; and to instruct, advise, and assist any officer, agency, or 
parastatals on the ways fraud or corruption may be eliminated or minimised by 
them. The ICPC was also empowered to advise heads of public bodies of any 
changes in practices, systems, or procedures – compatible with the effective dis-
charge of the duties of public bodies – that would reduce the likelihood or inci-
dence of bribery, corruption, and related offences, educate the public on and 
against bribery, corruption, and related offences, and enlist and foster public sup-
port in combating corruption (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2000a). 
The ICPC, as we have said, was also to hire its own staff and organize them in 
the manner it deemed fit. To achieve this goal, the commission created various 
departments and committees, which were charged with the responsibilities of car-
rying out different aspects of its duties. For instance, pursuant to Section 6 of the 
Act, the board of the commission was organized into three general committees. 
The first dealt with investigation and prosecution; the second dealt with the study 
of the systems, practices, and procedures at parastatals, public institutions, and 
the like; and the third took charge of public enlightenment and education. Each 
committee has a member of the commission as its chairman. The chairman of the 
                                                 
2  This provision was often interpreted by the ICPC to mean that it was not empowered to initiate any 
investigation on mere suspicion of corruption. In other words, even if it has sufficient evidence indi-
cating that an offence of corruption has been committed, investigation and prosecution will have to 
wait until a complaint is received from a member of the public. The consequence of this interpretation 
was that individuals or officials who were known to be living above their legitimate incomes contin-
ued to enjoy their loot, to the irritation of members of the public. The commission often justified its 
refusal to investigate such cases on the basis that it had not received any petition against these indi-
viduals.  
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ICPC was the chairman of the investigation and prosecution committee during 
the period under review (Tell Magazine, 3 June 2002: 33). 
Furthermore, the Act in Sections 8-26 created a wide range of punishments for 
offences which include acceptance of gratification by an official, corrupt offers to 
public officers (by private individuals, for example), corrupt demand by persons, 
and offences related to corrupt and fraudulent acquisition of property. Others are 
penalties for offences committed through postal systems, deliberate frustration of 
investigation by the commission, making false statement or returns, gratification 
by and through agents, bribery of public officers, the offence of using office or 
position for gratification, bribery in relation to auction, bribery for providing as-
sistance in regard to contracts, failure to report bribery transactions, dealing with, 
using, holding, receiving, or concealing gratification, making of statements 
which are intended to mislead the commission, and conspiracy. The penalties for 
these offences ranged between one and ten years’ imprisonment, with the option 
of a fine.. 
In order to eliminate all forms of corruption, especially the modern methods of 
perpetration, and render the commission and its fight against corruption more ef-
fective, the Act also contained provisions or unique clauses: One provision limits 
the time within which offences of corruption can be tried to 90 working days, 
with a proviso to extend the time when good grounds exist (Section 26(3));3 an-
other provides that special judges of the High Court be designated to try only 
corruption cases (Section 26(2) and Section 61(3)), in order to accelerate the 
speed of trials, bearing in mind the snail speed of the Nigerian judicial system; 
another provision requires the protection of witnesses and their evidence (Section 
64). Others are the clauses allowing for presumption in certain cases, notably in 
connection with giving or receiving of gratification, which can be presumed to 
have occurred for a corrupt motive once it is proved that it had been given or re-
ceived in the first place (Sections 53 and 54); a clause stating that evidence shall 
not be admissible to show that gratification is customary in any profession, trade, 
vocation, or calling, or on a social occasion (Section 60). There were also provi-
sions which provided for punishment for the following: Inflation of the price of 
goods or services above the prevailing market price or professional standard 
(Section 22(3)); the award of contracts without budgetary provisions, approvals, 
and cash backing (Section 22(4)); the transfer or the spending of money for a 
particular project or service on another project (Section 22(5)); and, of course, 
the failure to report bribery transactions (Section 23(3)).  
Sections 27 to 42 of the Act grant the commission wide powers to perform and 
enforce these provisions, including the powers to investigate, search, seize (any 
                                                 
3  This provision was later declared null and void by the Supreme Court of Nigeria, which reasoned that 
it encroached on the powers of the judiciary. 
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property which is the subject of investigation), and arrest (any suspect), if it 
deems this to be necessary in its investigations. These powers may be exercised 
upon the receipt of report(s) made orally or in writing by any member of the pub-
lic to an officer of the commission. In practice, the investigation department is 
assigned the responsibility to investigate any such report, and after investigation, 
cases are referred to the prosecution department if there are sufficient facts to 
prosecute. Officers of the commission investigating cases enjoy some immunity 
and are conferred with special powers under Section 5(1) of the Act, which pro-
vides that “(s)ubject to the provisions of this Act, an officer of the commission 
when investigating or prosecuting a case of corruption shall have all the powers 
and immunities of a police officer under the Police Act and other laws conferring 
power on the police, or empowering and protecting law enforcement agent”. 
In theory, prosecution of an offence under the ICPC Act is supposed to be ini-
tiated by the Attorney General of the Federation or any person or authority to 
whom he delegates this authority (Section 26 (2)). However, Section 61(1) of the 
Act also states that every prosecution for an offence under the Act or any other 
law prohibiting bribery and corruption will be deemed to be performed with the 
consent of the Attorney General.  
The comprehensive nature of the Act – that is, the wide scope of offences cre-
ated under it – appeared to be intended to bring within its ambit all forms of dis-
honesty related to corruption and allied offences, taking into consideration Nige-
ria’s past experiences. Similarly, the wide powers granted to the commission by 
the Act seemed not to be a mere accident, but a deliberate intention to make the 
commission not just a dog that barks, but also one that bites. Indeed, in the con-
text of a legal framework for combating corruption, there appeared to be ade-
quately worded provisions in the Act for tackling most aspects of corruption per-
vading public and business life in Nigeria. Nevertheless, as wide as its powers 
may appear to be on the surface, the ICPC Act – and as a consequence, the ICPC 
itself – faced at least two potential challenges which became increasingly obvi-
ous as time went on. 
The first problem was that the ICPC was precluded from investigating cases 
that occurred before 13 June 2000. In other words, because the anti-corruption 
Act was signed into law on 13 June 2000, any offence of corruption that was 
committed before that date cannot be prosecuted by the commission. According 
to Section 61(2) of the Act, such corrupt acts could only be prosecuted by the al-
ready existing anti-crime bodies.4 Indeed, pursuant to this legal provision, several 
                                                 
4  Section 61 (2) of the ICPC Act 2000 states that “(w)ithout prejudice to any other laws prohibiting 
bribery, corruption, fraud or any other related offences by public officers or other persons, a public of-
ficer or any other person may be prosecuted by the appropriate authority for an offence of bribery, 
corruption, fraud or any other related offences committed by such public officer or other person con-
26 
 
cases of corruption reported to the ICPC were referred to the Federal Director of 
Public Prosecutions and his counterparts in the individual Nigerian states or to 
the police, as the case may be. This legal provision not only contrasted with best 
practices around the world,5 it made little sense in Nigeria. The commission’s in-
ability to investigate and prosecute former officials became a major source of le-
gitimacy crisis for it. A second loophole was that the ICPC law had deliberately 
excluded several criminal acts taking place outside the public sector (bank 
frauds, money laundering, tax fraud, etc.), which most Nigerians considered to be 
corruption.  
Given these challenges, it was not surprising that the Obasanjo government 
soon came under intense public criticism and diplomatic pressure, notably from 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),6 which threatened to impose sanctions 
if perceived short-comings in Nigeria’s anti-corruption legislation were not cor-
rected (Abdullahi 2004). This was the basis for the establishment of the EFCC, 
which subsequently became the dominant anti-graft body in Nigeria.  
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
The EFCC was first proposed by a 2002 law, the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Act 2002,7 but came into existence only on 11 April 2003.8 Unlike the ICPC, the 
birth of the EFCC witnessed little or no controversy. Although its enabling Act 
contained far more ‘draconian’ powers than those of the ICPC, its passage in the 
National Assembly still proceeded almost without any political challenge. There 
are two explanations for this paradoxical situation. Firstly, being legislation that 
was more or less imposed by powerful international interests, it could not have 
faced the same kind of political opposition or legislative scrutiny which the ICPC 
Act attracted. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the EFCC bill was not 
considered a threat by Nigeria’s political class, who erroneously interpreted it as 
a weapon against fraudsters in the banking industry or individuals specialising in 
advance-fee fraud (commonly known as “419” in Nigeria).9 It was in an open 
                                                 
trary to any laws in force before or after the coming into effect of this Act and nothing in this Act shall 
be construed to derogate from or undermine the right or authority of any person or authority to prose-
cute offenders under any other laws”. ICPC Act 2000 op cit. 
5  In Hong Kong and Singapore, for instance, anti-corruption agencies can, under specific circumstances, 
investigate and prosecute cases committed even before the establishment of an anti-corruption body.  
6  The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established to promote and 
enforce national and international policies and legislation designed to combat money laundering. Its 
headquarters in located in Paris. 
7  This Act was subsequently replaced by the Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Act 2004. 
8  Before this date, the government’s war against economic and financial crimes was mainly conducted 
by an ad-hoc body known as the National Committee on Economic and Financial Crimes. 
9  419 is a financial crime which derives its name from Section 419 of Nigeria’s criminal code, which 
criminalises any act designed to obtain money under false pretext. Also known as advance-fee fraud 
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admission of this fact that a former Speaker of Nigeria’s lower legislative house, 
the House of Representatives, Ghali Umar Na’abba, said that the “EFCC was 
meant to fight 419 and money laundering. It was never intended to be an institu-
tion to fight corruption in public places. That duty is for ICPC” (ThisDay, 6 Feb-
ruary 2006). Thus, right from the beginning, the EFCC enjoyed far higher finan-
cial and political support from the executive arm of government and indeed the 
international community. This level of support translated into a more robust ad-
ministrative structure and a confident leadership willing to step on toes on some 
occasions.  
 
Powers and responsibilities of the EFCC 
Just like the ICPC, the powers and responsibilities of the EFCC are contained in 
different sections of its enabling Act. According to the Act, the commission is 
specifically charged with the responsibility of conducting investigations into 
crimes of a financial and economic nature,10 such as 419, money laundering, 
counterfeiting, capital and market fraud, cyber crimes, credit-card frauds, con-
tract frauds, and terrorism and terrorism financing, as outlined in Section 6. The 
commission can equally enforce other previously existing legislation touching on 
economic and financial crimes.11 The EFCC is also enjoined in Section 6 of the 
Act to take all necessary measures to prevent and eradicate economic and finan-
cial crimes in Nigeria. This will include identifying, monitoring, freezing, or con-
fiscating proceeds (funds and properties) from criminal activities such as terror-
ism and financial and economic crimes, and collaborating with similar institu-
tions abroad, especially in the area of research, investigations, exchanges of per-
sonnel, international mutual legal assistance (for extradition), and prosecutions. 
Similarly, the EFCC is expected to promote the coordination of, and maintain 
close ties with, all Nigerian institutions charged with investigating economic and 
financial crimes, such as the Police, Ministry of Justice, Customs, Immigration, 
Prisons, Central Bank of Nigeria, and National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA), to mention just a few. Another important task assigned to the com-
mission is to educate and enlighten the general public and solicit their support for 
the war against economic and financial crimes.  
                                                 
or confidence trick, 419 is a scam in which the target is usually persuaded, through emails or any other 
tool of communication, to advance sums of money in the hope of realizing a significantly larger gain. 
10  See Section 46 of the EFCC Act, 2004 op cit. 
11  Specifically, the Act in Section 7 (2) states that “in addition to the powers conferred on the Commis-
sion by this Act, the Commission shall be the coordinating agency for the enforcement of the provi-
sions of the Money Laundering Act of 2004; 2003 No. 7. 1995 No. 13; the Advance Fee Fraud and 
Other Related Offences Act 1995; the Failed Bank (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in 
Banks Act, as amended; the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 1991, as amended; Miscella-
neous Offences Act; and any other law or regulation relating to economic and financial crimes, includ-
ing the Criminal Code and Penal Code”. EFCC Act 2004 op cit. 
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Apart from its powers to coordinate all the other regulatory and security agen-
cies involved in the eradication of economic and financial crimes, which permits 
it to assume a sort of ‘position of superiority’ relative to the concerned institu-
tions, the EFCC differs from the ICPC in at least two important respects relative 
to the scope of its powers. In the first place, it did not misinterpret its liberty to 
commence investigations and even prosecutions – if and when it had reason to 
suspect that an individual or institution had committed or had infringed upon any 
of the economic and financial crimes’ laws – by waiting to receive a formal peti-
tion, as was the case with the ICPC. This meant that the EFCC was able to act in 
a more proactive manner to bring corrupt individuals to book before they had 
sufficient time to cover their tracks. The second point is that the powers of the 
EFCC are retroactive, in the sense that offences committed in the past (before the 
establishment of the commission) can be investigated, and any person suspected 
of illegal enrichment or illicit financial transaction and – better still – any person 
possessing unexplained wealth relative to his legitimate income can be brought to 
court. Thirdly, the powers of the EFCC cover both the private and the public sec-
tors. These wide powers were complemented by fairly broad administrative 
structures. 
 
The administrative structures of the EFCC 
In comparison with other institutions charged with eradicating corruption and 
crime, (ICPC, Code of Conduct Bureau, NDLEA, NAFDAC, etc.) the EFCC dis-
tinguishes itself not only by the extensive scope of its powers but also by its in-
clusive administrative structures. As is the case with the ICPC, members of the 
board of the EFCC, including its chairman (an executive chairman), must be very 
experienced personalities with impeccable character, nominated by the President 
and then confirmed by the Senate. However, apart from the EFCC chairman, who 
must possess at least 15 years of professional experience acquired in a security 
organization, the other members of the commission must include the heads, or 
their representatives, of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Justice. Others included are from the NDLEA, Na-
tional Intelligence Agency (NIA), State Security Services (SSS), Corporate Af-
fairs Commission (CAC), Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria 
(SEC), Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), Nigerian Insurance 
Commission (NIC), Nigerian Postal Service (NPS), National Communications 
Commission (NCC), Nigerian Customs Service, Immigration, and the Nigerian 
Police Force. 
The chairman is assisted by a secretary general, who is the head of administra-
tion, and a team of six directors in charge of each of its departments: Organiza-
tional Support, Financial Crimes Intelligence, Advance-Fee Fraud and Other 
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Economic Crimes, Intelligence, Enforcement and General Operations, and Prose-
cutions and Legal Council and Training School. The EFCC chairman is also 
placed in charge of a large bureaucratic structure, which in 2006 included some 
800 personnel. The figure was about 500 during its first year of existence. The 
EFCC’s staff profile was thus better than that at the ICPC. These permanent em-
ployees were housed in its imposing administrative headquarters in the federal 
capital, Abuja, and regional offices (in Lagos and Port Harcourt) which became 
functional in 2005. 
The size and effectiveness of any organization depends largely on the level of 
funding. While comprehensive and comparative data on the finances of both the 
EFCC and the ICPC are unavailable, anecdotal evidence points to a superior 
level of finance for the EFCC. According to our data, the EFCC received over 
N700 million ($5 million) in public subvention during its first year and N1.1 bil-
lion ($8 million) in its second (ThisDay, 4 June 2005). By contrast, the ICPC re-
ceived only about N500 million ($3 million) on average between 2000 and 2004. 
What accounted for this huge gap in funding between the EFCC and the ICPC? 
The different approaches to sourcing for funds by the two organizations were 
partly responsible for this wide gap in funding. While the EFCC enthusiastically 
welcomed funding from a variety of local (usually public) and international insti-
tutions, the ICPC on the other hand accepted assistance only from international 
organizations, which must be in non-monetary form (for example, training of 
ICPC personnel, supply of equipment, and payment for ICPC programmes). Ac-
cording to ICPC officials, this is to protect the integrity of the organization and 
avoid putting it in an awkward position when the anti-graft body is called upon to 
investigate an official of such donor organizations.12 Similarly, outside the provi-
sion that required the National Assembly to appropriate funds for its operations, 
the ICPC Act is virtually silent on the question of other sources of funding for the 
commission. On the other hand, Section 35(2) of the EFCC Act provides that in 
addition to statutory allocation to be approved by the National Assembly, “the 
Commission may accept gifts of land, money or other property whether within or 
outside Nigeria upon such terms and conditions, if any, as may be specified by 
the person or organization making the gift provided that the terms and conditions 
are not contrary to the objectives and functions of the Commission”.  
Conclusion 
From all indications, President Obasanjo considered the setting up of new anti-
corruption commissions as key to actualising his goal of fighting corruption in 
                                                 
12  This information was provided during my interview with Mr Mike Sowe, ICPC’s Head of Public 
Enlightenment, in Abuja in November 2004.  
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Nigeria. This was demonstrated by his establishing first the ICPC and then the 
EFCC, notwithstanding widespread political opposition. These two commissions, 
however, were not endowed with the same levels of legal powers and administra-
tive structures, as a result of the different circumstances of their birth and fund-
ing. As should be expected, these differences in level of funding, administrative 
structures, and scope of powers had substantial impacts on the achievements of 
these two institutions. But before looking at the performances of these bodies, let 
us first examine the other reform measures put in place by the Obasanjo govern-
ment to fight corrupt practices. 
 
 
 3 
Judicial and public service reform  
Introduction 
Over the years, the Public Service Commission at Federal and State Levels lost the values on 
which they were established. Merit was sacrificed for expediency and opportunism. Retrain-
ing of hired staff hardly took place. It allowed so-called “ghost workers” to infiltrate the ser-
vice and ended up with a payroll that was totally at variance with output or productivity. 
Parastatals were mismanaged, looted, and so badly run that they became an embarrassment 
to norms of efficiency, productivity, management, and probity … The proliferation of para-
statals as well as the creation of several agencies had resulted in unnecessary duplications of 
functions and in some cases mandates. – President Olusegun Obasanjo. (The Guardian, 3 
August 2004) 
A good, fair and fearless judiciary instils discipline in the people. A bad or corrupt judici-
ary is unworthy of a democratic society and is capable of destabilising the society and thus 
breeding anarchy.  – Chief Justice Mohammed Uwais. (Daily Independent, 27 July 2004) 
Despite their vaunted potency, it is now widely assumed that specialised 
commissions against corruption are not sufficient alone for fighting corruption, 
especially where corruption is systemic or endemic (Gould & Amaro-Reyes 
1983; Rose-Ackernan 1996; Mény 1997; Stapenhurst & Langseth 1997; World 
Bank 2000). Anti-corruption commissions – ex post curative measures – must be 
complemented by a general reform of the public bureaucracy, including the judi-
ciary – ex ante preventive measures – if they are to be effective. The measures 
taken by the Obasanjo government to reform Nigeria’s public services and judi-
ciary have been rooted in this logic. What exactly were the measures taken? And 
where did they originate from? In this chapter, two types of reforms will be con-
sidered. The first type involves all the major reforms directed at public agencies 
under the direct control of the executive arm of government. We will call these 
‘public service reforms’. The second type concerns reforms taking place within 
agencies of the judicial arm of government, and we will refer to these as ‘judicial 
reforms’. 
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Public service reforms 
During the years that preceded President Obasanjo’s rise to power, Nigeria’s 
public services became plagued by various forms of inefficiency and corruption. 
These were not new phenomena. Three decades earlier, similar issues had pro-
voked calls for reforms or restructuring, culminating in the ‘great purge’ of 1975-
76 by the military government of General Murtala Mohammed, in which over 
11,000 public servants lost their jobs (Ereho & Oladoyin 2000). Unfortunately, 
this purge and subsequent reforms failed to curtail the corruption and inefficiency 
of the public sector (Aina 1982). Many of the reforms proposed were not com-
prehensive enough – for instance, they often focussed merely on higher pay for 
civil servants (Mohammed 2003). Others were frequently abandoned midway 
through for political reasons. A typical example was the Shehu Shagari regime, 
which had, following a severe economic crisis in the early 1980s, constituted a 
panel on the reform/reorganization of public parastatals and companies in 1982. 
The commission recommended the privatisation of most state companies, to be 
quickly followed by an increase in the role of the private sector as a way of get-
ting out of the crisis (Osaghae 1995: 24). These recommendations, like most oth-
ers, were never implemented before the regime was toppled in a military coup on 
31 December 1983. The subsequent implementation in the mid-1980s of the rec-
ommendations of Shagari’s panel, under the title of ‘Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme’, did little to alter the decay in Nigerian public services, a decay which 
had reached an unprecedented height in 1999 by the time President Obasanjo was 
elected.   
To correct these issues, the Obasanjo administration announced a new series 
of reform measures, to be coordinated by a permanent institution, the Public Ser-
vice Reform Bureau (PSRB) (The Guardian, 12 February 2004). The goal of 
these reforms was first and foremost to reduce the incentives for corruption, 
through the elimination of monopolies by privatising and deregulating, the elimi-
nation of discretion by streamlining functions and reinforcing controls, and the 
removal of administrative opacity by increasing transparency and accountability, 
especially in public revenue collection and expenditure. The aggressive imple-
mentation of such policies was expected to reduce the opportunities for corrup-
tion among public officials. Our analysis in this section will not cover all aspects 
of the reforms implemented, but only the most important ones: Accelerated pri-
vatisation of public enterprises, reform of the management of public finance, and 
the adoption of a new policy on employment and compensation in the public ser-
vice, also known as ‘professionalisation’ and ‘rightsizing’. 
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Privatisation of public enterprises 
One of the most important reform policies of the Obasanjo administration was 
privatisation of public enterprises, defined as the “divestment by the (Federal) 
Government of part or all of its ordinary shareholding in designated enterprises” 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria 2000b: 2). Privatisation of public enterprises was 
conceived not only as a strategy for promoting economic growth and rapid de-
velopment but also as an effective means of fighting corruption. The argument of 
the government, according to Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, was that “a more 
efficient economy driven by the private sector would not give room for corrupt 
practices witnessed in the public sector” (The Guardian, 8 June 2004). Privatisa-
tion, according to the government, 
permits governments to concentrate resources on their core functions and responsibilities, 
while enforcing the ‘rules of the game’ so that the markets can work efficiently, with provi-
sion of adequate security and basic infrastructure, as well as ensuring access to key services 
like education, health and environmental protection. The objective is to assist in restructuring 
the public sector in a manner that will affect a new synergy between a leaner and more effi-
cient government and a revitalized, efficient and service-oriented private sector. (Obasanjo 
1999: 4) 
Although the sale of government businesses is now commonly associated with 
the Obasanjo administration, privatisation is not a recent phenomenon in Nigeria. 
On the contrary, its origin goes back to the Ibrahim Babangida military regime 
(1985-93), which adopted the policy as part of a Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme imposed on developing countries by the Bretton Woods institutions 
(IMF and World Bank) as a conditionality for negotiating the debts which be-
came unsustainable during the economic crises in the 1980s (Biersteker & Lewis 
1997; Umoren 2001; Dibie 2004). Nigeria is believed to have invested over $100 
billion in its diverse public enterprises, which numbered around 600 at federal 
level and employed some 420,000 persons by 1993 (Jerome 2003). Return on in-
vestments in these enterprises was said to be 10% at most. Indeed, these busi-
nesses were largely responsible for Nigeria’s external debt, which reached $36 
billion in 2005. According to the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), the institu-
tion charged with supervising the sale of these enterprises, $19.8 billion, repre-
senting 55% of Nigeria’s external debts, were in fact incurred to finance these 
enterprises. Of that sum, some $1.5 billion was borrowed to finance the construc-
tion of Hilton Hotels ($300 million), Sheraton Hotels ($250 million), and some 
Paper Mills ($1 billion) alone. According to the BPE, the rate of return on these 
investments was only 0.5%, while their contribution to budgetary deficit repre-
sented 5% of GDP in 1998. As a matter of fact, with the exception of the Nige-
rian Insurance Corporation (NICON) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), 
none of the state companies or corporations had been profitable. This is notwith-
standing the fact that they collectively received statutory transfers to the tune $3 
34 
 
billion in 1998, $800 million in 1999, $1.4 billion in 2000, and $4 billion in 2001 
(ThisDay, 28 April 2005).  
Despite this disappointing record, along with the collapse of course of some of 
the most costly state firms – such as Nigeria Airways, Nigerian National Ship-
ping Line, and Nigerian Railways Corporation – and the critical state of others – 
for example, the refineries, Nigeria Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), and 
the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) – the privatisation of inefficient 
state enterprises was never faithfully implemented by Obasanjo’s predecessors. 
The policy was abandoned midway by the Babangida regime, which had initially 
embraced it, and then by its successor the Abacha government, which showed 
even less interest in the policy. These regimes were pressurised to drop the policy 
both by the Nigerian political class, used to seeing appointments to public office 
(including onto the boards of public enterprises) as a principal source of political 
patronage, and by an increasingly impoverished civil society, who saw the in-
visible hands of some foreign actors bent on violating the sovereignty of their na-
tion and fostering inequality and mass poverty in Nigeria (Biersteker & Lewis 
1997). During his brief period in power, General Abdusalami Abubakar, who 
rose to power in June 1998 following the sudden demise of General Sani Abacha, 
promised to resuscitate the policy before the re-establishment of civil democratic 
rule planned for May 1999. This promise, however, which was applauded by Ni-
geria’s creditors in the West and international financial institutions (Obadina 
1998), went unfulfilled. Even if the regime had overcome domestic political 
pressure against the policy, time and the presence of other pressing priorities 
(such as the transition to a civilian-rule programme) would not have allowed for 
the implementation of any meaningful privatisation programme.  
The arrival of President Obasanjo in May 1999 marked the revival of the pri-
vatisation programme. Obasanjo’s vision was influenced by three factors: the 
works of influential scholars, successful privatisations elsewhere, and of course 
the pressures of international financial institutions. Despite some pessimism as to 
the efficacy of privatisation as an anti-corruption tool (Watt et al. 2000; White-
head 2000), many scholars and anti-corruption experts had continued to empha-
sise its benefits. Rose-Ackerman (1996: 3), for instance, argued that “if a parasta-
tal that is the locus of corrupt payoffs is moved into the private sector, those pay-
offs will end … Policies that lower the controls on foreign trade, remove entry 
barriers for private industry, and privatise state firms in a way that assures com-
petition, all contribute to the fight against corruption”. Some of the proponents of 
privatisation, however, have suggested that privatisation policy is likely to suc-
ceed only if accompanied by other specific changes, such as adoption of a new 
management order and new regulations and principles of production. These in 
turn will be facilitated by the putting in place of external controls – that is, the 
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transfer of ownership rights to foreign investors (Bafoil 1999). Empirical data 
have also been supplied by some Africanists to show the long-term benefits of 
privatisation. According to one such study, despite some deficits at the level of 
job creation, privatisation has largely ameliorated the condition of privatised 
firms in several countries in Africa, including Nigeria, Benin, Mozambique, and 
Uganda. In the particular case of Nigeria, “changes in management and labour 
practices led to improved enterprise performance and increase in shares prices” 
(Makalou 1999: 15). 
Successful privatisations in other emerging economies also had salutary ef-
fects on President Obasanjo. Since the 1980s, a considerable number of coun-
tries, notably in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and re-
cently Africa, have embraced the policy of privatisation of state enterprises on 
the conviction not only that it will raise the overall efficiency of the privatised 
firms, but also that it will lead to a reduction in the level of corruption (Schleifer 
& Vishny 1993; Olson 1996; Ades & Di Tella 1997; Kaufmann & Siegelbaum 
1997; Rose-Ackerman 1999). The fact that the successes of these nations did not 
escape President Obasanjo’s attention was evident in the following comments:  
State enterprises suffer from fundamental problems of defective capital structure, excessive 
bureaucratic control or intervention, inappropriate technology, gross incompetence and mis-
management, blatant corruption and crippling complacency which monopoly engenders. In-
evitably, these shortcomings take a heavy toll on the national economy. The problems asso-
ciated with state-owned enterprises and monopolies are not peculiar to Nigeria. It is true, 
however, that many developing countries have overcome the problems through a well-
designed and single-minded pursuit of privatization programme. (Obasanjo 1999: 4) 
While President Obasanjo, like other leaders before him, continued to deny 
that privatisation was embarked upon to satisfy powerful foreign interests, it re-
mains true that attempts to sell off wasteful and inefficient state companies is not 
just about a rational economic decision born out of enlightened self-interest. Ni-
geria, like other highly indebted poor countries, was more or less compelled to 
embrace privatisation, one of the preconditions fixed by her creditors for the 
much-sought-after debt relief (Obadina 1998). Pressures from these actors did 
not cease until Obasanjo began to implement the policy (cf. Osaghae 1995). But 
how far did Obasanjo go in his quest to sell Nigeria’s moribund public enter-
prises, and what challenges confronted him? How did the administration over-
come pressures from the political class and civil society – particularly from la-
bour, who are historically against privatisation? 
During the inauguration of the National Council on Privatisation on 20 July 
1999, President Obasanjo identified three steps or phases to be followed by his 
privatisation programme. The first phase, running from June to December 1999, 
was the privatisation of banks and cement factories already quoted on the stock 
exchange. The second phase was the sale of hotels, vehicle assembly plants, etc. 
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Then the third and final phase was to see the privatisation of the largest state 
companies and corporations, such as the National Electric Power Authority 
(NEPA), Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), Nigeria Airways, fer-
tiliser plants, and the petroleum refineries (Obasanjo 1999: 6). The administra-
tion approached the exercise with such speed that by the end of 2006, very few 
companies were unsold as against a total of 95 marked for either full or partial 
privatisation in 2000-01. The sales helped save the government some $4 billion 
in 2004 alone, representing the amount that was given to these institutions in the 
form of state support the previous year (ThisDay, 28 April 2005). This progress, 
however, did not outweigh the negative aspects of the policy. Progress was not as 
rapid as one may be tempted to assume, nor was it uniform across the three tiers 
of government. Some of the biggest enterprises were never privatised by the time 
Obasanjo left office in May 2007. More importantly, the whole process was not 
as transparent as the proponents of privatisation often presented it.  
First, Nigeria, a federation with 36 state governments and 774 local govern-
ments, is such a huge and complex country that a single policy is hardly applica-
ble across the whole country. While the federal government was quick in privat-
izing its own companies, the situation in the states and local councils remained 
unclear. While some state governments pursued their own privatisation plans, 
others were busy creating new business. To cite one example: In the north-central 
state of Nasarawa, an eight-man panel was inaugurated by Governor Abdullahi 
Adamu on 10 November 2003 to privatise the state’s enterprises. Seven of these 
enterprises were slated to be sold by the end of 2005 (ThisDay, 1 March 2005). 
But in the south-south state of Delta, which retained approximately N17.7 billion 
in investments in various private business concerns at 13 December 2004, includ-
ing N9.5 billion in one of Nigeria’s mobile phone operators (V Mobile Nigeria 
Limited), politicians were taking a completely different direction. In its 2005 
budget, this state announced it was setting aside a further N5 billion (out of a 
budget of N106 billion) for the creation of commercial enterprises with the aim 
of creating employment for the youth in the state. Conscious of the folly of its 
decision, the state government was quick to emphasise that “within a given pe-
riod, once the businesses stabilize, then we remove our participation before po-
litical interferences begin to impact on the business” (ThisDay, 12 March 2005). 
At a second level, in spite of its often-restated commitment, the Obasanjo gov-
ernment did not succeed in privatizing the largest enterprises, which were coinci-
dently the most inefficient firms. The electricity company (NEPA, now known as 
Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN)) and the refineries1 are the most 
relevant here. Part of the reason, as we have said, was the politics of patronage. 
                                                 
1  Nigeria operates a total of four oil refineries (Kaduna, Warri, Port Harcourt I, and Port Harcourt II). 
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The Nigerian political class (especially from the southeast and north of the coun-
try) opposed or tried to halt the privatisation train, owing to the fear that privati-
sation would most certainly exacerbate the concentration of economic wealth in 
the hands of elites from rival ethnic groups (such as the Yoruba of the southwest) 
considered to be more economically advanced (Osaghae 1995). They also collec-
tively feared losing a vital source of political patronage provided by these institu-
tions, which offered some 5,000 political appointments in their commissions and 
boards of directors (Anya 2003). One example occurred in April 2001, when a 
planned privatisation of the debt-ridden Nigeria Airways was halted following 
the strong opposition of some members of the House of Representatives, the sec-
ond chamber of the National Assembly (BBC News, April 2001). This decision 
prompted a World Bank team, advising the government on the privatisation pol-
icy, to depart in protest, citing “slow progress, refusal of the government to heed 
its advice and resistance to the sale of Nigerian Airways”. The government was 
able to liquidate the airline only in 2004, when all its aircraft became grounded.  
A third factor concerns the limited interest shown in the enterprises slated for 
privatisation by the foreign investors often preferred by the government. Outside 
the upstream sector of the petroleum industry, foreign investors showed limited 
interest in Nigeria, despite its immense potential. As a rule, foreign investments 
in Africa and Nigeria in particular largely favour the extractive sector, notably 
the oil and mining sectors (The Economist, 24 June 2006; UNCTAD 2006). In-
deed, frequent appearance in opinion polls of the world’s most corrupt countries, 
poor regulatory environment, decayed public infrastructures, and frequent violent 
ethno-religious conflicts appear to have conspired to rob the country of investors’ 
interest. The administration’s failed attempt to privatise the four refineries, sym-
bols of Nigeria’s endemic corruption, is emblematic of this situation. One news-
paper editorial dutifully summarised the problem of the refineries:  
The government’s efforts have met little success. The government is finding it difficult to 
sell the four refineries, which are being portrayed as worthless in their current state … Inves-
tigations revealed that the government made an unsuccessful bid to get the oil majors (Shell, 
Chevron-Texaco and Mobil) to take up the offer of acquiring 51 percent stake and partner 
the government in managing the refineries … The oil majors are demanding wide-ranging 
liberalisation (removal of fuel subsidy) and full control of the refineries’ management before 
considering buying them. Government’s attempt to implement these demands has sparked 
off unrest. (AfroNews, 5 August 2004) 
The privatisation of state assets was also dented by allegations of massive cor-
ruption and favouritism. The process was heavily criticised for the lack of trans-
parency which characterised the selection of buyers and consultants, the under-
valuing of assets on sale, and even conflicts of interest where officials bought up 
assets using fronts (Anyi-Ude 2005). These allegations were repeated by differ-
ent sources during the sale of companies such as the Aluminium Smelter Com-
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pany (ALSCON) located in Ikot Abasi, Akwa Ibom State (ThisDay, 29 April 
2005), and especially NITEL (ThisDay, 26 April 2005).  
By and large, these obstacles and challenges did not detract from other gains 
recorded in the privatisation project, especially at the federal level. In the final 
analysis, the success of the privatisation programme will depend on its contribu-
tion to the reduction in the level of waste and corruption in the public sector, 
which was the original intention of its initiators. This in itself will depend to 
some extent on the successful implementation of other aspects of the reforms 
proposed for the public sector, such as a reform of the management of public fi-
nance and the adoption of a new policy on employment and compensation. 
 
Reform of the management of public finance:  
The Budgetary and Fiscal Transparency Initiative (BFTI) 
Before the advent of civilian rule in 1999, the concept of budgetary or fiscal 
transparency in the management of public finances was almost non-existent (Alli 
2005; Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999b). This permitted assorted fraud and 
abuses, including massive diversion of state resources, illegal award of contracts, 
and tax fraud, to flourish unchecked. Contract awards, particularly, gave public 
officials unlimited opportunities to enrich themselves through the construction of 
white-elephant projects2 and price inflation and kick-backs.3 The relative absence 
of taxpayers and a culture of secrecy, induced by decades of military rule, un-
dermined the capacity of the population to demand financial accountability from 
leaders. Determined to eliminate such waste and abuses, the Obasanjo admini-
stration embraced a number of policy measures, including the adoption and ap-
plication of financial regulations relating to public procurement, the publication 
of all revenues and transfers accruing to the three levels of government (federal, 
state and local), and the monetisation of the benefits of public officials. 
 
Transparent and strict application of financial regulations  
relating to public procurement: The due process regime 
In January 2000, a document titled Preface to Financial Regulations was re-
leased by the federal government. The document painted a sorry picture of the 
state of public finances in Nigeria, while highlighting the need for urgent reform. 
                                                 
2  On 21 June 1999, a Panel on Non-Performing or Failed Contracts was instituted to study all federal 
projects launched between 1 January 1976 and 31 December 1998. The report of the study, which was 
submitted in November 2002, found that 1,651 projects had been abandoned by firms which had been 
paid varying sums to execute these projects. Most of these firms were linked to ‘big men’, who disap-
peared after receiving the payments (see Annex I). 
3  In June 2006, the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit, a national institution set up to check 
contract inflation, reported that it had saved about N40 billion ($330,000) after closely scrutinizing 
bids submitted for public purchases and contracts. 
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To correct some of the observed deficiencies, a study by the World Bank and a 
group of local experts was commissioned by the administration. Accordingly, 
the comprehensive review of the country’s public procurement system covered the existing 
legal framework; organisational responsibilities and capabilities within government; present 
procedures and practices; the reliability of government accounting systems and the effective-
ness of budgeting systems in directing resources for intended purposes. Comparisons were 
made in each of these areas on how practices in Nigeria differ from established international 
best practices. A participatory approach was used for the review, which involved all key 
stakeholders, including Federal, State and Local Governments together with representatives 
of the private sector. (Ekpenkhio 2003: 1) 
After a painstaking review, the study concluded:  
Nigeria lacks a modern law … to provide guidance and monitor purchasing entities; the Fi-
nance (Control and Management) Act (1958), and … regulations which set basic rules for 
managing public expenditures have gaps, deficiencies and faulty implementations … which 
create opportunities for bribery and corruption; due to inflation and lack of regular adjust-
ments on the thresholds of the approving limits of the Tender Boards, their authorizations 
were constantly being eroded resulting in abuses; there was proliferation of tender boards 
which were perceived by the private sector as sources of delays and non-transparency … 
Customs systems and procedures were cumbersome and major causes of delay in clearing 
goods, and hence a source of corruption; and procurement is often carried out by staff who 
substantially lack relevant training. (World Bank 2003: 2) 
The report also proposed some remedies, including 
the need for a procurement law based on the United Nations Commission for International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model; the need to establish a Public Procurement Commission 
(PPC) to serve as the regulatory and oversight body on Public Sector Procurements; the revi-
sion of key areas of the Financial Regulations to make them more transparent; the streamlin-
ing of Tender Boards and strengthening their functional authority, including powers to award 
contracts; a critical need to rebuild procurement and financial management capacity in the 
public sector; and a comprehensive review of the businesses related to export, import and 
transit regulations, procedures and practices. (ibid.) 
In furtherance of these recommendations, the federal government published a 
document, dated 27 June 2000, Circular on New Policy Guidelines for Procure-
ment and Award of Contracts in Government Ministries/Parastatals, outlining 
what later became known as the due process policy. Under the policy, all projects 
or purchases below N1 million must now be approved by the Director Gen-
eral/Permanent Secretary, through “selective tendering”. Projects and purchases 
of between N1 and N50 million are to be approved by a minister heading a Min-
isterial Tenders Board, while those above N50 million must now be approved by 
the Federal Executive Council, presided over by the President (Federal Govern-
ment of Nigeria 2000c).  
After this policy was adopted, other measures followed in quick succession. 
For instance, a bill for the establishment of a Federal Public Procurement Regula-
tory Agency was submitted to the National Assembly. And in a move towards 
institutionalising reform, an institution named the Budget Monitoring and Price 
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Intelligence Unit (BMPIU) was established. All projects financed from the public 
treasury at the federal level and above N50 million are now to be vetted by the 
BMPIU, which was given powers to issue “due process certificates” or cancel all 
contracts that failed to meet international standards for transparency and compe-
tition or ‘value-for-money’.  
Despite mounting criticisms that the BMPIU was slowing down government 
work,4 the evasive attitude of some government institutions, and the unwilling-
ness of the federal legislature to pass into law some bills that were supposed to 
institutionalise this policy – including the Fiscal Responsibility Bill and the Fed-
eral Procurement Bill – the BMPIU made rapid progress. It managed to increase 
conformity with financial regulations,5 at the same time saving billions of dollars 
in inflated contracts that would have ended up in private bank accounts. The in-
stitution became particularly well-known during the period 2004-5, when it was 
led by one of the most reform-minded members of the Obasanjo administration, 
Mrs Obiageli Ezekwesili.6 
 
 Publication of revenue allocations to all tiers of government  
At the beginning of its second term of office, in April 2003, Obasanjo’s admini-
stration introduced a new financial policy: The monthly publication of revenues 
accruing to all levels of governments (federal, state, and local). This was ex-
pected to promote greater financial accountability and reduce corruption. The 
brainchild of the former Minister of Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the monthly 
publications of official revenue on the Federal Ministry of Finance’s official 
website and in the local dailies soon emerged as one of the most important steps 
taken by the administration to advance its war against corruption.  
However, much as it encouraged interest and popular demand for political 
leaders to provide more information on their financial activities, which was tradi-
tionally considered an official secret, monthly publication of government revenue 
inflow was deeply controversial. It was also difficult to see how exactly this 
measure could contribute to reducing official corruption and how to measure its 
effectiveness. Nevertheless, the virulent opposition the policy generated, espe-
cially among state governors and their local government chairmen, who immedi-
ately dismissed it as “harmful” to good governance, appears to confirm its po-
                                                 
4  Senator Abubakar Sodangi, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Internal Affairs, announced this 
during a meeting on the ministry’s budget with the Minister of Internal Affairs.  
5  A report by the Ibadan-based Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), Nigeria’s 
foremost think-tank, also confirmed the effectiveness of the BMPIU, although the report also sug-
gested the BMPIU should be relocated to the Budget Office in order to further enhance its effective-
ness.  
6  Mrs Ezekwesili, a founding member of Transparency International, subsequently became Minister for 
Solid Minerals, and then Education, in Obasanjo’s cabinet.  
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tency as a tool in fighting corruption. The real challenge, therefore, was how to 
ensure its consistent application, especially after Obasanjo’s expected departure 
in May 2007. Fears about the principled application of the policy were initially 
raised by the refusal of the President to fulfil his June 2004 promise to ensure 
that, in line with this policy, payments to all federal ministries and parastatals are 
published regularly (ThisDay, 15 June 2004). This immediately opened the door 
to accusations of hypocrisy by the state governors, who now see the policy as 
targeted at them. One other factor, apart from political opposition, that threatened 
its survival was funding. The publication of such information on a regular basis 
entailed huge financial costs. In fact, within a few months of launching it, the 
policy was almost abandoned owing to shortage of funds. The policy was rescued 
only by the generosity of The Soros Foundation, which intervened to ensure that 
publications continued (The Independent, 16 May 2006).  
 
 Monetisation of the benefits of public officials 
The third aspect of reforms in public-sector finance was the introduction of a new 
policy, which calls for the monetisation of fringe benefits enjoyed by federal of-
ficials.7 This policy came into existence in 2002. Monetisation, as it was popu-
larly called, aimed to eliminate waste and abuse committed by public officials in 
general, and the top brass in particular, who were provided with assorted official 
benefits outside their monthly take-home pay. These included accommodation, 
domestic servants, furniture, and chauffeur-driven vehicles (Ekaette 2003; The 
Anti-Corruption Crusader 2003). As Head of Service Alhaji Yayale Ahmed him-
self pointed out, the management of these provisions in the past had generally 
“tended to create leakages weighing heavily on the cost of government” (The 
Guardian, 18 June 2004). Typically, the officials concerned converted public 
property in their possession, especially official vehicles, and their houses, includ-
ing the facilities inside them (telephones, electricity, gas, water), to illegal private 
or commercial use. Alternatively, they allowed them to decay into the most terri-
ble conditions, or simply left with them when they disengaged from the service. 
In place of such official privileges, public servants (with very few exceptions 
such as soldiers, police officers, and judges) would now be paid cash, propor-
tionate to their position. This was to be included in their monthly salaries, in lieu 
of such benefits. In other words, these public officials would henceforth now rent 
or purchase their own homes, buy their own vehicles, and pay their telephone, 
water, and electricity/gas bills8 (Daily Independent, 16 May 2006). 
                                                 
7  A piece of legislation known as “Certain Political and Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and 
Allowances etc.) Act 2002” was adopted to manage this policy.  
8  By May 2006, over 25,000 government houses had been sold under the monetisation policy. 
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There are obviously some important benefits associated with such a policy. 
Unlike what obtained in the past, this policy is not only prudent because it will 
save the government substantial resources in the long run; it is also more just and 
egalitarian. As the government itself was quick to point out: “There was inequal-
ity (in the previous system) as majority of the officers did not enjoy those bene-
fits. Monetization on the other hand, is anchored on equity as every officer gets 
his or her due” (ibid.).  
Like all the other reform policies highlighted, monetisation has also had its 
own costs and setbacks. Beyond the noble intentions, monetisation involved con-
siderable financial resources and some macro-economic trade-offs in terms of 
inflationary pressure and distortion of national budget. These considerations sub-
sequently forced the government to slow down its implementation. Instead of ap-
plying the policy to all categories of federal officials in one sweep, a revised plan 
issued in June 2004 stated that the policy would first apply to the ministries (core 
civil service) and then progressively apply to the other services in a step-by-step 
fashion or as funds permitted.  
Soon after its implementation commenced, other problems began to appear, 
which tended to undermine the very objective of the policy. Some institutions of 
the same government were not committed to this policy and took steps that went 
contrary to the requirements of monetisation. The federal legislature will serve as 
an example. In April 2006, the Senate ordered and took delivery of 117 Peugeot 
407 cars, one each for its members. Apart from a statement condemning this ac-
tion, which was issued by the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal 
Commission (RMAFC) – the federal institution charged with supervising reve-
nue allocation to the three tiers of government and fixing salaries and benefits of 
public servants – nothing else was heard from the administration, fuelling specu-
lation that the purchase might have been made with the approval of the Presi-
dency as a way of buying off the lawmakers, who were planning to vote on a 
controversial constitutional amendment bill which sought to extend the tenure of 
President Olusegun Obasanjo beyond 2007 (ThisDay, 25 April 2006).  
 
Reinforcing administrative capacity:  
New policy on employment, remuneration and retrenchment  
To be able to push sufficient changes in the direction of public service capacity building re-
quires that we review and strengthen our management development institutions. Accord-
ingly, I have mandated the Head of Service to immediately embark on a policy of catch them 
young to bring into the service young graduates from tertiary institutions with first-class per-
formance in their colleges. With their ambition, motivation, creativity and capacity to learn, 
they will be the high flyers that will move the civil service into the contemporary age of pre-
cision-driven efficiency and effectiveness. – President Olusegun Obasanjo. (The Guardian, 
25 June 2005) 
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With the above statement, President Olusegun Obasanjo signalled the arrival 
of yet another aspect of his multiple public-sector reforms: A new policy on re-
cruitment, reinforcement of capacity, and retrenchment9 of public servants. This 
policy, like the other policies discussed above, was pursued with relative vigour 
and consistency until Obasanjo left office in May 2007. What was the actual goal 
and content of this policy? The policy on recruitment, reinforcement of capacity, 
and retrenchment focussed on three broad areas: Meritocracy in recruitments – 
that is, professional competences with respect to actual institutional needs; ap-
propriate compensation or remuneration for public officers, including regular 
salary increases, reform of the pension system, and the gradual adoption of a Na-
tional Health Insurance Scheme; and retrenchment or prompt removal of officials 
for inefficiency or corruption. These reforms received wide support from Nigeri-
ans and the international community, especially among the international financial 
institutions,10 creating the impression that they were irreversible. 
 
 Appropriate compensation and remuneration 
The new policy of reinforcing the capacity of public officers was tied principally 
to the idea of adequate compensation and remuneration of workers. It rests on the 
hypothesis according to which only a well-remunerated service can resist corrupt 
temptations or inducements (van Rijckeghem & Weder 1997). Pursuant to this, 
the monthly minimum wage of federal workers rose from N3,500 to N7,500 in 
1999, representing a more than 100% increase. In 2003, an increase of between 
12% and 4% was implemented in ascending order.11 Salary increases were also 
introduced in all the 36 states of the federation, as dictated by available re-
sources. In the same measure, the government also pushed through a new Con-
tributory Pension Scheme. The debt-ridden National Pension Fund (NPF) was 
replaced by several licensed, private financial institutions specializing in the 
management of pension funds. Similarly, a new National Healthcare Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) was launched by the federal government to ensure decent living 
conditions for workers.12 On a more negative note, the proposed National Hous-
ing Fund failed to materialise despite all the publicity, in part owing to the com-
plex negotiations involving the federal government and workers’ union on the 
one hand, and federal government and state governments on the other.  
                                                 
9  Retrenchment in Nigerian parlance refers to the termination of employment, owing to redundancy, the 
poor financial health of an organization, or any other reason.  
10  In 2006, the World Bank voted a sum of $140 million to support these reforms. 
11  In January 2007, a new minimum wage brought the salary of the lowest-paid federal worker to 
N12,000.  
12  The Pension Reform Act 2004, which aimed to reform the pension system, came into effect on 1 July 
2004, when the National Pension Commission was established. On the other hand, the National Health 
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was set up on 6 June 2005, 43 years after it was first proposed. It was made 
possible by the passage of the National Health Insurance Scheme Act 1999.  
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 Professionalisation of the public service: Return to merit-based recruitment 
The professional competence of a public service is a factor that cannot be ignored 
or underestimated in the search for a credible and honest public service (Evans & 
Rauch 1995). To this end, a new policy emphasizing a more meritocratic re-
cruitment – that is, the attraction of quality personnel into the public service – 
was encouraged. In theory this should involve a reformulation of Nigeria’s con-
stitutionally rooted quota system or ‘federal character system’, which prescribes 
that public sector employment at all levels of government must be shared be-
tween the geo-political zones, states, or local governments as the case may be. 
This system, which is as old as Nigeria itself, was adopted to avoid the domina-
tion of the public services by a few states or ethnic groups or regions, but has 
now become emblematic of its neo-patrimonial politics, often becoming a source 
of conflict and disintegration rather than stability and integration, the latter being 
the reasons for which it was adopted in the first place (Suberu 2001). Even if this 
system had permitted a better management of ethno-religious tensions, it had un-
fortunately institutionalised a culture of mediocrity, clientelism, and corruption, 
which have plagued the Nigerian public service for decades (Ademolekun 1997). 
The Nigerian public service is largely composed of individuals lacking the neces-
sary skills and know-how to do the job required of them. This is because most 
owe their job to the quota system or to the benevolence of a certain ‘big man’ 
with the right ‘connections’.  
This fact has been adequately reflected in most official statistics published 
since 1999 on the subject. According to the report of a committee set up by the 
Federal Ministry of Finance (Committee on Restructuring and Reprofessionalisa-
tion of the Federal Ministry of Finance) to conduct a staff audit on behalf of the 
ministry in 2003, only 8% of the ministry’s employees possessed degrees or pro-
fessional qualifications relevant to the work of the ministry. In all, a total of only 
13% had university degrees, while 70% were not qualified to work in the minis-
try in the first place (ThisDay, 28 July 2004). The same scenario has been re-
ported in other public institutions, such as the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS), an institution that emerged in 2005 following the merger of the former 
Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) and the National Data Bank (NDB). According 
to its director general, Dr Vincent Akinyosoye, of a total staff strength of 4,100, 
only 15% possessed any of the professional qualifications necessary for the work 
of the institution. The other 85% had irrelevant qualifications or none at all. In 
order to correct this anomaly, 1,153 employees of the NBS were relieved of their 
positions in February 2006. The fund required for this exercise, estimated at 
some N1 billion, was supplied by the World Bank (ThisDay, 6 February 2006).  
Summarizing the decay which has characterised the public service in Nigeria, 
President Olusegun Obasanjo had this to say:  
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I have received reports of a number of pilot ministries, which reinforced the self-review stud-
ies undertaken by the Office of the Head of the Civil Service. The results show that the civil 
service has decayed very badly. It did not retool. Its technology and methods became out-
dated. Its philosophy became denigrated and its integrity badly compromised and corrupted. 
The net result was inefficiency, waste, corruption and, in some cases, arrogance. (The 
Guardian, 25 June 2004) 
In furtherance of its mission of professionalising the Nigerian public service, 
the Obasanjo government soon ordered the employment of 1,000 young Nigerian 
graduates with at least first-class or second-class-upper honours’ degrees in vari-
ous fields to beef up the organisation. Beyond that, it also sought to bring about a 
change of value among those who are already employed. This largely involved 
the holding of seminars, conferences, and retreats, during which public officers 
were reminded of the necessity of observing and internalising the rules of the 
game, that is, the Civil Service Rules and Financial Regulations.  
 
 Dismissal of inefficient and corrupt officers  
The strategy for reinforcing the capacity of the public service finally came down 
to dismissal or making redundant of corrupt and inefficient public officers, or 
‘deadwoods’ as they are called in Nigeria. The thinking of the government was 
that its policies which focused on attracting young and talented Nigerians into the 
public service could not succeed unless there was first a reliable process of iden-
tifying and dismissing unwanted hands. The identifying and removing of un-
wanted civil servants was not, however, a very simple task in Nigeria. 
The first issue was that outside the 180,000 individuals working in the federal 
ministries or ‘core civil service’, the exact number of public servants at the fed-
eral level was unknown. The compilation of any such list would certainly contain 
thousands of ‘ghost workers’. To cite just a single example: After a 2004 audit, 
the federal government confirmed that it had identified 42,000 ghost workers in 
the entire federal public service, of whom 3,000 came from the defunct Ministry 
of Federal Capital alone (ThisDay, 5 May 2004). These figures were far from ex-
haustive. Indeed, following another round of reform in 2005, this time initiated 
by Minister of the Federal Capital Territory Nasir El-Rufai specifically for the 
ministry, it was found that the staff strength had tumbled from 26,000 to 18,000. 
Among the 8,000 that had left, 5,000 were said to be ghost workers. The other 
3,000 were those who had no qualification required for the job (Vanguard, 5 June 
2005).  
The phenomenon of ghost workers is a problem common to all the tiers of 
government in Nigeria. Zamfara, Ondo, and Ekiti states are among the few states 
that identified and flushed out hundreds of ghost workers during the period cov-
ered by this study. In a single incident in 2004, Zamfara State was able to iden-
tify as many as 800 ghost workers in its 14 local councils, through the work of a 
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Special Verification Committee (The Guardian, 21 June 2004). In April 2004, 
following a probe of the payroll of one of its parastatals, Ondo State Scholarship 
Board, the Ondo State government was able to save a staggering N44 million. 
Note that the budget of this institution for the same year was just N71.4 million 
(The Guardian, 18 May 2004). In a related development, Ekiti State government 
also announced it was saving about N33 million monthly, after identifying an 
undisclosed number of ghost workers on its payroll during an audit (ThisDay, 22 
June 2004). 
The ghost-worker syndrome was unfortunately not the only pathological con-
dition of the Nigerian public service. The service was also characterised by an 
aging workforce, if official reports are anything to go by.13 At least 60% of the 
workforce was said to be above 40 years of age in 2004. These statistics, of 
course, hide some very important information, one piece of which is the rampant 
falsification of age among all categories of public officials. As the Head of Civil 
Service of the Federation pointed out, “it should not be a surprise that a large 
proportion of staff … are over the age limit for serving officers, but continue to 
amend their records to stay … We have discovered that except we utilise the 
modern techniques on scrutinising, we would never be able to clean up our re-
cords and determine our actual staff strength” (The Guardian, 18 June 2004).  
Whatever may be the case, the Obasanjo government tried to implement 
measures to tackle these problems. With the concept of ‘rightsizing’, it sought to 
return the service to its past glory through the removal of unwanted public ser-
vants, judged in terms of their inefficiency or involvement in corrupt practices.  
 
 Disengagement for corruption 
The notion of rightsizing hinged, first and foremost, on the dismissal or retire-
ment of public officers believed or alleged to be guilty of corruption. Despite 
controversies that often trail allegations of corruption, this policy surprisingly 
proved much easier to carry out, at least when compared with the policy of axing 
people on the basis of inefficiency or redundancy. There is a general feeling in 
Nigeria that given the level of unemployment in the country, people should not 
be dismissed from their positions just because their services are deemed unneces-
                                                 
13  According to statistics released in February 2005 by the Bureau of Public Service Reforms (BPSR), 
the Nigerian public service is also characterised by an aging workforce. This was largely attributed to 
a 12-year ban on employment. According to the BPSR, a considerable number of these employees 
were above the optimal age in relation to their qualification and position (Graduate of Optimal Age, 
GOA). The data showed that the percentages of employees above the optimal age were as follows: 
Ministry of Works (94%), Labour (95%), Petroleum (95%), Intergovernmental Affairs (95%), Com-
merce (94%), Industries (94%), Solid Minerals (92%), Women Affairs (92%), Tourism (92%), Hous-
ing (91%), Transport (91%), Water Resources (90%), Defence (90%), Aviation (90%), Finance 
(90%), Energy (89%), Communication (88%), Cooperation in Africa (88%), and Police Affairs (87%) 
(The Guardian, 24 February 2005).  
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sary. On the other hand, most people accept that corrupt officials should be dis-
missed. Thus, when in August 2001 the Federal Executive Council approved a 
resolution giving the President carte blanche to sack corrupt public officers 
(Vanguard, 20 September 2001), the resolution passed almost without notice.  
Before then, several public institutions had independently announced a purge 
of ‘bad eggs’ from their organisations. The Nigeria Police Force, for example, 
dismissed over 1,000 officers between 1999 and 2004 for various offences, rang-
ing from bribery and extortion to falsification of certificates and records in the 
quest to enter into the force14 (Balogun 2004; Daily Times, 26 April 2004; The 
Guardian, 2 July 2004; The Guardian, 4 August 2004). The Federal Road Safety 
Commission (FRSC) also dismissed some of its personnel, including 13 who 
were sacked in February 2004 for various corrupt practices (The Guardian, 4 
February 2004). Other agencies which took similar steps included the Nigeria 
Immigration Service, which sacked 200 officers (out of 235 employed in its 
passport office) in January 2006 for fraud in the issuance of passports or ‘official 
touting’ (ThisDay, 25 January 2006), and the National Electric Power Authority 
(NEPA), which in January 2005 dismissed 6 people judged by its Anti-
Corruption and Transparency Unit to be guilty of “involvement in unethical con-
duct, poor attitude to work and rude to customers” (The Guardian, 19 January 
2005). NEPA, now known as the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), 
also sacked over 500 personnel (including 15 managers) between 2001 and June 
2006 for corrupt practices, through its own Anti-Corruption and Transparency 
Unit (The Guardian, 29 July 2006). The Federal Capital Development Authority 
(FCDA), a parastatal under the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory, was proba-
bly one of the worst hit. According to the minister in charge, as many as 300 of-
ficials of the FCDA had been dismissed as at 6 June 2005 for fraudulently selling 
lands belonging to the ministry (ThisDay, 6 June 2005). 
Retrenchment for corruption is not limited to junior- or middle-level staff, 
notwithstanding the impression of a highly politicised public service. In April 
2004, seven senior managers of the Pipelines Products and Marketing Company 
(PPMC), a subsidiary of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), 
received their dismissal letters (ThisDay, 19 April 2004). In June of the same 
year, a further three received the same treatment (The Guardian, 3 June 2004). 
These officials, in active collaboration with some fraudulent foreign business-
men, had allegedly engineered a fraud in the importation of petroleum products 
which cost the nation some $108 million. Similarly, in 2001, 109 senior officials 
of the Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), indicted by NITEL’s 
Anti-Corruption and Other Related Offences Monitoring Committee, were sacked for 
                                                 
14  Falsification of certificates and bribery were the most common reasons for the dismissals. In one inci-
dent alone, 1,220 were dismissed for these offences. 
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various corrupt practices, including extortion, over-charging of clients, and manipu-
lation of phone lines (Otisi 2001). Similar reforms were also carried out by the 
National Judicial Council (NJC) in the justice sector, where a number of judges 
were queried, suspended, retired, or dismissed from service for corruption.  
According to the federal government, up to 160,000 public servants were to be 
disengaged as part of the ongoing reform. This number includes 90,000 in the 
lower grades, 62,000 from the intermediate grades, and 8,000 from the superior 
grades (The Guardian, 9 January 2006; ThisDay, 8 February 2006). It must be 
emphasised, however, that not all these officers were to be disengaged because of 
corruption. According to a policy paper approved by the Senate on 7 February 
2006, the criteria for retrenchment included the following: Being guilty of gross 
misconduct, lacking basic entry qualifications, being unfit medically, failing to 
earn promotion, failing to acquire mandatory skills, and age (ibid.).  
In the states of the federation, where similar public service reforms were im-
plemented – under the title of State Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy (SEEDS) – dismissals for corruption also took place. For instance, in 
Imo State, 700 public officers employed in the Secondary Education Manage-
ment Board were sacked in January 2004, after being indicted by a commission 
of inquiry established in September 2003, for fraud leading to the loss of N126.5 
million. Out of this number, 613 were employed illegally, 27 had fabricated a list 
of ‘ghost pensioners’ to defraud the state, 9 were due for retirement but had falsi-
fied their records to remain in service, 46 were actually in retirement but contin-
ued to receive their salaries, and 33 had earlier retired but were illegally reem-
ployed (Daily Times, 28 January 2004). Other states, such as Kwara (The Guard-
ian, 3 March 2004) and Cross River (The Guardian, 25 November 2004) also 
dismissed some of their staff, especially school heads who engaged in examina-
tion malpractices. Some states, like Gombe State, had to take even more radical 
measures, such as the sacking in some cases of the entire management parasta-
tals. This, for example, was the case on 23 December 2004, when the entire man-
agement of Gombe Floods Relief Management Committee, who were accused of 
diverting relief materials meant for three local government areas (ThisDay, 24 
December 2004), were sacked. Ondo State also took the same action, when it 
sacked six managers in November 2004 at its Ondo State Afforestation Project 
(OSAP), accused of stealing equipment valued at N20 million (The Guardian, 17 
November 2004).  
The complexities of malpractices witnessed in the various public services of 
the federal and state governments as presented above show that not only was 
comprehensive reform urgently needed to reposition the Nigerian public bureauc-
racies, but also that such reforms required considerable political commitment and 
time to implement.  
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 Retrenchment for inefficiency and redundancy 
While corruption among public servants has been the major focus of public sec-
tor reform and has attracted much attention from Nigeria’s leaders, other areas 
such as inefficiency have not been completely forgotten. During the tenure of 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, thousands of public officers were sent packing for 
no other reason than inefficiency or redundancy. While officials often cited mul-
tiple reasons for downsizing, many of the reasons were actually linked with the 
ongoing policy of professionalisation and rightsizing of the public service. For 
example, when in November 2003 NNPC, which employed 14,000 workers, an-
nounced the departure of 1,388 workers and the promotion of 34 to management 
positions, it claimed that the decision “reflected management’s decision to re-
ward hardworking staff and weed out the bad eggs” (ThisDay, 19 April 2004). 
But the reorganization was widely interpreted within the framework of the fed-
eral government’s adjustment policy. Most organisations, however, did not see 
any reason to be evasive about their intentions or objectives. Thus, Nigerian Cus-
tom Services, with over 17,418 employees, justified its downsizing policy by 
saying, “many officers were found to be redundant, while there are serious over-
lapping responsibilities in the existing schedules of duty … The committee had 
thoroughly reviewed the service and found that the service … is over-bloated at 
the top and medium levels especially in the comptroller cadre” (ThisDay, 22 
March 2004). Similarly, in February 2004, over 153 employees of the Nigerian 
Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) were relieved of their duties. According to an 
official statement from NCAA, “the staffs affected were those with disciplinary 
cases or are redundant, those considered untrainable, cases of ill health as well as 
length of service put in” (ThisDay, 10 February 2004). This exercise, according 
to the NCAA, would lead to the departure of 500 more workers (ibid.).  
The judicial reforms 
As was the case with institutions of the executive arm of government, reform of 
the institutions of the judicial arm of the Nigerian state also received unprece-
dented attention, even if to a lesser extent, after the launch of the anti-corruption 
campaign in 1999. The importance of a credible and effective judiciary in the 
struggle against criminality in general, and corruption more particularly, is no 
longer in doubt (Langseth & Stolpe 2001; Shihata 1997; Ades & Di Tella 1996; 
Gurgur & Shah 1999). For obvious reasons, it should be expected that where the 
judiciary is corrupt or inefficient, the first priority of a war against corruption 
should seek to reform this institution and ensure that a close collaboration exist 
between it and the various law enforcement agencies. As the experiences of de-
veloped countries show, this partnership holds the key to the rule of law and 
good governance. Unfortunately, in Nigeria such co-operation was more the ex-
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ception than the rule. The relations between the judges and law enforcement 
agencies were frequently characterised by mutual accusations. Nigerian security 
agencies, especially the Police and the anti-corruption agencies, regularly blame 
the judiciary for the high level of criminality and corruption, owing to the judici-
ary’s tendency to grant bail to individuals accused of corruption and other 
crimes. According to the then EFCC chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, “the judiciary has 
encouraged financial crime because the … law enforcement agencies and the ju-
diciary often times turned a blind eye to the criminal activities of these 419 per-
petrators … Instead of fighting them, they provided the fraudsters with adequate 
protection via heavily armed police or army escorts and in some cases the courts 
grant trivial injunctions in favour of the criminals” (ThisDay, 29 June 2004). The 
judges, on the other hand, blamed these agencies for poor investigations. 
More troubling is the fact that the Nigerian judiciary itself was not free from 
corruption. Allegations of corruption and inefficiency against judges are not new 
phenomena in Nigeria (Osipitan 2005). Indeed, the persistence of these accusa-
tions led to the establishment of a commission by the Abacha regime in 1993. 
During the inauguration of the commission, which was to examine the issue of 
corruption in the judiciary and suggest necessary reform, General Abacha cor-
rectly summarised the state of this institution: 
This administration is aware of some of the public perceptions of the present state of our na-
tion’s judiciary, namely: Polarisation of the Judicial System along ethnic, tribal and political 
lines; corruption and high-profile lifestyle of some of the judges; ineptitude, laziness and in-
competence; long period of time in the disposition of cases; ridiculously high cost of obtain-
ing justice; mode of employment of judges which does not facilitate the required calibre of 
judges into the Service; the terms and conditions of service of judges. (Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 2004: 6) 
Many of these lapses highlighted by Abacha were later confirmed by the re-
port of the Kayode Eso Panel. According to the report of the panel, which was 
submitted to the Abacha government in 1994, the Nigerian judiciary was chroni-
cally inefficient and deficient in credibility. The inefficiency of the judiciary, 
which manifests itself notably in the area of slow speed of trials and poor quality 
of judgments, was largely caused by inadequate funding, use of obsolete equip-
ment, insufficient judges, inefficiency of the security agencies, reliance on out-
dated legislation, and widespread corruption among judges, especially at the 
lower levels of the judicial pyramid (ibid. 20). On the issue of corruption, the 
commission noted: 
There is a concurrent affirmation that the judiciary has declined by alarming proportions. 
What is more, and the saddest aspect, is that the pernicious cankerworms of official corrup-
tion by gratification, undue influence, ineptitude, laziness have made appreciable inroads 
into the nation’s judicial system all over the country. The lower you descend in the hierarchy 
of courts, the denser is the cloud of corruption. (ibid. 117) 
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According to the panel, these problems came about largely owing to the insti-
tution’s lack of independence vis-à-vis other organs of government (notably the 
Executive), poor remuneration, and absence of a regulatory body. As a remedy, 
the report called for the immediate retirement of 47 judges across the different 
levels of the courts’ system, including 8 Chief Judges, 21 High Court Judges, and 
18 Magistrates, and the establishment of 2 regulatory bodies. These were the Na-
tional Judicial Service Commission (NJSC), to be concerned with appointments, 
promotion, and general well-being of judicial workers, especially judges, and the 
National Judicial Council (NJC), to be charged with the finance, discipline, and 
independence of the judiciary. 
While corruption and abuse of power has been part of the history of the judici-
ary in Nigeria for decades, under the Obasanjo administration the institution be-
came enmeshed in major scandals, which further undermined its credibility and 
culminated in the sacking of several judges15 (Newswatch, 9 February 2004). The 
widening degree of corruption among judges, including judges of superior courts 
– until recently relatively immune from graft – also became a major source of 
worry for many senior citizens. A retired judge of the Supreme Court, Honour-
able Justice Samson Odenwingie Uwaifo, captured this perception when he made 
the following observation:  
Corruption was once thought to be only in the magistracy because of the disturbing way 
some of the personnel tended to abuse their office … It gradually crawled to the High Courts 
and would appear to have had a foothold among a noticeable number of judicial officers 
there … Now, there is real apprehension that the appellate court may soon be infested if not 
already contaminated with some of these vices. (ThisDay, 25 January 2005) 
The multiple challenges facing the Nigerian judiciary were highlighted by an-
other report published in December 2003. The report, Judicial Integrity and Ca-
pacity in Nigeria, noted: 
The overriding problem was identified as ‘the precarious situation of the rule of law in Nige-
ria caused by insufficient integrity and capacity of the justice system in general and the judi-
ciary in particular’. At the time of the Project’s development, the main challenges faced by 
the Nigeria judiciary were seen as an absence of thorough knowledge and data regarding the 
extent and nature of and the reasons for the malfunctioning of the judiciary. Finally, there 
was a lack of a systematic, realistic, time-bound and broad-based anti-corruption action 
plans, both at the Federal and State levels. (UNODC 2003c: 13) 
But despite the depth of the rot in the judiciary and the implications of a cor-
rupt and inefficient judiciary for the declared war against corruption, the Oba-
sanjo administration made little or no attempt to instigate reform in the judiciary. 
Talks of reforming the judiciary and indeed the entire criminal justice system 
only began to appear in the second half of the regime’s tenure in office. What 
                                                 
15  Between 1999 and 2004, at least five senior judges were dismissed for corruption and abuse of power, 
following investigations by the NJC.  
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explains this seeming indifference to matters related to the judicial sector? In our 
view, there are at least three possible explanations to account for this. Firstly, the 
reform of the judiciary failed to receive much attention largely because it was 
theoretically an independent institution, constitutionally separate from the execu-
tive arm of government led by President Obasanjo. The second explanation is 
that such reforms required some constitutional amendments, a very cumbersome 
process in Nigeria, where such a process entails the support of absolute majori-
ties in not only the federal legislature (Senate and House of Representatives) but 
also in at least two-thirds of the 36 State Houses of Assembly. The third explana-
tion is the poor appreciation of the role of the judiciary; that is to say, there was 
general ignorance about the implications of judicial corruption for society. This 
fact only became obvious during the adjudication of the 2003 election petitions,16 
when the government and the population suddenly discovered that the judiciary 
is an indispensable instrument in any democracy. 
The first known attempt by the government to introduce reform of the justice 
system occurred in July 2004, when the government inaugurated a panel, offi-
cially named the National Working Group on the judiciary. The terms of refer-
ence of this panel included the following:  
Develop a first draft of an administration of criminal justice (ACJ) bill aimed at reducing de-
lay in the criminal trial and generally modernising the criminal justice system in the country 
… To organize stakeholders’ consultation on the draft bill … on the issue of corruption in 
the investigation and prosecution of cases, lack of effective coordination amongst the agen-
cies of criminal justice administration, especially the police, the prisons, the prosecutors and 
the courts. The group is also expected to look at such areas as absence of clear sentencing 
guidelines, prison congestion, growing number of awaiting trial cases, lack of witnesses, lack 
of sureties and the issue of missing case files. (Daily Independent, 6 July 2004) 
The proposed reforms, however, did not represent any serious or comprehen-
sive reform of the judiciary. Indeed, as was clearly obvious in the panel’s terms 
of reference, the government of Obasanjo was very much aware of its limited 
power over the judiciary. Worse still, the panel, which began its work five years 
after the arrival of the Obasanjo administration, submitted its report only on 9 
August 2005 (Efeizomor 2005), leaving the government with very little time to 
reflect on its findings and implement recommended reforms. Several other re-
form measures conceived by the Obasanjo government for the judiciary suffered 
the same fate. One of them was the proposed Administration of Criminal Justice 
(ACJ) Bill, which was supposed to be drafted by a panel of eight law specialists 
(Panel on Criminal Justice Reform), appointed by the government in July 2004. 
                                                 
16  The 2003 elections were heavily tainted with violence, fraud, and other forms of electoral malprac-
tices, leading to the filing of approximately 1500 law suits before the various courts constituted to re-
solve such disputes. The handling of these cases brought the role of the judiciary into the limelight 
(Enweremadu 2011). 
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The bill was intended to reduce the delay which often characterises court trials 
and to modernise the criminal justice system (Daily Independent, 6 July 2004). 
This law did not pass before the end of the Obasanjo administration in May 2007 
and remains unpassed to date.  
However, the inability of the Obasanjo administration to extend its reforms to 
the judiciary did not stop other actors, including international institutions and the 
leadership of the judiciary itself, from stepping in to rescue the institution. What 
are the nature and goals of these reforms? In general, two types of reforms were 
implemented in the Nigerian judiciary between 1999 and 2007: Reforms that 
sought to enhance the capacity of the judiciary, and reforms that were directed at 
improving judicial integrity. The reforms seeking to boost capacity were spear-
headed by international organizations, while reforms aimed at promoting integ-
rity were championed by the leadership of the judiciary itself. 
 
Reforms aimed at improving judicial capacity 
The first set of reforms – that is, reforms seeking to reinforce capacity within the 
Nigerian justice system – was led by several international institutions and un-
veiled during a meeting organized in April 2000 by the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in close collaboration with Transparency Interna-
tional. This meeting examined the necessary measures required to reform the 
various institutions of the judiciary and the areas where the integrity of the judi-
ciary was deficient. After establishing the basic principle of such reform, its pre-
cise objectives, and scope, three member states of the UN – Nigeria, Sri Lanka, 
and Uganda – offered to test the programmes in their respective countries 
(UNODC 2003a: 3). This point marked the commencement of a series of judicial 
reform measures in Nigeria.  
Following this international meeting, another project, christened ‘Strengthen-
ing Judicial Integrity and Capacity’, was launched specifically for Nigeria. This 
project, coordinated by the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) in close collaboration 
with the UNODC, was formally announced in October 2001 during a meeting in 
Abuja between the CJN and the Chief Judges of the 36 states of the federation 
(First Integrity Meeting for Chief Judges) (ibid.: 4). The first stage of this project 
involved the collection of a wide range of relevant data concerning the problem 
of Nigerian judicial integrity and capacity. Three principal sources of data were 
identified. The first source was the investigation conducted by the International 
Judicial Group, which had participated at the April 2000 meeting. The second 
was the report of the April 2001 meeting between the CJN and head of judiciary 
or Chief Judges of the 36 states of the federation. This meeting had identified 
four aspects of the judicial system that required urgent reforms, namely, the qual-
ity and speed of court trials, access to courts, public confidence in the judiciary, 
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and efficient management of cases brought before the courts. The third source 
was the conclusions of the research carried out by the Nigerian Institute for Ad-
vanced Legal Studies (NIALS), which itself was financed by UNODC.  
The second stage of the project had to do with deciding the specific objectives 
to be achieved by the project in the context of the problems identified. To this 
end, the UNODC project sought to facilitate the struggle against corruption in the 
judiciary with, on the one hand, the production of a “federal action plan for a war 
against corruption in the judiciary”, and, on the other hand, the definition of ef-
fective measures to correct the identified deficiencies touching on judicial capac-
ity. The measures aimed to increase access to justice, the quality of services, the 
level of public confidence in the judicial process, the effectiveness of responses 
to public complaints, and coordination within the criminal justice system.  
A third phase involved the concrete application of all the identified measures 
in a progressive manner, aiming first at three pilot states (Borno, Delta and La-
gos) which were selected between October 2001 and November 2003. The out-
come of this exercise was carefully studied and analysed by several experts, in a 
way that would enable the authors of the project to gradually extend the pro-
gramme to all the other parts of the country, while perfecting it with respect to 
lessons learnt from the experience of the pilot states.17  
Despite the well-conceived nature of these projects, their implementation was 
undermined by a number of difficulties. According to the report received at the 
end of the exercise, these difficulties ranged from problems of finance and ad-
ministration to the limited cooperation (e.g. from the ICPC), if not indifference 
(from the Police), of key public institutions18 (UNODC 2003c: 25). There were 
also problems posed by tensions existing between the institutions concerned (the 
ICPC, the Police, and the judiciary) on the one hand, and between a secular and 
an Islamic legal system (Shari’ah) on the other hand (ibid.: 29). Similarly, the 
report observed that “the continuing relative poverty and ‘non-maintenance’ cul-
ture which exists in the country will be threats to sustainability” (ibid.: 30).  
What then was the essence or benefit of the whole exercise? Or, how substan-
tial were the reforms? According to our interviews with people familiar with the 
system, this phase of the project did produce some remarkable results and can be 
considered as a relative success. The project is said to be largely responsible for 
the noticeable improvements seen in the judicial systems of some states of the 
                                                 
17  This system is known as the Action Learning Model. 
18  The Police were the worst offenders, as the UNODC report observed: “Chiefs/Commissioners of Po-
lice do not routinely attend implementation and sub-committee meetings, if at all. The Police gener-
ally do not grant bail in accordance with Project aims, nor will they routinely accept women as sure-
ties. At the other extreme, individual police/entire police stations have removed and/or vandalised 
Project posters which educate citizens of their rights” (UNODC 2003b: 25).  
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federation (notably Lagos and, to a lesser extent, Bornu),19 in addition to attract-
ing popular support. The technical report prepared for the UNODC also stressed 
this point. According to the report: 
Notwithstanding the absence of empirical evidence, this evaluation finds that there is sub-
stantial and compelling anecdotal evidence that the project has been successful in increasing 
judicial capacity and integrity. Such evidence includes the response to the installation of 
complaints boxes and attendant complaints process, and rights awareness posters; high levels 
of interest and enthusiasm for the project has been generated, resulting in high numbers of 
other Nigerian states lobbying for inclusion in the project; and procedural reform (e.g. Alter-
native Dispute Resolution (ADR), Multi-door courts, Civil Law Reform, ‘holding charge’ re-
form) which has reduced court delays and improved access to injustice. (UNODC 2003b: 6) 
 
Reforms designed to restore the integrity of the judiciary 
Several years after the launching of the campaign against corruption, the level of 
judicial integrity remained low. The assistance of the international community 
had facilitated the improvement of judicial capacity in Nigeria in many ways. 
Unfortunately, the programme did not do much in the area of restoring the integ-
rity of judges. Similarly, the efforts launched by the Obasanjo administration in 
July 2004 to improve access to justice, increase the speed and quality of trials, 
enhance the confidence of the public in the courts, increase the effectiveness and 
credibility of criminal investigations, and produce a greater coordination between 
the major institutions of the criminal justice system did not bring much succour. 
Nevertheless, there have been unprecedented improvements in the level of integ-
rity of judges in Nigeria since 1999. Ironically, much of the progress noticed by 
way of enhanced integrity of judges was made possible by some of the efforts of 
the judiciary itself, which took unprecedented steps to bring some of its erring 
members, especially judges, to book. Three factors encouraged the leadership of 
the judiciary to move in this direction. 
The first factor relates to some unique provisions of the 1999 Constitution. 
The 1999 Constitution, unlike previous constitutions, made provision for the es-
tablishment of two independent regulatory institutions, known as the National 
Judicial Council (NJC) and the Federal Judicial Service Commission (FJSC), 
with the sole responsibility of recommending judges for appointment and promo-
tion, enforcing laid-down procedures (as codified in the Code of Conduct for Ju-
dicial Officers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria), and overseeing the general 
welfare of members of the judiciary. Under the Constitution, judges are to be ap-
pointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, but on the basis of the 
recommendation of the NJC, which itself receives advice or nominations from 
                                                 
19  Our information came from a personal interview with a retired Supreme Court judge, Justice Kayode 
Esho, who also headed the Judicial Panel on the Reform/Reorganization of the Judiciary, established 
by General Abacha in 1993. The interview took place at his residence on 15 August 2005. 
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the FJSC. In order to guarantee their independence, the composition of both bod-
ies was made largely independent of the executive and legislative arms of gov-
ernment. Thus, both institutions are headed by the CJN and comprise some of the 
most senior members of the Nigerian bench and bar, in addition to some repre-
sentation from outside the legal profession. Despite criticisms that these bodies 
represent an assault on Nigeria’s federal system, they functioned relatively well 
to promote judicial independence and integrity (Suberu 2008). 
The second factor was the personal commitment of successive CJNs, notably 
Justice Mohammed Uwais, who was Nigeria’s Chief Justice from December 
1995 until June 2006 (ibid.: 457). During his tenure in office, Justice Uwais be-
came extraordinarily committed to the idea of judicial integrity and independ-
ence. Under his leadership, the Nigerian judiciary managed not only to adhere 
substantially to a national, prescribed Code of Conduct, but also enthusiastically 
submitted to an international judicial code, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial 
Conduct of 2002. Indeed, the Nigerian judiciary, under Chief Justice Uwais, was 
one of the major initiators of the code and participated actively in all the stages 
leading to its adoption in April 2000 in Vienna, Austria.  
The third factor was the vigilance of the public, especially court users, lawyers 
and their clients, civil society groups, human rights advocates and democracy ac-
tivists, and politicians, especially from opposition parties. These groups had in-
creasingly monitored the activities of judges and in some instances raised the 
alarm when traces of corrupt practices or abuse of powers were found. Conse-
quently, their petitions led to the launching of several investigations, many of 
which culminated in the retirement or outright dismissal of scores of judges.  
Most of the retirements and dismissals witnessed were in connection with the 
handling of election petitions. The outcome of successive elections, especially 
the hotly contested 1999 and 2003 elections, left many political aspirants ag-
grieved, particularly in the opposition parties. This resulted in the filing of hun-
dreds of appeals before the various election petition tribunals, set up specifically 
to deal with election-related cases. As should be expected, many politicians des-
perate to preserve their victory or to secure one resorted to bribing judges to pro-
cure favourable judgments. In the past, such acts would have gone largely unpun-
ished. But under the Fourth Republic, the prompt intervention of the National Ju-
dicial Council (NJC)20 resulted in the fall of several judges.21  
                                                 
20  The 1999 Constitution, in the Third Schedule, Chapters 20(a) and 21(a), empowers the NJC to inves-
tigate judges accused of wrongdoing and recommend appropriate sanctions to the President. Accord-
ing to Section 158(1), “in exercise of its power to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary con-
trol over such persons, the National Judicial Council shall not be subject to the discretion or control of 
any other authority or person” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999a).  
21  According to one law professor, Taiwo Adebayo Osipitan, the reason why there were so many casual-
ties is that “some people got to bench through some errors, either because they knew one person or the 
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A few examples will suffice. On 6 and 7 October 2003, the NJC met to exam-
ine accusations and petitions against several judges, most of whom were accused 
of having abused their powers during election-related litigations across the states 
of the federation. One of the judges under investigation was Justice Wilson 
Egbo-Egbo, who had given a very controversial judgment in a case involving 
some parties in Anambra State. After initially suspending him, the NJC sent a 
recommendation to President Obasanjo that he be dismissed from service. This 
recommendation was commuted to compulsory retirement (Newswatch, 9 Febru-
ary 2004). The next case was that of Justice Stanley Nnaji, from neighbouring 
Enugu State, who was later found guilty of abuse of power. Specifically, he was 
said to have delivered a judgment considered illegal in another electoral dispute 
linked to the political crisis in Anambra State. Justice Nnaji was suspended, 
pending the conclusion of investigations launched by the NJC (ThisDay, 23 
March 2004). 
The most notable allegation of judicial corruption in Nigeria was the accusa-
tion made against the Akwa Ibom Election Petition Tribunal. The judges of this 
tribunal were accused of favouritism in the legal dispute over the election of the 
state governor, Victor Attah, after receiving bribes from some of the governor’s 
emissaries. On the basis of this allegation, an investigation was opened by the 
NJC. It should be noted that before this incident, four judges had been indicted 
by the NJC for “trying to influence the same tribunal to give judgment in favour 
of one of the parties in the petition over the governorship election in the state”. 
Following this, Justice Chris P. N. Selong became the first casualty, when he was 
dismissed on 25 February 2004 by the President (ThisDay, 26 February 2004), 
acting on the recommendation of the NJC.22 Next came Justice M. M. Adamu, 
former President of the Akwa Ibom Election Petition Tribunal, who was sacked 
on 26 February 2004 (ThisDay, 16 March 2004), and Justice A. N. Elelegwu, 
dismissed on 20 April 2004 (Vanguard, 21 April 2004), by the governors of Pla-
teau and Delta States, respectively. All the decisions were taken in deference to 
the recommendations of the NJC. The fourth victim was Chief Magistrate James 
                                                 
other, and in this dynamic system some of them are found wanting. Hitherto, at the state level, ap-
pointments, promotions and dismissals terminated at the state level, such that if you act in favour of a 
governor, he would assure of securing your position. If you act against him, they can remove you and 
displace you from office. Now it’s no longer possible. A neutral body at the central level consisting of 
each geographical unit will now decide the fate of judges. So a judge who, either out of corruption or 
ignorance, gives a questionable decision cannot run back to his employer or godfather and seek pro-
tection, because the body that will decide his faith is independent of the Federal Government and also 
independent of the state government. Most of the time, these Executives do sometimes cajole these 
judges to give questionable decisions and are unable to protect them. In other words, judges are now 
on their own”. (ThisDay, 13 April 2004)  
22  Justice Selong has since gone to court to challenge his dismissal. 
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O. Isede, who lost his job on 1 March 2004, following the recommendations of 
the Judicial Service Commission of Edo State (ThisDay, 16 March 2004).  
These anti-corruption stands taken by the NJC, even though a federal institu-
tion, also had substantial indirect impacts on the judicial systems of the other 
levels of government, particularly the states. For instance, on 18 April 2004, the 
Chief Judge of Plateau State was suspended by the state government, following 
allegations of inefficiency, corruption, and abuse of power made by the local 
branch of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) (The Guardian, 19 April 2004). 
This crisis reached its peak on 4 May 2004, when Justice James Samba was re-
tired, following the recommendations of the Plateau State House of Assembly. 
Investigations conducted by the state legislature had confirmed the accusations 
made against the Chief Judge by the Bar Association (ThisDay, 5 March 2004). 
But many allegations of corruption made against judges also went unpunished, 
just as pressures from the NJC for change did not always lead to the removal of 
errant judges in all cases. One reason for this, according to Justice Samson 
Odemwingie Uwaifo, former Supreme Court judge, is the difficulty encountered 
by the accusers in assembling proofs (ThisDay, 25 January 2005). A good exam-
ple is the investigation launched in Abia State in December 2003 into the activi-
ties of the State Chief Judge, Kalu O. Amah, over some allegations of corrupt 
practices (The Guardian, 17 December 2003). The allegations were not the first 
to be made against the Chief Judge. Earlier, in 2002, he was investigated by the 
NJC over some financial dealings. The 2003 investigation, however, found him 
guilty. Indeed, a special committee of the State House of Assembly which probed 
him even called for his dismissal. Several other groups, including lawyers, civil 
servants, and labour unions, also came out openly to accuse him of financial 
abuse and abuse of power. However, the Chief Judge managed to remain in of-
fice (Newswatch, 9 February 2004). Such cases, nevertheless, could not hide the 
fact that in Nigeria the fear of the NJC had become the beginning of wisdom for 
most judges.  
Conclusion 
From all indications, the strategies employed to fight corruption in Nigeria since 
1999 have also included attempts to reform key public institutions, such as the 
civil service and the judiciary. This indicates that corruption is systemic and that 
no major public institution is free from its consequences. The scope of reforms 
proposed for the judiciary has targeted the improvement of capacity, effective-
ness, and integrity of judges and their courts, confirming on the one hand that ca-
pacity and effectiveness are directly linked to the integrity of these institutions, 
and on the other hand that diverse measures are necessary if any significant pro-
gress is be made. As for reforms implemented in the public service, the govern-
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ment of President Obasanjo, under domestic and international pressure, pursued a 
broad range of policies, including privatisation of public enterprises and reform 
of the management of public revenue and expenditure, as well as the design and 
implementation of new rules on recruitment, compensation, and disengagement 
in the public service, under the concepts of re-professionalisation and rightsizing 
of the workforce. All these measures were taken in the hope that they would help 
alter the rent-seeking behaviour of Nigerian public institutions.  
However, given the slow speed of execution of the reforms, the uncertain po-
litical environment, and the virulent opposition which some of the measures elic-
ited within civil society, the question arose whether these policies could indeed 
achieve their goals. The commitment and political dexterity of the Obasanjo gov-
ernment was certainly required, but so also was the support and involvement of 
the international community, especially the West. Nigerians were aware of the 
fact that much of the funds looted in Nigeria were comfortably sitting in the 
vaults of Western banks. The availability of these safe havens, many believe, 
made corruption a very attractive activity in Nigeria. Indeed, it was the realisa-
tion of this fact that prompted the Obasanjo government to include in the anti-
corruption campaign measures a policy to persuade Western financial institutions 
to stop accepting deposits from corrupt Nigerian officials and return whatever 
had been deposited in their vaults. This constituted the third prong of Obasanjo’s 
anti-corruption fight, the first and second prongs being the creation of new anti-
corruption commissions and a general reform of the public services, respectively. 
 
 4 
International campaign for  
the recovery of looted assets  
Introduction 
Political leaders in this part of the world (Nigeria) are encouraged in part to be brazenly cor-
rupt because they have safe havens to store their ill-gotten wealth outside the country. And 
as long as these havens exist, domestic wars on corruption are unlikely to go far. But if the 
havens are made unsafe, the incentive to steal will be greatly reduced. (ThisDay, 12 April 
2005) 
One of the main features of corruption in Africa in general, and Nigeria in par-
ticular, is the regular transfer of looted public funds to overseas bank accounts 
(United Nations 2002). Indeed, much of the estimated $350 to $400 billion si-
phoned off by Nigeria’s political class is said to be sitting in foreign, mainly 
Western, financial institutions.1 The transfer of looted public assets is not a phe-
nomenon unique to African countries. For a long time, corrupt leaders in many 
Third World countries (Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, Ferdinand Marcos of Philip-
pines, Alberto Fujimori of Peru, and Augusto Pinochet of Chile are good exam-
ples) saw Western financial institutions as ‘safe havens’ to hide their loot (Trans-
parency International 2004: 32). This was not without good reason. Unlike their 
own local institutions, which were easily susceptible to investigation once their 
government was overthrown, Western institutions, famous for bank secrecy rules 
and protection by their home governments, proved more reliable. This reason 
held particular attraction for African leaders, fleeing the double menace of a 
chronically unstable political and economic environment, characterised by fre-
quent changes in government, and galloping inflation and depreciation of na-
tional currencies (Sindzingre 1997). As African economic crises intensified in the 
                                                 
1  According to a UN study, Nigerians hold an estimated $170 billion in foreign bank accounts and as-
sets (usually landed property), most of these in Western countries (United Nations 2002). 
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1990s, attention shifted to how some of the billions stashed away in foreign lands 
could be returned to help grow national economies. Effective asset recovery, it 
was reasoned, would not only assist these poor countries redress the worst effects 
of corruption; it would also help send a strong message to corrupt officials that 
there would be no place to hide their illicit assets (Brinkerhoff 1999). 
The third aspect of Obasanjo’s anti-corruption campaign, therefore, was prem-
ised on recovering Nigeria’s billions stashed away in foreign banks. The cam-
paign involved a frantic international effort aimed at identifying the hundreds of 
bank accounts and assets (landed property, companies, shares, etc.) held illegally 
abroad by corrupt Nigerian officials and then efforts aimed at ensuring that they 
were duly confiscated and the proceeds repatriated to the country. A second part 
of this campaign involved persuading the governments whose financial institu-
tions are at the centre of this fraud, and indeed the entire international commu-
nity, to initiate reforms leading to the adoption of new legislation and treaties to 
criminalise the fraud and prevent the international financial system from being 
used to launder stolen funds from poor countries such as Nigeria. These policies 
were clearly unprecedented in Nigeria,2 where pursuit of looted funds had largely 
been localised inside the country. As a consequence, they raised a number of 
questions. Did the Obasanjo government possess the necessary political will to 
see this policy through? Where would Nigeria get the technical expertise needed 
to uncover hundreds, if not thousands, of secret bank accounts owned by corrupt 
Nigerian officials abroad? Would the foreign financial institutions and their gov-
ernments be willing to cooperate with Nigeria in its search for funds hidden in 
their vaults?  
As the experiences of a number of other countries who have engaged in simi-
lar battles clearly showed, recovering stolen assets from abroad is a Herculean 
task, requiring not only political will, a reliable legal system, technical know-
how, and familiarity with the exigencies of countries holding the assets (‘re-
quested states’) by those seeking to recover their assets (‘requesting states’) (U4 
online (undated)), but also the financial and diplomatic muscle to overcome the 
administrative bottlenecks and political manoeuvres usually created by states 
who receive stolen assets (Turner 2004: 4). Undeterred by these difficulties, the 
Obasanjo government plunged into the fight, which soon transformed into one of 
its major foreign policy priorities. Subsequently, the struggle was boosted by 
several initiatives taken by the international community, aimed at depriving cor-
                                                 
2  In 1984, a move by the Mohammadu Buhari military regime, requesting the aid of the British gov-
ernment in recovering funds embezzled and stashed in British banks by the political-tycoon class of 
the Second Republic (1979-83), the very first of its kind, was quietly abandoned once the British 
Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, announced her intention to publish a list of Nigerians owning 
bank accounts in Britain (Graf 1988: 177).  
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rupt officials around the world of the opportunity of using the international fi-
nancial system to hide their ill-gotten wealth (Daniel 2004). In this chapter, we 
will look at how this campaign was elaborated and prosecuted, beginning first as 
a purely Nigerian struggle before later turning into a major international preoc-
cupation.  
Nigerian initiatives to recover looted assets from abroad  
Although widely associated with the Obasanjo administration, the prevention of 
transfer of public assets and their recovery had long been a standing challenge for 
Nigerians before the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in May 1999. For in-
stance, the problem was so important in the 1970s that the framers of the 1979 
Constitution had cause to include a clause prohibiting the ownership of foreign 
accounts by top public officials, who had to close any foreign accounts before 
assuming office (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979). All public officials were 
also required to declare their assets, and those of their spouses and children, 
every four years. However, like most other anti-corruption laws, these provi-
sions, which found their way into all successive constitutions, were more often 
observed in the breach, so that by 1999 much of Nigeria’s wealth was said to 
have found its way into the foreign bank accounts of a few powerful individuals. 
The scale of the problem was brought into sharp focus by the sordid revelations 
that followed the unexpected demise of General Sani Abacha in June 1998.  
 
The demise of Abacha: The beginning of the search for looted funds 
Investigations into what came to be known as ‘Abacha’s loot’ began almost im-
mediately after his death in June 1998,3 when a Special Investigation Panel (SIP) 
was inaugurated by his immediate successor, General Abdusalami Abubakar. 
According to media reports, the investigations were provoked by the interception 
of Abacha’s widow, Mariam Abacha, at the Kano Airport, allegedly in posses-
sion of 38 suitcases stuffed with hard currency and on her way to Saudi Arabia 
(Newsweek, 13 March 2000: 16). During a press conference on 6 September 
1998, General Abubakar announced that investigators had uncovered at least 130 
bank accounts in 50 different banks (foreign and local) in which millions of dol-
lars stolen from the Nigerian public treasury were stashed (see Table 4.1 for de-
tails). The General also confirmed that in a bid to recover the funds, his govern-
ment had requested the cooperation of the countries where the funds were kept 
(The News, 31 May 1999). 
 
 
                                                 
3  Abacha died on the 8 of June 1998, allegedly from a cardiac arrest.  
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Table 4.1  Details of withdrawals effected at the Central Bank of Nigeria 
Date of withdrawal Amount withdrawn 
15 February 1995 
07 February 1995 
08 July 1995 
29 December 1995 
28 March 1996 
29 May 1996 
20 June 1996 
20 August 1996 
24 September1996 
30 September 1996 
14 October 1996 
11 November 1996 
18 February 1997 
28 February 1997 
3 March 1997 
6 March 1997 
22 April 1997 
28 April 1997 
30 June 1997 
9 July 1997 
8 August 1997 
18 October 1997 
21 October 1997 
23 October 1997 
29 October 1997 
14 November 1997 
26 November 1997 
10 December 1997 
18 December 1997 
$4 million and £2 million 
$4 million and £2 million 
$5 million and £4 million 
$5 million 
$3.8 million 
$12.5 million 
$10 million and £5 million 
$30 million and £15 million 
$50 million 
$50 million and £3 million 
$5 million 
$5 million and £3 million 
$6 million 
$3 million 
$3.27 million 
$1.21 million 
$60 million 
$60 million and £30 million 
$4.9 million 
$5 million and £2 million 
$10 million 
$12.3 million 
£5.88 million 
£14.76 million 
£11.76 million 
$10 million 
$24 million 
$24 million 
£6.15 million 
Source: Ugolor 2002.  
 
 
By the time he left office in May 1999, General Abubakar had recovered $825 
million from the Abacha family, leaving a total of $1.3 billion frozen in several 
banks in Switzerland, Luxemburg, and Liechtenstein (Daniel 2004: 102). Ac-
cording to the military government, most of the money recovered came from as-
sets (buildings, lands, stocks and shares, vehicles, companies, etc.) and bank ac-
counts of the late dictator and a few collaborators, which were held within Nige-
ria and had been returned ‘voluntarily’ by the family of the late Abacha and their 
close allies. Most of these funds were withdrawn directly from the vaults of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) between 1994 and 1997 (Ugolor 2002). Accord-
ing to data released, Abacha and some members of his ‘kitchen cabinet’ may 
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have grabbed at least $2 billion from the CBN (see Table 4.1). The monies were 
often loaded into CBN bullet-proof vans and delivered directly to Abacha and his 
cronies (Newsweek, 13 March 2000).  
Despite the fact that most of the looted funds were kept overseas, the Abu-
bakar administration placed the emphasis on recovering what was held within 
Nigeria. The reason for this decision was obvious. The regime was faced with a 
number of political constraints: The resolution of the political crisis provoked by 
the annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential elections; restoration of national 
unity sapped by the five years of tyranny under Abacha; successful and speedy 
completion of a democratic transition programme; rehabilitation of Nigeria into 
the international community after years of international isolation; and of course, 
lack of time – Abubakar’s regime was in power for only one year. Thus, even if 
we assume that the regime had the required political will and competencies for a 
more extensive search – which is debatable – the scope of the domestic task be-
fore it would have made such an effort impossible.  
 
The arrival of the Obasanjo administration:  
From domestic constraints to external challenge 
The arrival of the Obasanjo government was accompanied by a dramatic change 
in the campaign to recover Nigeria’s stolen assets, from a more local-based ini-
tiative to an international campaign, with Western governments and other finan-
cial centres where stolen funds were believed to be held coming under increasing 
pressure. As soon as he assumed office, President Obasanjo wrote to all heads of 
states and governments concerned, including the leaders of the G7, requesting 
their support in the recovery of Nigerian assets stashed abroad in general, and in 
their countries in particular. According to Nigerian officials, this request received 
favourable responses. The Nigerian government’s claim that the responses of 
these leaders were positive4 was confirmed by initial progress in the recovery of 
looted assets, as the amount frozen in foreign accounts rose from $1.3 billion to 
$1.93 billion within one year. Similarly, according to figures published by the 
Ministry of Finance, out of a total of $6 billion allegedly stolen by Abacha, $3 
billion had been identified and almost $2 billion already repatriated to the coun-
try by May 2005. The Abubakar administration was responsible for the restitu-
tion of $825 million, while the Obasanjo administration accounted for the re-
maining $1.175 billion (ThisDay, 13 May 2005). 
                                                 
4  In March 2000, Vice-President Atiku Abubakar told Newsweek magazine that “legislations dealing 
with secret accounts have now been eased, liberalized. Countries that can demonstrate that their re-
sources were stolen and stashed away can now bring them back. It gives us hope that we will be able 
to return some of our stolen wealth … We are encouraged with the responses we have so far” (News-
week, 13 March 2000).  
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As the data in Table 4.2 show, Switzerland, a well-known fiscal paradise, was 
the principal destination for Abacha and his cronies. Between 2003 and 2005, a 
total of $750 million frozen in approximately 42 bank accounts was repatriated 
from that country in different batches (Vanguard, 17 March 2005). This gesture 
was consequent upon intense diplomatic pressure and even threats of legal action 
by the Nigerian authorities (Ribadu 2005a). The release of the funds was also 
based on certain conditionalities, including that the Nigerian government first 
begin prosecution of the accused persons at home, confirm the criminal origin of 
the funds concerned, and sign an undertaking guaranteeing the transparent use of 
any funds repatriated. The latter condition was to be supervised by the World 
Bank. It was after these protracted diplomatic exchanges and bargaining between 
both governments that the funds were released (Vanguard, 10 March 2005). The 
‘Swiss bargain’ was later followed by the repatriation of $149 million from Jer-
sey Island in November 2003 (ibid.). 
 
 
Table 4.2 Estimates of Abacha funds frozen in Western banks as at July 2000 (US$) 
Country Amount No. of accounts No. of banks 
Switzerland  $750 million 120 11 
Liechtenstein $100 million NA 3 
Luxembourg $630 million NA NA 
Great Britain $450 million 20 11 
Total $1.93 billion NA NA 
Source: ThisDay, 10 July 2000. 
 
 
After these initial signs of progress, the loot recovery effort ran into stormy 
waters. Apart from Switzerland and Jersey Island, other countries such as Great 
Britain, Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein, which also served as safe havens for 
Nigerian leaders’ loot, refused to show enthusiasm in response to Nigeria’s re-
quest. Their procrastinations were further helped by the capacity of the accused 
to exploit existing loopholes in the legal systems both at home and abroad to 
their own advantage. For instance, in April 2002, confronted by mounting legal 
expenses, a slow legal system, and the uncooperative attitudes of accused per-
sons, the Nigerian government entered into an accord with the family of the late 
Abacha, which provided that about $1 billion (out of $1.1 billion frozen in ac-
counts in Switzerland, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, and Jersey Is-
land) be released to the Nigerian authorities. In exchange, all legal processes in-
stituted by the Nigerian government against the Abacha family were to be 
dropped. According to the terms of the agreement, the Abacha family would also 
keep $100 million (The Guardian, 19 August 2004). This accord, however, was 
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unilaterally repudiated by Abacha’s eldest son, who, once released from deten-
tion, claimed that the accord never existed (Ugolor 2002). Fully aware that he 
could play for time and hoping that a more pliant president would emerge in 
2007, he chose to continue his battle with the government in the Nigerian courts.  
Throughout the eight years Obasanjo was in office, Luxembourg, which had 
frozen $600 million ‘owned’ by Abacha and his cronies (BBC News, 9 May 
2000), and also Liechtenstein failed to repatriate any funds, despite passing new 
laws following international pressure. As for Great Britain, another favoured des-
tination for looted assets from Nigeria,5 only a very tiny fraction of funds held 
was released (BBC News, 8 March 2001). This was despite the many cultural and 
historical links between Britain and Nigeria and multiple diplomatic pressures 
from Abuja. The presence of a host of legal instruments on judicial cooperation6 
was of no help (Daniel 2003). The British long continued to insist on the need to 
first initiate prosecution in Nigeria and provide credible proofs linking the ac-
cused to the assets. Even when such steps were taken, the British maintained they 
were insufficient (The Guardian, 26 January 2001).  
After much pressure, £3 million ($3.9 million) was returned to Nigeria in De-
cember 2003 by the British authorities. The return was made possible only by the 
conviction of one Uri David, who was one of the financiers of Tony Blair’s La-
bour Party, for laundering millions of dollars for the late Sani Abacha (ThisDay, 
28 December 2003). On 2 February 2005, the British Minister for Africa, Chris 
Mullin, announced that “we have discovered in British banks about £30 million 
smuggled out of the country by former Head of State Sani Abacha … the money 
is frozen pending court proceedings and once the proceedings are resolved the 
money will be returned to Nigeria” (ThisDay, 3 February 2005). This declaration, 
however, did not lead to the repatriation of any significant sum.  
Western governments were clearly not of much assistance to Nigeria’s quest 
for the recovery of its assets. However, the uncooperative attitude of Western 
countries and their strict legal systems or rules were not the only challenges that 
confronted the Nigerian government. The less-than-transparent nature of the re-
covery campaign and daily reports about incumbent officials committing similar 
crimes ensured that the exercise did not attract much domestic sympathy or sup-
port. The editors of The Punch, one of Nigeria’s most respected newspapers, 
were every incisive when they observed that “unless the Federal Government re-
                                                 
5  According to Britain’s Financial Services Authority (FSA), 42 British banks handled some $1.3 bil-
lion for the Abacha family and their cronies between 1996 and 2000. Out of these 42 banks, 15 were 
guilty of significant control weakness in their anti-money-laundering controls (BBC News, 8 March 
2001). 
6  These treaties included the pact on Mutual Legal Assistance between Britain and Nigeria, the Harare 
Scheme of 1987 on mutual assistance in the area of the fight against crime among Commonwealth na-
tions, and the Convention of the Council of Europe of 1990. 
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assesses its loot-recovery efforts, relief may be far from ordinary Nigerians that 
bear the brunt of corruption. Apart from lack of transparency that has attended 
Nigeria’s loot-recovery process, much of the national wealth continues to be si-
phoned into private offshore accounts” (The Punch, 27 December 2004).  
In other words, aside from the international community, many Nigerian citi-
zens were also worried about the poor level of transparency and accountability 
that characterised Obasanjo’s international loot-recovery exercise. Indeed, it was 
a known fact that the Nigerian leadership was resisting international and domes-
tic pressure to publish detailed information periodically concerning the loot re-
covery (the amounts recovered, those from whom they were recovered, banks 
where funds came from, the agents or intermediaries employed in these opera-
tions, the fees or commissions incurred, etc.). These contradictions, no doubt, 
point to the limited political will of the head of government and the nature of the 
political stakes involved. The persistence of this same crime under the Obasanjo 
government only served to worsen the situation. But despite these deficiencies, 
Obasanjo’s loot-recovery efforts did produce some successes, the most notable 
being the support of critical sections of the international community for his poli-
cies. 
International initiatives to facilitate 
the recovery of looted assets 
Even before Nigeria launched its global campaign in 1999 for the recovery of na-
tional assets siphoned off overseas, international attitudes towards this crime had 
been hardening. This change was clearly evident in the growing number of inter-
national conventions and treaties signed in the few years preceding Obasanjo’s 
arrival in power and by preventive measures taken by some of the major receiv-
ers of such assets, such as the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and even the United 
States of America. Many of these changes have been due to the activities of a 
handful of international anti-corruption NGOs, such as Transparency Interna-
tional, and diplomatic pressures from countries that have been victims of such 
crimes, like Peru and the Philippines. The arrival of the Abacha affair only made 
the issue more urgent, especially for the world’s leading international organiza-
tions and recipients of stolen assets.  
 
International organizations and the campaign against illicit transfer of assets 
Until relatively recently, international laws and treaties regulating illegal cross-
border financial transactions were grossly inadequate, as they tended to focus too 
narrowly on the bribery of foreign officials and money-laundering activities of 
international narcotic and terrorist networks. The OECD Convention of 1997 and 
the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption of 1996 are examples of in-
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ternational laws containing this bias. Not unexpectedly, national legislation in 
this area also reflected similar biases. Since then a host of international legisla-
tion seeking to prevent and punish the laundering of stolen assets has come into 
existence. This process was greatly helped by the September 2001 terrorist at-
tacks on the United States, which forced the world’s only superpower to pressur-
ise its allies in the EU, G8, and OECD to tighten their rules and take radical 
measures to fight money laundering, now seen as an important source of terrorist 
financing.  
One of the international legal instruments touching directly on the criminalisa-
tion, confiscation, and repatriation of proceeds of corruption is the Convention of 
the African Union Against Corruption, adopted in July 2003. Article 6 of this 
convention prohibits the transfer or receipt of the proceeds of corruption and 
calls for such assets to be frozen and repatriated under Article 16. It also calls on 
the states concerned to cooperate with each other under the framework of Mutual 
Legal Assistance. The European Union has a similar convention, which it 
adopted in 2005. At a more global level, the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the United Nations Convention Against Cor-
ruption have also been adopted. The first legislation came into existence in No-
vember 2000, while the second was adopted in December 2003. Both conven-
tions require that member states take necessary measures to regulate their finan-
cial systems, prohibit corruption, prevent money laundering, initiate investiga-
tions and prosecutions, and offer international legal assistance and cooperation to 
countries which require them. While there have not been many successful prose-
cutions on the basis of these international conventions, the conviction of one of 
Abacha’s sons and the son’s business partner by a Swiss court for money laun-
dering, participation in an organized criminal network, and fraud appears to 
demonstrate the importance of these international efforts.  
Several other international groupings have also toed the same line. The G8, the 
OECD, The Commonwealth, and the FATF have all committed to “… intensify-
ing support for the adoption and implementation of effective measures to combat 
corruption, bribery and embezzlement by … intensifying international coopera-
tion to recover illicitly acquired financial assets and assisting African countries in 
their efforts to combat money laundering” (G8 2002). The FATF, which groups 
together some of the most influential members of the other international organi-
zations, has now emerged as the primary driving force of the global drive to con-
trol money laundering. Its annual list of non-cooperative countries and territories 
is now a major reference point for assessing progress in individual countries. 
Countries that find themselves on the list are usually subjected to international 
ridicule and even sanctions. Nigeria itself narrowly escaped sanction in 2002, 
when it hurriedly passed anti-money-laundering legislation. But how exactly did 
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these international regulations impact on Nigeria’s attempts to recover its looted 
assets? 
International initiatives, such as conventions and treaties seeking to prevent 
the transfer of illicit wealth abroad, are effective only to the extent that member 
states are willing to enforce them within their territories. Available data showed 
that some of the most important safe havens (US, UK, Switzerland, etc.), includ-
ing those that have been most unwilling to return stolen assets lodged in their ju-
risdictions (UK), have taken steps to reform their laws and financial policies to 
ensure that they are no longer used by criminal networks and corrupt foreign of-
ficials to hide illicit wealth. While it is true that such reforms were largely driven 
by international developments, such as pressure from Nigeria for the return of the 
Abacha loot, rather than by any altruistic desire to correct some observed defi-
ciencies in the system, the impact of these reforms should not be underestimated. 
 
Reactions of safe havens: Great Britain, Switzerland, and the Abacha affair 
As we said earlier, Switzerland, for practical and professional reasons (bank se-
crecy and international diplomatic isolation), and Great Britain, for historical and 
cultural reasons, are among the most preferred destinations for stashing funds 
stolen by Nigerian leaders. Therefore, any changes put in place in these two 
countries would probably have the greatest consequences for the war against cor-
ruption in Nigeria. For a number of reasons, the policies and laws of these coun-
tries have seen quite a number of changes that have tended to strengthen the on-
going Nigerian war against the transfer of national assets abroad. We will begin 
with Switzerland and then turn to Great Britain.  
 
 Switzerland: The quest for better reputation 
For decades, international diplomatic isolation and a culture of bank secrecy 
made Switzerland a preferred destination for stolen funds. Abacha, for instance, 
held accounts in at least 19 Swiss banks (see Table 4.3). However, since the be-
ginning of the 1990s, when a series of lawsuits brought by families of the victims 
of the Jewish Holocaust began to take its toll on its reputation, Switzerland has 
been forced to alter its laws and policies related to banking. The impact of the 
lawsuits was made worse by pressure from some foreign governments, notably 
the US, following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, and Nigeria, desperate to 
recover billions of dollars stolen by its former dictator, Sani Abacha. 
For these reasons, Switzerland went further than any of the other fiscal para-
dises in the reform of its laws, which are now among the toughest. Its regulatory 
institution, in line with FATF’s recommendations, set in motion rules requiring 
that financial institutions should be attentive to suspicious financial transactions  
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Table 4.3 List of Swiss banks holding Abacha funds 
1 Banca del Gottardo 
2 Citibank N. A. 
3 Goldman Sachs & Co. Bank 
4 Merrill Lynch  
5 UBS AG 
6 Banque Edouard Constant SA 
7 Banque Nationale de Paris (Suisse) SA 
8 Banque Baring Brothers (Suisse) SA 
9 J. Henry Schroder Bank 
10 Pictet & Cie 
11 SG Rüegg Bank AG 
12 Credit Suisse 
13 Bank Hofmann AG 
14 Bank Leu AG 
15 Crédit Agricole Indosuez (Suisse) SA 
16 UBP Union Bancaire Privé 
17 M. M. Warburg Bank (Schweiz) AG 
18 Mirabaud & Cie 
19 UEB United European Bank 
Source: Swiss Federal Banking Commission (2000). 
 
 
and their perpetrators. In Switzerland, laws criminalising money laundering (Ar-
ticle 305bis) and the non-exercise of ‘due diligence’ (305te) first entered into 
force as part of the penal code on 1 August 1990. The former penalised failure to 
establish the origin of funds and identify and freeze the proceeds of crime, while 
the latter created the obligation for financial institutions and their intermediaries 
to verify with reasonable diligence the identity of their clients and holders of ac-
counts (Swiss Bankers Association 2001: 11). Effectively, with this legislation, 
money-laundering offences abroad could now be investigated and offenders con-
victed in Switzerland. 
In the years that followed, other laws or amendments were introduced. These 
included a 1994 law authorising the confiscation of assets (Article 58ff) and a 
July 1998 convention binding all Swiss banks (Banks’ Obligation of Due Dili-
gence, CDB) to identify and verify their clients and the sources of their wealth. 
These rules were made in compliance with Recommendations 10 and 11 of the 
FATF (GAFI 2003). On 10 October 1997 a more comprehensive law, the Federal 
Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering in the Financial Sector, was 
adopted. This law had two new features. One was the extension of rules hitherto 
applicable to banks alone to other groups (financial intermediaries, bureaux de 
change, dealers in precious stones, estate agents, etc.). The second was the obli-
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gation to alert the authorities (Money Laundering Reporting Office, MROS) of 
suspicious transactions. Any violation was subject to prosecution.  
However, the presence of these laws did nothing to keep out Abacha’s money, 
nor did it encourage the Swiss to act without prompting from abroad, until 1999 
when the Nigerian government began its search for Abacha’s loot. Even the di-
rective on Politically Exposed Persons (Government of Switzerland 2002), pro-
hibiting the acceptance of funds presumed to come from corruption, came too 
late. Abacha died in June 1998, while the directive was issued in January 1998. 
In fact, it only became law after the Abacha scandal exploded (Swiss Federal 
Banking Commission 2000: 13). Nevertheless, the Abacha affair and indeed the 
changes in Swiss laws, financial regulations, and practices still had consequences 
for the global campaign against corruption, and the one led by President 
Obasanjo in particular. 
One of the consequences was that henceforth all clients from Nigeria must 
now be considered high-risk customers by all 342 banks in Switzerland. Follow-
ing these changes, reports on suspicious transactions to the Money Laundering 
Reporting Office increased from 303 in 1999 to 652 in 2002, representing a 56% 
increase, while in 2003 they went up by another 50% (Swiss Federal Banking 
Commission 2003: 66). Apart from some assistance to the government of Nigeria 
on recovery of funds, the Swiss also acted more or less unilaterally – for exam-
ple, when the country requested Germany to arrest Abacha’s second son, Abba 
Abacha. He was picked up in the city of Neuss, Germany, on 9 December 2004 
on the order of a Geneva court, allegedly while attempting to close a bank ac-
count (The Punch, 10 January 2005). He has since been jailed in Switzerland.  
 
 Great Britain: The Abacha affair as a trigger 
In January 2004, officers of the London Metropolitan Police received tip-offs 
suggesting that Governor Joshua Dariye of Plateau State had violated British and 
Nigerian money-laundering laws. Mr Dariye was said to own eight bank ac-
counts in Britain, containing over £2 million ($2.6 million), in violation of provi-
sions of the Nigerian Constitution, and some landed property estimated at 
£395,000 ($517,450) in London (Financial Times, 3 December 2004). On the ba-
sis of these allegations, he was arrested while on a visit to the British capital on 2 
September 2004. On the day of his arrest, he was in possession of an undeclared 
sum of £90,000 ($117,900), in open violation of British legislation on money 
laundering. After being granted bail, Dariye absconded to Nigeria, where he en-
joys constitutional immunity against arrest and prosecution. In swift response, all 
his assets in the United Kingdom were frozen, while an international warrant for 
his arrest was issued at the request of the London Metropolitan Police and the 
Crown Prosecution Service (ThisDay, 24 February 2005). Just a few months after 
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Dariye’s arrest, on 17 September 2005 Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, Governor of 
the oil-rich Bayelsa State, was arrested upon his arrival in London for being in 
possession of over $100,000 in undeclared cash. Following subsequent raids on 
his home, $1 million in cash was found in his London home and £800,000 
($1.048 million) in his bank accounts in Britain (The Times, 7 September 2005). 
Alamieyeseigha, who was later arraigned before a Lagos court for embezzling 
and laundering over a billion dollars between 1999 and 2005 (The Guardian, 21 
December 2005), also escaped from London after being granted bail. Like 
Dariye, his property in London, estimated at £10 million ($13.1) million, was 
frozen (ThisDay, 7 October 2005). According to the British authorities, several 
other highly placed Nigerians were under investigation for similar offences at the 
time (ThisDay, 25 January 2005). These unprecedented measures by the British 
authorities pointed to changes in British policy which were not unrelated to the 
September 2001 attacks in the US, but which were also linked to the international 
embarrassment caused by the Abacha affair.  
The role of the British banking system in the Abacha affair was first raised 
during the investigations conducted by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission 
on the Abacha loot in 2000. The investigations established that a third of the 
Abacha money found in Swiss banks had passed through banks in Britain, Aus-
tria, and the USA (Swiss Federal Banking Commission 2000: 13). These allega-
tions were subsequently confirmed by the British-based Financial Services Au-
thority (FSA) and the Nigerian government, which believed that at least $1.9 bil-
lion had been sent through London. Before the Abacha affair, Britain had no pol-
icy on the repatriation of funds linked to corruption. This was largely because 
confiscated funds until very recently tended to come from or be linked to drug 
trafficking and without an obvious victim. Therefore, the existing rules and prac-
tices favoured the confiscation and retention of such funds by the British authori-
ties (DFID 2002). The arrival of the Abacha scandal brought dramatic changes in 
these procedures. 
In November 2001, under pressure over the Abacha loot, representatives of 
judicial and banking regulatory institutions of the G7 (including Britain) met at 
Lausanne, Switzerland at the initiative of the Swiss to discuss the issue of Politi-
cally Exposed Persons (PEPs) and the Abacha affair in particular (Swiss Federal 
Banking Commission 2003: 25). The meeting took a decision to reinforce vigi-
lance measures (Enhanced Due Diligence Procedures) with respect to PEPs. Be-
fore this multilateral initiative, the British had even started their own internal 
process of change. In October 1998, for instance, Prime Minister Tony Blair had 
inaugurated a committee to examine arrangements in place for the recovery of 
stolen wealth in Britain and suggest measures to increase the effectiveness of the 
system. In its report published in June 2000, the committee highlighted a number 
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of shortcomings in the system. It also stressed the need to consolidate all existing 
laws on money laundering and confiscation of proceeds of crime into a single 
piece of legislation (United Kingdom 2000). This legislation was adopted on 31 
July 2002, under the title Proceeds of Crime Act of 2000 (POCA), and entered 
into force progressively between December 2002 and March 2003 (United King-
dom 2002). 
The arrival of the POCA opened new opportunities to countries seeking to re-
cover illegally transferred assets in Britain, including Nigeria. Unlike in the past, 
assets acquired through corruption, along with assets from drug trafficking and 
other crimes, can now be confiscated and repatriated to their owners (Section 
327-329). According to Sections 294 and 370 of the Act, assets may be frozen on 
the orders of the Crown Courts as soon as investigations (not prosecutions, as in 
the past) are launched. All countries will now also benefit from mutual legal as-
sistance. The previous arrangement had restricted the privilege to some specifi-
cally designated countries and thus excluded a number of developing countries. 
Similarly, under Section 330, financial institutions are to report cases to the au-
thorities on the basis of suspicion, not actual knowledge. Finally, the POCA es-
tablished a central institution, Asset Recovery Agency (ARA), to be responsible 
for the coordination of British asset recovery strategy7.  
Soon after the POCA came into existence, a few Nigerian officials went on to 
sample its potency. On 10 November 2004 a Director with the Department of 
National Civic Registration, a parastatal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Chris 
Agidi, became its first victim when he was arrested at Heathrow Airport in pos-
session of £200,000 ($262,000) stocked in a suitcase. It is noteworthy that he was 
actually arrested on suspicion of belonging to a terrorist network, which high-
lights the impact of the 11 September 2001 events. Only after further investiga-
tions did the authorities confirm that the money was part of bribes paid by a 
French company (SAGEM SA) to some Nigerian officials to win a national iden-
tity card project in 2002. Mr. Agidi made his first court appearance before the 
Southwark Crown Court in London on 18 January 2006 (The Guardian, 19 Janu-
ary 2006). In another incident, on 12 December 2005, the Stratford Magistrates’ 
Court in London, relying on Article 301 of the POCA, ordered the repatriation of 
N23 million (£117,000 or $153,270) seized from Governor Joshua Dariye fol-
lowing his arrest in London in September 2004. This move, according to one 
British official, Sgt. Bob Ingram, was intended to “send out a clear message to 
Nigerian politicians that if they bring any illicit money to this country (United 
Kingdom), we will seize them and return the money to Nigeria, because the 
money belongs to the Nigerian people” (The Guardian, 13 December 2005.). 
                                                 
7  The ARA has since been merged with another institution, known as the Serious Organized Crime 
Agency.  
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One of Dariye’s accomplices, Joyce Bamidele Oyebanjo, who aided in launder-
ing £1.4 million ($1.8 million), was convicted by the same court in April 2007. 
Mrs Oyebanjo, who must serve a three-year sentence, was also ordered to refund 
£198,045 ($259,438) to the Nigerian government (The Guardian, 6 June 2007). 
On 6 July 2006, the British government said it intended to repatriate up to £250 
million ($327.5 million) to the Nigerian government (The Punch, 12 July 2006). 
According to the Head of the Specialist Crimes and Anti-Money Laundering 
Team, Mr. Peter Clarke, all this “demonstrates the success of our application of 
the Proceeds of Crime Act to stop criminals benefitting from illegally obtained 
money … We believe these types of seizures will help deter financial crime in 
both London and Nigeria” (ThisDay, 7 July 2006). 
Conclusion 
After a prolonged silence, the international community began supporting efforts 
aimed at combating corruption, notably illicit transfer of looted assets abroad by 
public officials in developing countries, an epidemic that has been ravaging the 
political economy of many developing countries for decades. This support in-
volved not only giving technical support to countries that are interested in pre-
venting the illicit transfer of public assets overseas, but also diplomatic help to 
those seeking the recovery of assets, already siphoned off by corrupt officials 
from those states, to help meet national development needs (Daniel 2004; Turner 
2004). It was within this context that the Nigerian campaign, launched in 1998 to 
recover public funds looted under the Abacha regime and stashed in Western 
banks, can be situated. 
While in power, President Obasanjo sought to intensify this effort, taking ad-
vantage of the changed attitude of the international community. Much of his ef-
forts, widely believed to have had a salutary effect on the global fight against in-
ternational money laundering, failed to achieve their intended results, however, 
owing to a combination of several domestic and international factors. Even 
though President Obasanjo’s effort cannot be considered a total failure, given the 
positive way it has impacted on the global financial system (witness the many 
reforms that have taken place in Switzerland in the last few years), the effort did 
not lead to any substantial repatriation of looted Nigerian funds held in foreign 
banks. Several factors combined to limit the impact of his campaign, one of them 
being an inefficient judicial system and limited investigative skills in Nigeria. 
There was also a noticeable shortage of political will, both at home and abroad. 
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To the dismay of many Nigerians and members of the international community, 
public funds continue to be siphoned off by incumbent Nigerian officials.8 
                                                 
8  For instance, in July 201 the erstwhile Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, 
Nigeria’s most feared anti-corruption agency, estimated that some of Nigeria’s state governors had 
transferred at least $10 billion between the time the current democratic experiment began in May 1999 
and when he left office in December 2008. See ThisDay, 21 July 2010. Some of these governors have 
already been convicted for money laundering, or illegally operating foreign accounts, while many oth-
ers are currently standing trial for the same offences. 
 5 
Anti-corruption agencies and  
the challenge of capacity  
Introduction 
From all accounts, fighting corruption was certainly a top priority in the policy of 
the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo, which during its eight years 
in office pursued a number of wide-ranging reform measures aimed at checking 
corrupt practices and raising the credibility of public officials and institutions in 
Nigeria. Given all the energy and resources that were committed to prosecuting 
this struggle, the question that now arises is this: What was the impact of 
Obasanjo’s initiatives on the Nigerian governance landscape? To what extent did 
Obasanjo’s anti-corruption policies achieve their goals? If they achieved great 
success, what are the explanations for such a result? And if they produced little 
or no impact, what are the reasons for this? 
Assessing the impact of any reform policy, and an anti-corruption policy in 
particular, is a difficult task for a number of reasons. The first problem is that it is 
not always easy to determine what specific goals anti-corruption policies are de-
signed to achieve (Dye 1984: 356). Anti-corruption crusades, as we have seen, 
often involve not only publicly stated goals (ridding society of corruption and 
corrupt individuals) but also some undisclosed political ends, such as procuring 
political legitimacy or eliminating the political enemies of a regime. Perhaps the 
best one can do is to focus on the attainment of officially stated objectives, which 
in almost all cases will be centred on reducing corrupt practices through removal 
of all incentives for corruption, detection of corrupt acts, and punishment of the 
perpetrators of corrupt acts. But even when policy objectives are clear, other ana-
lytical problems surface.  
First, corruption is a phenomenon that can hardly be measured empirically. 
Knowing whether corruption levels have decreased, increased, or remained the 
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same requires first that corruption at any given time can be measured. There are 
two reasons why this measurement is impossible. First, there is the shortage of 
reliable data on corruption. Most corrupt acts are perpetrated in secrecy and so 
are not captured in official or academic data. Cases reported to the police or 
sourced from court records are only the tip of the iceberg and therefore are not 
representative of reality. One common fallacy is to regard the increase in the out-
break of corruption scandals as evidence that corruption has increased. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. Increasing outbreaks of scandals can, in fact, be a 
sign of improvement brought by increasing scrutiny of the activities of officials, 
which itself can be explained by the presence of a regime that has made the fight 
against corruption a major policy and thus has every incentive to create the im-
pression that corruption is serious. It can also be linked to the arrival of a more 
liberal political regime, ushering in a freer press, a wider role for non-state ac-
tors, separation of powers, and checks and balances among public institutions. 
Second, the understanding of corruption itself is not static, varying from one 
country to another and from one time to another within the same country.  
Another problem is that because corruption is a complex and multi-dimen-
sional phenomenon, prescribed measures are often multi-dimensional, involving 
a host of policies implemented over a long period of time. The problem that then 
arises is how to know when evaluation should commence and which particular 
reform has produced which effect or what the contribution is of each policy. 
Since reforms commence at different dates, we can defer evaluation until such a 
time as all policy intervention is over – for example, at the end of the administra-
tion. If we focus on a specific aspect of reforms or policies, can the result ob-
tained from such a study be used as a yardstick for analyzing the anti-corruption 
drive as a whole? If we focus on the overall policy objective (to achieve a reduc-
tion in corruption), how do we determine the relative effectiveness of each indi-
vidual policy? The reduction in the level of corruption depends on several sepa-
rate policies. If corruption fails to drop, how do we determine which policy is to 
blame (anti-corruption institutions, privatisation, reform of public revenue and 
expenditure process, new policies on reward, employment, and retrenchment in 
the public service, or international campaigns aimed at recovering stolen assets?). 
These challenges, however, will not deter us from attempting to evaluate Ni-
geria’s anti-corruption reforms under Obasanjo. In the first place, this book, for 
practical reasons, does not seek to evaluate the impact or effectiveness of all the 
anti-corruption measures put in place by the Obasanjo government, a task which 
is clearly impossible. Our goal in this section is a much narrower one, focusing 
on the impact of a few policies and institutions, such as the work of specialised 
anti-corruption commissions. This choice is informed by the fact that not only are 
these institutions regarded as the major pillars of Obasanjo’s anti-corruption cru-
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sade, but there are sufficient data on their work to enable an assessment, and their 
impact is also easier to observe than the other aspects of reforms put in place to 
fight corruption. How then can one assess the effectiveness of these aspects of 
the anti-corruption reform? To do this, we have decided to rely on evaluation cri-
teria suggested by Vasant Moharir. He argues that for any public policy to suc-
ceed, it must be effective (be able to achieve stated goals), efficient (achieve its 
goals with reasonable cost and time), innovative, and feasible both politically 
(meet the interests and aspirations of all major actors) and administratively (pos-
sess political will and the capacity of organs of implementation) (Moharir 2002: 
113; Fischer 1995). To avoid unhelpful repetitions, Moharir is simply saying that 
the effectiveness of a policy – in this case, Nigeria’s anti-corruption crusade’s 
ability to achieve its goal, as in reducing corruption quickly – depends on institu-
tional capacity (powers, resources, and leadership of implementation organs), po-
litical will, and the role or behaviour of major actors (Goodin 1996: 41), includ-
ing national leaders, local elites, and civil society.  
Findings of numerous studies conducted on the work of anti-corruption com-
missions around the world have confirmed Moharir’s hypothesis. Robert Wil-
liams, Alan Doig, and Robin Theobald, in a comparative study focusing on such 
commissions in Africa, find that their effectiveness is hampered by what they 
called the ‘seven sins’: ‘economic sins’, or lack of resources; ‘political sins’, or 
absence of political will; ‘legal sins’, or inefficient legal system; ‘organisational 
sins’, or leadership weakness such as lack of independence and poor administra-
tive style; ‘governance sins’, or lack or effective complementary institutions such 
as the police; ‘performance sins’, or level of efficiency; and ‘public confidence 
sins’, or lack of public trust and confidence (Williams & Doig 2004). Robin 
Theobald put these arguments in a more precise language when he observed that 
effective anti-corruptions agencies must have or be built around the following: 
[C]onsiderable long-term resources, human capital, highly specialised skills … that must 
also be highly motivated; must be endowed with considerable legal and administrative pow-
ers; administrative clout … often taken to mean that such agencies need the strongest possi-
ble backing, perhaps even that of the head of state; appropriate levels of accountability and 
transparency; a strong institutional environment, especially in immediate ancillary areas such 
as the police service and the judiciary and availability of records particularly in the area of 
finance. (Theobald 1999: 152) 
In 1998, a World Bank report pointed out that Tanzania’s anti-corruption drive 
was greatly sapped by the poor performance of the Prevention of Corruption Bu-
reau (PCB), which it said had been “generally weak and ineffective, lacking ade-
quate staff, facilities, equipment and training. Staff is paid on civil service scale”. 
According to the report, “considerable time and effort in recruiting and training 
will be required to turn the PCB into an effective instrument in the anti-cor-
ruption struggle” (World Bank 1998a: 17). A similar report on Uganda argued: 
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Uganda has a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework which is essentially sufficient 
to combat corruption. However, the judiciary and enforcement agencies are weak, under-
funded, and lack human and material resources … The institutions most directly involved 
with anti-corruption – the Inspectorate of Government (IGG), Directorate of Public Prosecu-
tions (DPP) and Police – are severely constrained by limited resources, including low pay. 
(World Bank 1998b: 12) 
Official reports published by anti-corruption agencies themselves have also 
highlighted the same problems (DCEC 2000). 
As we will show in the following three chapters, Nigeria’s anti-corruption 
drive could not escape this predicament. The major anti-graft agencies which 
were at the heart of Obasanjo’s anti-corruption fight – the EFCC and ICPC – 
were victims of weak administrative capacity (limited powers, insufficient hu-
man and material resources, and inefficient legal system). A lack of broad-based 
support and commitment from the major political actors – national government, 
sub-national authorities, and civil society – further compounded the problem, 
contributing substantially to the continued prevalence of endemic corruption in 
the polity. The evidence was first and foremost the festering atmosphere of graft 
at all levels of government, despite the well-publicised anti-corruption war. An-
other factor was the continuing open hostility of key political heads in Nigeria, 
notably state governors, to the anti-graft war.  
In this section of our book, we discuss the three most important challenges that 
confronted the Nigerian anti-corruption reforms: Limited capacities of the anti-
corruption bodies, strong opposition of state governments, and weak engagement 
of civil society. In the first of the three chapters, which examines the impact of 
poor administrative capacity on the struggle against corruption, we will demon-
strate that although the decision to create the ICPC and EFCC was well-intended, 
these institutions unfortunately failed to contribute to the reduction of corruption 
in a significant way. Despite their wide powers and relatively extensive adminis-
trative structures, which set them apart from similar institutions created by past 
regimes in the country, the EFCC, and more particularly the ICPC, grappled with 
problems of administrative capacity caused by inadequate political will at the 
highest level and an uncooperative political class dominated by people who were 
committed to the preservation of the status quo. We shall examine each of the 
two institutions in turn, beginning with the ICPC. 
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The ICPC and the war against corruption:  
A disappointing balance sheet 
Before the establishment of the ICPC in September 2000, Nigeria had not con-
victed anybody for corruption in a regular court.1 The inauguration of the ICPC, 
with unprecedented powers and promise of support from the highest level, there-
fore raised hopes of a new dawn. As Table 5.1 shows, within its first year, cover-
ing October 2000 to September 2001, four cases were brought before the courts 
for various corruption offences. This figure rose to 14 at the end of the ICPC’s 
second year in September 2002, before peaking at 27 at the close of its third year 
in September 2003.2 According to some ICPC officials interviewed, these 
stemmed from a total of 800 petitions submitted to the ICPC by different indi-
viduals and groups in conformity with the 2000 ICPC Act. At the end of the day, 
the ICPC could not secure convictions in these cases or many more that fol-
lowed. The consequence was that by 2007, after more than seven years in exis-
tence, it had become more synonymous merely with its anti-corruption jingles 
advertised repeatedly on local television stations and with the term “toothless 
bulldog”. Indeed, the ICPC could only secure one conviction involving two rela-
tively minor individuals (the medical director of the famous Ahmadu Bello Uni-
versity Teaching Hospital and his finance director). The limits imposed by its 
 
 
Table 5.1 Index of performance of the ICPC (July 2005) 
 Oct. 2000 - Oct. 2001 - Oct. 2002 - Oct. 2003 - Oct. 2004 - 
 Sept. 2001 Sept. 2002 Sept. 2003 Sept. 2004 July 2005 Total 
Total petitions  
received 264 365 367 451 399 1846 
Petitions approved  
for investigations 20 185 439+ 327 209 1180 
Investigations  
concluded 11 19 17 16 17 80 
Cases filed in court 4 10 13 8 14 49 
Convictions won 0 0 1* 0 0 1 
* Two individuals were convicted during this trial. 
+ Some of these petitions included those submitted during earlier years 
Source: ICPC (2006). 
                                                 
1  The first major attempt in this regard was made in 1984 by the Muhammadu Buhari regime (1984-85). 
This effort, however, suffered a major setback when the regime was displaced from power after only 
18 months in office. Prosecutions of corrupt officials were replaced by a gradual institutionalisation of 
corruption by the regimes of Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha.  
2  Those charged included a High Court judge, a prominent lawyer (senior advocate of Nigeria), chair-
men of private and public companies, heads of government parastatals and local councils, some direc-
tor-generals and permanent secretaries, ministers, former governors, senators, and a former Senate 
president.  
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own legislation, poor investigative skills and its own mishandling of investiga-
tions, insufficient human and financial resources, its management style, an ineffi-
cient judicial system, and constant attacks from politicians, especially federal 
legislators, all combined to create the basis for poor results and progressive loss 
of credibility. 
The task of the ICPC was not restricted to arresting, investigating, and prose-
cuting suspected corrupt individuals. It was also expected to do the following: 
Design and implement measures aimed at preventing corruption in the country, 
such as a nationwide public enlightenment campaign; provide support to the for-
mation and development of other institutions, such as NGOs and anti-corruption 
units in other public institutions committed to the fight against corruption; con-
duct research on the practices and procedures of public institutions which en-
courage corruption; and suggest ways of eradicating such practices and proce-
dures (ICPC 2006). Although the ICPC gave substantial attention to these func-
tions, these efforts were to be in vain if it could not invoke sanctions against cor-
rupt officials and individuals through criminal investigation and successful 
prosecution. The willingness and capacity to detect corruption and impose sanc-
tions, ranging from conviction and imprisonment to confiscation of corruptly ac-
quired wealth, are among the most important indices for evaluating the perform-
ance of an anti-corruption institution. This is the real deterrence, and not the level 
of information available to the organ or the number of studies performed on and 
recommendations made for corrupt public institutions and systems. Unfortu-
nately, the ICPC performed, according to these indices, very inadequately. Table 
5.1 makes this point clearly. The reasons, as we have said, are numerous. We will 
highlight some of the most important ones.  
 
Chronic underfunding and insufficient manpower 
The lack of sufficient human resources, resources which define the capacity and 
effectiveness of all bureaucratic organisations, was a major source of constraint 
for the ICPC. The effects manifested not only in the scale and speed of investiga-
tions but more importantly in their quality – and thus in the results of trials. The 
question of the shortage of human (qualified staff) and material resources (funds, 
functional offices, equipment) at the ICPC has already been discussed in some 
detail in Chapter 3 of this book; thus, it will be unnecessary to recount it here. It 
suffices to note, however, that this foremost anti-corruption body did not possess 
sufficient numbers or quality of personnel and the administrative structures re-
quired to make an appreciable impact in the war against corruption in such a 
huge country as Nigeria. Availability of high-quality manpower and administra-
tive structures are a direct function of adequate budget. An institution which 
lacks adequate budgetary support cannot hire or mobilise a competent workforce, 
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nor can it run and maintain a robust physical structure. As the data presented in 
Table 5.2 shows, the Nigerian authorities did not understand this fact or had cho-
sen to ignore it. 
Even though its weak financial base did not allow it to hire the brightest law-
yers (Ribadu 2004: 9)3 or the full complement of investigators required, the man-
ner in which the managers of the ICPC applied their resources – relative to re-
cruitment of staff – raises some questions about their managerial skills. From its 
own data, the ICPC clearly favoured the employment of administrative staff over 
specialists in its core areas (investigators and prosecutors). In 2004 for example, 
four years after its establishment, it could boast of only 26 investigators out of a 
total of 294 workers (ThisDay, 17 June 2004). The figure improved slightly to 32 
for investigators and 17 prosecutors out of a total of 271 workers in July 2005 
(ICPC 2006: 104). One can easily contrast this with what obtained at the Inde-
pendent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong, which had 
1,148 employees in December 1991, 794 (or 69%) of whom were working in the 
department of investigation. A mere 7% of its total workforce was employed in 
the administration department (Quah 1995: 402). The consequence of such dis-
equilibrium, especially in a country of more than 140 million people and marked 
by several decades of endemic and systemic corruption, was obvious. The ICPC 
could not conclude investigations in good time nor was it able to speedily prose-
cute corrupt individuals reported to it, resulting in many accusations being made 
against it. More importantly, its activities were mainly visible in Abuja (see Ta-
ble 5.3). 
 
 
Table 5.2  Budgetary allocation and staff strength of ICPC (2000-5) 
 Oct. 2000 - 
Sept. 2001 
Oct. 2001 - 
Sept. 2002 
Oct. 2002 - 
Sept. 2003 
Oct. 2003 - 
Sept. 2004 
Oct. 2004 - 
July 2005 
Budget 
proposed 
by ICPC  
N2,558m N9,027m N1,652m N943m N1,208m 
Amount 
released  
N990m 
(38.7%) 
N415m 
(4.6%) 
N410m 
(24.9%) 
N497m 
(52.7%) 
N262m* 
(21.7%) 
Number of 
personnel 137 261 293 294 271** 
*  This amount represents the sum that had been released as at the end of May 2005. This will probably 
have doubled by the end of the year. 
**  The reduction in the number of staff, compared with the previous year, was explained largely by the 
departure of several staff who were on secondment from other public institutions. 
Source: ICPC (2006). 
                                                 
3  Nuhu Ribadu, the EFCC chairman, estimated that it costs between N5 and N10 million to prosecute a 
major fraud case (Ribadu, 2004).  
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Table 5.3 Geographical distribution of court cases initiated  
 by ICPC (March 2005) 
State Location of court No. of cases 
Abuja 
Kaduna 
Rivers 
Edo 
Kano 
Imo 
Benue 
Kwara 
Lagos 
Niger 
Kogi 
Plateu 
Ebonyi 
Ondo 
Kebbi 
Delta 
Abuja 
Kaduna 
Port Harcourt 
Benin 
Kano 
Owerri 
Markurdi 
Ilorin 
Lagos/Ikeja 
Minna 
Lokoja 
Jos 
Abakaliki 
Akure 
Birnin-Kebbi 
Asaba 
15 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
Total  40 
Source: ICPC (2005a).  
 
 
In October 2005, the ICPC took steps to improve and restructure its staff situa-
tion by recruiting more staff. During that exercise, a total of 152 new employees 
were brought in to boost its operations, 45 of whom were investigators (ICPC 
2005b). Many thought, all things being equal, this improvement in staff strength 
was going to impact positively on the ICPC’s performance, especially in the key 
areas of investigations and prosecutions. But as the saying goes, all things are 
never equal. The ICPC’s problems were much deeper than the issue of funding or 
staffing. Inefficiencies in Nigeria’s criminal justice system in general and the un-
cooperative attitude of the political leadership at the time, particularly the notori-
ously corrupt federal legislature, proved to be greater sources of problems for this 
anti-corruption body.  
 
Constitutional loopholes and ineffective criminal justice system  
According to the authors of a recent UN report on judicial integrity, “a fair and 
efficient judiciary is the key to all anti-corruption initiatives” (Langseth & Stolpe 
2001: 3). Nigerian courts, especially at the lower levels, are notorious for corrup-
tion, perversion of justice, snail-speed of trials, and political interference (Oye-
bode 1996; Federal Republic of Nigeria 1994). Despite the much-vaunted inten-
tion to reform these institutions (Ojo 2005), the Obasanjo government failed to 
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push through any major reform before leaving office in May 2007. Although the 
judiciary went on to witness considerable reforms following the intervention of 
some international organisations and the increasingly independent National Judi-
cial Council (see Chapter 4), most of the progress recorded was in the area of 
improving the integrity of judges. In the area of efficiency, that is speed of trials, 
very little change took place. Although part of the problems had to do with con-
stitutional immunity against arrest and prosecution granted to some political 
leaders, and an insufficient number of judges, the courts were also guilty of un-
necessary adjournments of cases and indulging in granting incessant interlocu-
tory injunctions to accused persons (Ribadu 2004: 6).  
The consequence of this for the ICPC was that its court cases, some of them as 
old as the commission itself, were buried in complex judicial processes, as ac-
cused persons, aided and abetted by their lawyers, continued to exploit these 
loopholes to frustrate the course of justice.  
Court cases could last between five and ten years, or even longer. This is espe-
cially the case where the individual facing trial has sufficient resources, enough 
to hire one of the senior advocates of Nigeria (SAN). The SANs are the most 
successful lawyers in the country. Among them are those who are very conver-
sant with the numerous loopholes in the legal system, which can enable an ac-
cused person to delay justice, if not escape it completely. With this information 
in mind, we will now proceed to review some of the most ‘celebrated cases’, 
which highlight the role of an inefficient judiciary in Nigeria’s faltering anti-
corruption drive. 
 
 The case of Milton Paul Ohwovoriole and others 
The ICPC launched its first major operation in 2000 with the arrest of four indi-
viduals accused of offering N3.5 million in bribes to a member of a commission 
of inquiry established by the federal government to probe the financial activities 
of the defunct Nigerian Airways Limited (NAL). The four included a senior ad-
vocate, Milton Paul Ohwovoriole; Adebiyi Olafisoye, a multi-millionaire and 
proprietor of an insurance company, Fidelity Bond Ltd.; and one of the latter’s 
managers, Adeyemi Omowunmi. The three, according to the ICPC, conspired to 
offer the bribe through Adeyemi Omowunmi to the fourth accused, Alhaji Mika 
Anache, a member of the commission of inquiry on NAL. The money, which 
was paid on the 16 November 2000, according to investigators, was intended to 
procure a favourable report from the commission of inquiry. Alhaji Anache, an 
influential member of the governing Peoples Democratic Party, said he kept the 
money in his personal bank account because “the commission was on recess”, 
with the intention of reporting the matter to the commission. He failed to do so, 
however, until another member reported that he had received information that a 
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member of the commission of inquiry had received N3.5 million in gratification. 
This was two months after the money was paid. The action constituted an offence 
under Sections 10(a)(ii) and 231(1) of the ICPC Act. 
This case immediately raised hope of a quick breakthrough in Nigeria’s per-
ennial struggle with corruption, given its straightforward nature and the social 
backgrounds of those involved. Unfortunately, the hope soon turned unfounded, 
as the ICPC’s attempts to prosecute the offenders suffered one delay or the other 
owing to incessant adjournments, injunctions, and counter injunctions granted by 
the trial courts. More disturbingly, the Nigerian Police, well known for their cor-
ruption and inclination to collude with criminals seeking to escape justice, soon 
announced that the principal suspect, Adeyemi Omowunmi, who investigators 
said had personally ferried the money to the indicted member of the commission, 
had escaped from its detention under ‘mysterious’ circumstances (The News, 25 
June 2001). As at the end of March 2012, this case had yet to be concluded. In 
fact, the trial had not yet gone beyond the Abuja High Court, which was the first 
court of trial. In other words, even if conviction was secured at that level, the ac-
cused persons could still appeal to the Appeal Court at Kaduna, before proceed-
ing finally to the Supreme Court were the Appeal court to uphold the judgment 
of the Abuja High Court. 
 
 The case of the Ondo commissioners 
Another case that underlined the ICPC’s battle with an inefficient, sluggish 
criminal justice system was the one involving two commissioners (equivalent to 
ministers at the federal level) from Ondo State. It is important to recall that Ondo 
State was one of the states which mounted a legal challenge against the ICPC Act 
between June 2000 and July 2001 at the Supreme Court of Nigeria, challenging 
the constitutionality of the ICPC and its enabling Act. This state, therefore, has a 
long history of hostility to the ICPC and everything connected with it. Indeed, its 
hostility was further reinforced when the ICPC decided to open investigations 
against officials of the state for alleged corrupt practices. The investigations fol-
lowed a petition to the ICPC, alleging that the Ondo State government had ac-
quired a property valued N500 million, in Lagos, the nation’s commercial capi-
tal, ‘under very dubious circumstances’. Some top government officials, includ-
ing the state governor, were said to have derived undue benefits from the deal, in 
violation of their oath of office and indeed the ICPC Act. Following this, an invi-
tation was issued to the State Commissioner for Finance, requiring him to appear 
before the anti-graft body with all documents related to the acquisition of the 
property (Newswatch, 3 March 2003). This invitation was ignored by the official 
concerned, prompting the ICPC to issue a warrant for his arrest and the arrest of 
the Ondo State Attorney-General, which did not produce any result either. The 
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two officials, with the active connivance of the state government, simply disap-
peared or went into hiding each time officials of the ICPC were in the state to ef-
fect their arrest.  
When they finally decided to come out of hiding, these officials, again with 
the open support of the Ondo State government, sued the ICPC and its chairman, 
whom they accused of defamation (Vanguard, 24 May 2002). According to 
them, the ICPC boss had referred to them as “fleeing criminals”, while featuring 
in some radio and television programmes held on 4 and 7 January 2002, respec-
tively. They alleged that the aforesaid invitation was signed only on 9 January 
2002. The ICPC’s action, according to them, constituted an infringement of their 
“fundamental human rights” (The Guardian, 18 January 2002). Political senti-
ments were soon introduced, when they alleged that their investigation was a 
“deliberate attempt by the ICPC, which has become an instrument in the hands of 
their political rivals, to bring down the leadership of the state” (Newswatch, 3 
March 2002).4  
By evading physical arrest and possible arraignment on 11 counts of infrac-
tions bordering on corruption and then filing a civil suit against the ICPC, these 
accused persons managed to escape justice. Their schemes were helped by defi-
ciencies in the criminal justice system. For instance, a general lack of security 
had ensured that one of the accused (the Attorney-General) managed to flee the 
country, leaving the ICPC with very little proof. It was not surprising that at the 
end of their first trial at the High Court of Akure, the capital of Ondo State, in 
March 2004, the accused were acquitted for want of “substantial evidence” 
(ThisDay, 23 March 2004), leaving the ICPC with no option but to appeal.  
The failure of the ICPC before the Akure High Court was also due in part to 
loopholes in its own law (the ICPC Act). According to Section 26 (2) of the Act, 
“(p)rosecution for an offence under this Act shall be initiated … in any superior 
court of record so designated by the Chief Judge of a State or the Chief Judge of 
the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2000a). In 
other words, it is the responsibility of the head of the judiciary or chief judge of 
the 36 states of the federation (for all offences committed in any of the 36 states) 
or the chief judge of the federal capital, Abuja (for offences committed in Abuja), 
to inaugurate a “superior court of record” and appoint “competent” judges to hear 
cases brought by the ICPC. The term “superior court of record” in Nigeria means 
any of the 36 State High Courts (under the 36 state governments) or any of the 
                                                 
4  These officials had actually traced their problems to a “certain ex-commissioner” who was dismissed 
for fraud by the state government. Determined to get back his own pound of flesh, this individual was 
said to have sent a petition to the ICPC and distributed forged documents on the acquisition of the 
controversial property, with the aim of discrediting the state government. This was during the period 
leading to the run-up to the 2003 general elections.  
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Federal High Courts scattered across the country, including the one based in 
Abuja, the federal capital (under the federal government).  
The consequence of this provision of the ICPC Act is that any offence com-
mitted in any of the 36 states (such as the one involving the Ondo commission-
ers) is brought before a court controlled by the state in question and judged by a 
judge appointed by an appointee of the same state government. In countries such 
as Nigeria, where judges are hardly independent of appointing authorities, it is 
difficult to see how a case brought against an official of a state government can 
receive a fair trial in its own court. If the Ondo State government does not want 
its officials convicted, as was clearly the case, it is almost impossible for the 
ICPC to secure victory before an Ondo State High Court. The ICPC subsequently 
launched an initiative to have this aspect of its law repealed, to ensure that its 
cases are taken only before the federal high courts and to avoid any interference 
by the state governments, largely seen as indifferent to the ongoing war against 
corruption. The ICPC’s proposed amendment had still not passed through the 
National Assembly by the time President Obasanjo left office, and nor has it been 
passed to date. 
 
 The case of state governors 
Beyond incessant adjournment of cases by judges and the use of counter litiga-
tion by accused persons, which tend to delay the application of justice, there are 
other important legal factors which have limited the capacity of the ICPC enor-
mously, and indeed all the other anti-corruption bodies in Nigeria (including the 
Nigerian Police, the EFCC, and the Code of Conduct Bureau). One of these 
loopholes is certainly the constitutional immunity against arrest and prosecution 
granted by Section 308 to major political leaders: The President, Vice-President, 
and all 36 state governors and their deputies (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999a). 
This provision was partly intended to protect these political leaders or heads of 
government and their deputies from incessant and frivolous litigation, which 
would distract attention from the serious business of governance. However, this 
nobly intended provision also served other functions, notably as a carte blanche 
for some of these officials to engage in treasury looting. 
Certainly, relevant sections of the ICPC law prescribe some procedures under 
which the President, Vice-President, and governors and their deputies can be in-
vestigated and impeached for corruption. According to Section 52 of the Act, 
when an allegation of corruption has been made and found to be true (by the 
ICPC), the report of such investigation must be submitted to the Chief Justice of 
Nigeria, who will then appoint an independent jury to further investigate the ac-
cusations. Where the jury confirms the veracity of the allegations, it will then 
foreword its findings to the National Assembly (in the case of the President or 
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Vice-President) or the state legislature (in the case of the governors or their depu-
ties), which can then initiate proceedings for impeachment in accordance with 
Section 52(1) (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2000a). Unfortunately, all attempts 
by the ICPC and other institutions to apply this difficult rule were blocked by the 
courts, which held that the provision was illegal to the extent that it is in conflict 
with Section 308 of the Constitution.  
Similarly, as in all presidential systems of government, the Nigerian Constitu-
tion anticipates some type of legislative control of the Executive. Unfortunately, 
the actual practice is such that the Executive (the governors especially) exercises 
greater control over the legislature than does the legislature over the Executive. 
Rather than check the excesses of their governors, much of the legislature acts 
more like a rubber stamp for the governors. As the cases that follow show, unless 
constitutional immunity is completely removed or at least modified, all these 
provisions will remain ineffective in the face of the wanton corruption perpe-
trated by some of these protected officials, particularly the governors.  
Between 1999 and 2007, petitions alleging one form of corruption or another 
against the governors, who collectively control about half of Nigeria’s vast oil 
revenue, flooded the ICPC. After initial hesitation, the ICPC decided to act. In 
January 2003, it issued a statement confirming that investigations involving at 
least 15 of the 36 governors, who belonged mostly to the ruling PDP, had almost 
been concluded and that those who had cases to answer would soon be prose-
cuted (The Guardian, 28 March 2003). Of course, this statement raised many po-
litical concerns, given the fact that it had been preceded by an earlier request by 
the National Chairman of the PDP, addressed to the ICPC, seeking to ascertain 
the ‘status’ of all those who wanted to contest elections (in April 2003) under its 
platform. Fears were raised about the possibility that the leadership of the party, 
in active connivance with the Presidency, might be seeking to scuttle the political 
ambition of some governors perceived to be hostile or disloyal to the President. 
All the same, the statement by the ICPC was welcomed by a considerable num-
ber of Nigerians, who had become overwhelmed by stories of massive corruption 
by government officials, particularly by governors of oil-producing states. These 
individuals were frequently associated with massive embezzlement of public 
funds, money laundering, ownership of numerous overseas accounts and prop-
erty, ostentatious displays of wealth, and frequent and unexplained trips abroad. 
These accusations were not unfounded, as some of the events described in the 
next chapter will show. But the challenge for anti-corruption bodies such as the 
ICPC remained how to bring these powerful officials to book in view of the im-
munity which the Constitution accords them. 
Subsequently, the ICPC announced that investigations were completed and 
that a formal request had been forwarded to the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) in 
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line with Section 52 of its Act, requesting him to appoint an independent jury to 
investigate allegations against five governors indicted in its report (The Guard-
ian, 28 March 2003). Apart from Governor D. S. P. Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa 
State, whose file was the first to be sent to the CJN on 8 January 2003, the other 
governors were not named. Alamieyeseigha was accused of corruption and abuse 
of office by one Festus Gbassa, a citizen of his state (ThisDay, 21 January 2001). 
Specifically, he was said to have approved “contracts and payments to the tune of 
N1.7 billion to 8 fictitious companies” with respect to construction works in the 
state-owned Niger Delta University. The Bayelsa State Tenders Board, presided 
over by him, also awarded contracts valued at N667.3 million to fictitious com-
panies. Another allegation was that this governor, with the help of some local 
banks, transferred public funds running into billions of naira into his private bank 
accounts abroad. Mr Alamieyeseigha was also said to own numerous landed 
properties at home and abroad, including a five-star hotel in Abuja, the nation’s 
capital (Newswatch, 3 March 2003). 
But the ICPC’s case file on Alamieyeseigha contained at least two important 
weaknesses. First, as the agency itself noted, it could not confirm or verify the 
authenticity of all the claims, such as the property he allegedly owned in his 
state. This, according to the ICPC, was because all attempts to do so were frus-
trated by the state’s Commissioner of Lands and Housing, who refused to coop-
erate with agents of the commission during their investigations. When the ICPC 
declared its intention to commence criminal prosecution against Alamieyeseigha, 
a second weakness emerged. Five of the eight companies classified as “fictitious” 
by the ICPC and as having benefited from the Bayelsa governor emerged with 
proof of their existence to challenge what they called “false accusations and at-
tempts to intimidate them”. According to them, not only did they exist as legal 
entities (the ICPC apparently had not crosschecked this fact with the Corporate 
Affairs Commissions charged with the registration of companies, nor did it invite 
the companies for a discussion), but they had had no business relations whatso-
ever with Alamieyeseigha or the government of Bayelsa State. They thereafter 
instituted their own suits before the Abuja High Court requesting damages and, 
of course, that the entire report on Alamieyeseigha be set aside. 
While these suits failed to secure a reprieve for Alamieyeseigha, which was 
clearly the intended goal – the trial court upheld the ICPC’s powers to prosecute 
the governor in line with Section 52 of its Act – it dealt a decisive blow to the 
credibility of the ICPC. The indiscretion and poor investigative skills of the ICPC 
were highlighted by the trial judge, who noted in his 25 November 2005 judg-
ment that “there was an attendant irregularity in the probe conducted by the ICPC 
to the extent that the companies were not given the opportunity to defend them-
selves in line with the principle of fair hearing” (The Guardian, 28 November 
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2005). For a long time, these gaps in the case of the ICPC were capitalised upon 
by Alamieyeseigha and his supporters, who spearheaded a media war in an at-
tempt to weaken the commission and force it to back down on its pledge to press 
charges against the governor. When the ICPC refused to back down, Alamieye-
seigha’s immunity against investigation and prosecution became an alternative 
escape route. 
On 20 January 2003, barely two weeks after his case file was sent to the CJN 
for action, Governor Alamieyeseigha filed his own suit before the Abuja High 
Court against the ICPC and the CJN. In his suit, Alamieyeseigha did not contest 
his indictment over allegations of grand corruption. He simply wanted an order 
(interlocutory injunction) by the court restraining the CJN from appointing an 
independent counsel, as demanded by the ICPC, to investigate allegations of cor-
ruption against him (ThisDay, 21 January 2001). The principal ground for his suit 
was that “all governors (and their deputies) enjoy immunity against investigation 
and prosecution in line with Section 308 of the Nigerian Constitution” and, there-
fore, that “Section 52(1) of the ICPC Act on the basis of which the ICPC had 
demanded the CJN appoint a jury was unconstitutional, null and void”. In Ala-
mieyeseigha’s estimation, the action demanded by the ICPC – his appearance be-
fore an independent counsel – would violate his immunity as guaranteed by the 
Constitution. Governor Alamieyeseigha also sued the CJN himself over the same 
issue (ThisDay, 17 June 2004). 
Governor Alamieyeseigha’s request was fully granted by the court, which is-
sued a restraining order that all investigations and prosecutions be stopped. 
Alamieyeseigha’s victory had an immediate consequence on the activities of the 
ICPC, notably the quiet decision by the anti-corruption agency to abandon prose-
cution of the other four governors whose files were already before the CJN, 
whatever may have been their crimes. By the same measure, all future attempts 
to prosecute state governors, believed to be among the worst offenders in terms 
of corruption, were also rendered practically impossible,5 subsequently granting a 
charter of impunity among these categories of officials. After its failed attempts 
to bring Alamieyeseigha to justice, the ICPC carefully avoided taking on the 
governors despite public pressure to do so, leading to a gradual loss of credibil-
ity. Its defence was often that it lacked sufficient financial resources to do so. 
Other sister organizations which had sought to challenge the constitutional im-
munity granted to governors encountered the same defeat. One of them was the 
Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), which in a close collaboration with the EFCC 
wanted to prosecute Governor Joshua Dariye of Plateau State over allegations of 
                                                 
5  At this time, the ICPC had already forwarded the dossiers of 15 governors indicted for corruption to 
the CJN. 
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operating foreign bank accounts, corruption, and money laundering but was stop-
ped by the court (The Guardian, 7 December 2004).  
The negative impact of constitutional immunity in a country ravaged by en-
demic high-level corruption was widely acknowledged. Indeed, not many Nigeri-
ans, outside the group who benefit from this provision, hold the view that it 
should be retained. Gani Fawehinmi, a senior lawyer and one of Nigeria’s irre-
pressible anti-corruption and human rights’ crusaders, warned that “the entire 
Section 308 has to go. If it does not go, corruption will not end. If Section 308 is 
not removed, executive lawlessness will never stop. If Section 308 is not thrown 
out of our constitutional order, abuse of power will continue to heighten in the 
body polity” (The Guardian, 15 April 2004). Even in his ruling restraining the 
CCB from prosecuting the Governor of Plateau State for corruption, Justice 
Steve Jonah Adah of the High Court of Abuja warned that “this immunity is the 
albatross that hangs on the neck of Nigeria. Until it is cut off there will be no 
unity between politics and probe” (The Guardian, 7 December 2004). The Na-
tional Judicial Council (NJC), Nigeria’s highest judicial regulatory body, also 
expressed a similar view. In a proposal submitted to the Senate (Sub-Committee 
on the Review of the 1999 Constitution), the body argued that “immunity from 
criminal prosecution granted to specified officers of State … is being abused and 
is capable of being abused in a manner that could endanger the nation and its 
democratic system of government … In view of all the following, the NJC is of 
the opinion that (it) be reviewed with a view to closing avenues of abuse”.6 
There were also several discussions within government circles about a possi-
ble modification of the immunity clause, to allow for the nomination of an inde-
pendent jury that could launch criminal pursuits (but not civil) if good grounds 
existed against indicted officials. This was also among the recommendations of a 
National Political Reform Conference inaugurated by President Obasanjo, which 
brought together some of the most important members of the Nigerian elite in 
Abuja between February and May 2005 (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2005). This 
proposal had earlier been advanced in a bill sent to the National Assembly by the 
CCB, which had suffered legal defeat at the hands of Governor Dariye of Plateau 
State and three others (in Abia, Oyo, and Jigawa states) accused of maintaining 
foreign bank accounts in violation of existing rules (ThisDay, 20 May 2005). 
However, political reality on the ground did not favour such changes. Any 
amendment of the Nigerian Constitution requires the approval not only of both 
houses of the National Assembly, most of whose members had expressed their 
discomfort with a powerful anti-graft body, but also that of at least 24 state as-
semblies. This means the support of the state governors is necessary, those who 
                                                 
6  The NJC in fact wanted to exclude criminal and electoral offences from the cover of constitutional 
immunity.  
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stand to lose most if they support the amendment. Any such move on their part 
will amount to committing a form of class suicide, something that is rather un-
common in Nigeria. 
In many ways, therefore, the problem of weak capacity (insufficient human 
and material resources, limited powers, and an obstructive criminal justice sys-
tem) that confronted Nigeria’s foremost anti-corruption agency is also dependent 
upon and closely linked to the issue of political will and support and the attitudes 
of key political actors. This point was clearly demonstrated by the frosty relation-
ship between the National Assembly and the ICPC during the Obasanjo era, es-
pecially during the period 2000-4. 
 
Political leadership and the ICPC’s anti-corruption campaign 
Since the publication of Gaetano’s ground-breaking work on elite theory (Gae-
tano 1939), the dominant role of national elites in political life in general, and in 
the policymaking and implementation process in particular, in all countries – 
democratic and authoritarian – has been the subject of much intellectual interest 
(Dye 2001; Kalu 2004; Daloz 2002). In a study touching on the role of customs’ 
agencies in the fight against corruption, Irene Hors noted that “reformers need to 
be centrally concerned with the attitudes, perceptions and actions of elites, as 
they will be fundamental to any efforts to initiate and sustain reform” (Hors 
2001: 54). The will and political behaviour of a national elite form what Vasant 
Moharir calls the “political feasibility” of a public policy, which according to 
him is a decisive factor that cannot be ignored or underestimated in the explana-
tions for success or failure of government policies and programmes (Moharir 
2002), including anti-corruption crusades. This hypothesis is largely true of Ni-
geria’s anti-corruption policy, as reflected in the predicament of the ICPC at the 
hands of Nigeria’s governing elite, of whom the national lawmakers form an im-
portant component.  
Although it may not be the sole or even the strongest holder of political power, 
the support and behaviour of the parliament is crucial for the success of govern-
ment policies and programmes for many reasons, notably the parliament’s power 
over the control of public funds and laws. Strong political will and support for 
public policies by the political class (including the legislature), which controls 
public resources in a democratic state, can be measured by their willingness to do 
all that is necessary to raise the capacity and effectiveness of institutions charged 
with the implementation of public policies. This usually involves appropriation 
of sufficient funding required for running such institutions and achieving policy 
goals, such as recruitment of qualified staff, acquisition of necessary structures 
and equipment, granting such institutions sufficient powers, and providing the 
necessary enabling legal environment for these institutions to operate. Similarly, 
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the presence of strong political will should also be seen in the absence of political 
interference and in the refusal to politicise or manipulate such institutions for 
selfish ends. Political leaders must also be willing to respect and observe the 
regulations advanced by the policy and thereby show a good example and en-
courage public confidence.  
These conditions were largely absent as far as the crusade against corruption 
spearheaded by the ICPC was concerned. The political leadership at the national 
level, particularly the federal legislature, did more to undermine the capacity of 
the ICPC than empower it to fight corruption. We have already noted how the 
federal legislators’ refusal to allocate sufficient funds and to give favourable con-
sideration to the request from the anti-graft agencies for legal amendments to 
correct observed legal loopholes undermined the potency of these institutions. 
Yet it appears that the greatest weapon employed by the legislature to weaken 
these institutions was their open indulgence of corrupt practices and their politi-
cisation of the work of the ICPC.  
Until 2003, the National Assembly did nothing overtly to interfere in the op-
erations of the ICPC. It was content with its decision not to allocate sufficient 
funds and not to give favourable consideration to the request from the anti-graft 
agencies for legal amendments to correct observed legal loopholes. Friction be-
tween both institutions and open interference from the Assembly emerged only 
when the ICPC announced that following the petitions it received from some 
members of the national legislature alleging corruption on the part of its leader-
ship, it had opened investigations into the financial activities of the leaderships of 
both houses of the National Assembly, that is, the Senate and the House of Rep-
resentatives.  
The ICPC’s statement did not come as a surprise. For many years, both institu-
tions, which together make up the federal legislature, were considered the bastion 
of political scandals and large-scale corruption. Only six months after the As-
sembly’s inauguration, its entire leadership was swept away following allega-
tions of falsification of age and certificates. These were no mere allegations. In 
July 1999, Mr Salusi Burahi, Speaker of the House of Representatives, was sen-
tenced to two years in prison (with the option of a N2,000 fine) for falsifying his 
educational and birth certificates (ThisDay, 25 July 1999). A few months later, 
the new leadership, including the Senate President (also the Chairman of the Na-
tional Assembly) became enmeshed in yet another serious allegation of corrup-
tion. The allegation included the charge that the leadership of the legislature had 
awarded contracts to themselves, members of their families, and cronies at in-
flated prices and in utter disregard of existing regulations. These allegations were 
so widespread that they forced the National Assembly to allow an internal probe. 
The report of the probe submitted in August 2002 indicted the leadership, includ-
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ing the Senate President and his deputy and virtually all the senate committee 
chairmen, paving the way for the loss of their leadership positions (ThisDay, 26 
July 2000). The new leadership that emerged after this scandal did not show 
much interest in transparency either. Repeated pleas and law suits initiated by 
some members of the legislature to force the new leaders to hand over the report 
of the Senate committee that had indicted the departed officers to the ICPC for 
possible prosecutions were spurned (Vanguard, 24 May 2002).  
The failure of the National Assembly to keep its own house in order and re-
peated petitions against its leadership made the ICPC’s intervention and the sub-
sequent clash between the institutions unavoidable. The ICPC intervention was 
first prompted by a petition by one Senator Arthur Nzeribe, to the effect that 
Senate President Anyim Pius Anyim (the third since the birth of the National As-
sembly in May 1999), was constructing three mansions in different parts of the 
country, supposedly with state funds. The Senate President also allegedly “ap-
proved contracts to fictitious companies at inflated prices and paid huge sums to 
his loyalists in the Senate for some official duties that were never carried out” 
(The News, 7 May 2001). Similar allegations were also made against the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, Alhaji Ghali Umar Na’abba, in petitions ad-
dressed to the ICPC in August 2002 by some members of that institution (ICPC 
2002). On the basis of these petitions, the ICPC decided to write to the leadership 
of both institutions, demanding their cooperation in its investigations. But instead 
of cooperation, the leaders of the National Assembly were spoiling for a fight. 
The Speaker of the House of Representatives initially agreed to cooperate with 
the ICPC, but on the condition that a copy of the report of investigation on him 
be made available to him. This request was turned down by the ICPC, which 
cited provisions in its Act stating that the contents of investigations can only be 
divulged to the accused person when preliminary investigations are concluded. 
At this point, Mr Na’abba adopted a more confrontational posture. Initially he 
demanded assurances from the ICPC that the agency would not allow itself to be 
used as an instrument of blackmail and intimidation by politicians, in a veiled 
reference to the President, who was then embroiled in a bitter struggle for power 
with the leadership of the National Assembly over the latter’s attempt to impeach 
him. Mr Na’abba later stated that allegations against him, which he said were 
false, were instigated by the President, who wanted to undermine the impeach-
ment process put in place against him by the National Assembly. When the ICPC 
completed its preliminary investigation and found that sufficient grounds existed 
to interrogate the Speaker, Mr Na’abba promptly went to court, which gave him 
an interlocutory injunction halting further action on the matter by the ICPC. 
The Senate President also pursued a similar strategy. But in addition to a law 
suit against the ICPC, Mr Anyim also wrote petitions to the President, in which 
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he criticised the modus operandi adopted by the ICPC. For instance, he com-
plained that the ICPC had gone to the houses he was said to be building, in the 
company of agents of his accuser (Senator Nzeribe). In his opinion, it was also 
unacceptable for the ICPC to enter the premises of an accused without notifying 
him or her. For these reasons, Anyim accused the ICPC of becoming a “weapon 
in the hands of certain people” and therefore corrupt (Newswatch, 3 March 
2003).  
Tension between the ICPC and the National Assembly increased when the two 
leaders secured the support of the majority of their colleagues in the Senate and 
House of Representatives, most of whom wanted the anti-graft commission to be 
tamed, if not abolished completely. Thus, on 19 November 2002, the Senate in-
augurated a committee to investigate the activities of the ICPC since inception 
(Newswatch, 9 December 2002). This decision signalled the preparedness of the 
legislators to move finally against the commission, which the legislators had now 
come to perceive as a threat or, in the words of the Deputy Senate President, 
Ibrahim Mantu, as a “terrorist institution”. There were only two ways through 
which this move could be achieved: Abolition of the ICPC or amendment of its 
Act. For obvious reasons, the legislatures settled for the second strategy. This 
process commenced on 6 February 2003, when procedures for the amendment of 
the ICPC Act were unveiled in the Senate (ThisDay, 7 February 2003), amidst 
criticisms from the Executive and a number of civil society organisations, includ-
ing Transparency International, Zero Corruption Coalition, and the Nigerian Bar 
Association (The Guardian, 24 February 2003; ThisDay, 4 March 2003; This-
Day, 7 March 2003). After some very harsh criticisms directed at the ICPC, the 
bill was adopted by the Senate on 26 February 2003, that is, less than three weeks 
after the bill was introduced (The Guardian, 27 February 2003). Even the House 
of Representatives could not wait longer. On 13 March 2003, it followed the 
same path, despite a subsisting court order to the contrary (ThisDay, 14 March 
2003). These decisions were unprecedented departures from established legisla-
tive tradition in the country. While it took the same legislators a whole year (June 
1999 to July 2000) to consider and pass the 2000 Act, seven weeks was more 
than enough to complete both a probe of the activities of the ICPC and the pas-
sage of a new Act (the 2003 ICPC Act). Spirited attempts by the Executive to 
halt the process and save the 2000 Act, through a presidential veto, produced lit-
tle effect. The two houses of the national legislature simply met in a joint sitting 
on 7 May 2003 to overturn the veto (ThisDay, 8 May 2003).  
The lawmakers had premised their action on the need to safeguard the inde-
pendence and integrity of the ICPC. But their real intention could hardly be con-
cealed. In addition to the speed with which the bill was passed, its contents also 
spoke volumes about the real intention of the lawmakers. The new law contained 
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several important changes, which were obviously intended to weaken the anti-
corruption agency and eliminate any control the Executive (President) had over 
it. According to The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Bill 2003, the 
chairman of the ICPC would now be a serving judge of an appeal court, ap-
pointed by the CJN and subject to confirmation by the Senate (Newswatch, 24 
March 2003). The consequence was that the then chairman of the ICPC, a retired 
judge, had to quit his position, and the President was no longer in a position to 
appoint future chairmen to the commission. The new law also contained other 
new provisions, such as the one requiring that the commission must inform ac-
cused persons that it has received a petition against them or that they are under 
investigation for corruption. The scope of imposable sanctions (i.e. prison terms), 
and even the powers of the ICPC, were also dramatically reduced. Clearly, the 
lawmakers wanted to cripple the commission permanently.  
The actions of the lawmakers did not bring the ICPC to its knees, but their 
long-term impact was very damaging. While the ICPC was subsequently rescued 
by an Abuja High Court order, which invalidated the new Act on the grounds that 
lawmakers did not follow due process in amending the 2000 Act as required by 
the Constitution, its confidence and capacity was greatly eroded by the actions of 
the legislature (The Guardian, 9 October 2005). After this incident, it began to 
shy away from launching ‘high-profile’ investigations. All the leaders of the Na-
tional Assembly whom it accused of corruption left their posts without being 
questioned subsequently. The National Assembly had clearly succeeded in in-
timidating the ICPC. The agency was so intimidated that it began to talk about 
the need to make its existence (and those of other anti-corruption bodies) a “con-
stitutional requirement” (The Punch, 17 March 2005), to make it more difficult 
for hostile politicians to repeal the Act.7 Credibility also suffered, to the extent 
that there were growing calls for the ICPC to be scrapped, or merged with other 
similar institutions (Onyekakeyah 2006). But despite this compelling evidence of 
political interference and poor performance, a focus on the ICPC alone cannot 
reveal the full extent of difficulties involved in the quest to deploy specialised 
anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria. A more complete view will emerge after 
evaluation of the activities of the second major anti-corruption institution created 
by President Olusegun Obasanjo: The EFCC. 
The EFCC and the politics of anti-corruption crusade  
On 11 April 2003, President Obasanjo inaugurated a second anti-corruption 
agency, known as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Ac-
                                                 
7  This view was strongly canvassed by the ICPC during the National Political Reform Conference, 
which took place in Abuja between February and May 2005.  
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cording to information posted on its official website, the EFCC was created to 
“curb the menace of corruption that constitutes the cog in the wheel of progress; 
protect national and foreign investments in the country; imbue the spirit of hard 
work in the citizenry and discourage ill gotten wealth; identify illegally acquired 
wealth and confiscate it; build an upright workforce in both the private and pub-
lic sectors of the economy and; contribute to the global war against financial 
crimes”.8 In other words, the EFCC was created to fight corruption, among other 
crimes.  
The establishment of yet another anti-corruption commission can easily lead to 
the conclusion that Nigeria’s problem of corruption and financial crimes can best 
be overcome by the creation of more anti-corruption institutions rather than the 
strengthening of existing ones. Indeed, in one of his earliest interviews as chair-
man of the EFCC, Nuhu Ribadu even exaggerated this view a little further by 
suggesting that “in Nigeria today we need 10 EFCCs, 10 ICPCs for us to make 
even a meaningful progress” (ThisDay, 4 June 2005). However, the limited suc-
cess recorded by Ribadu’s men since their arrival in 2003, especially in the area 
of successful prosecution of corruption-related offences, punctured this argu-
ment. While not trying to provide excuses for the lacklustre performance of the 
ICPC or underestimate the relevance of a second or even more institutions to 
fight corruption where institutional capacity and political support exist, the ex-
perience of the EFCC, at least under Obasanjo, showed that Nigerians must first 
address the issues of internal institutional capacity (adequate human and material 
resources), poor judicial environment, and lack of commitment among key po-
litical actors – all of which have undermined the effectiveness of existing institu-
tions – if they hope to win the war against graft in the Fourth Republic. Before 
elaborating these challenges, we will first look at the relative contributions of the 
EFCC to the war against corruption, particularly in the areas of arrest, investiga-
tion, prosecution, and recovery of looted funds or proceeds of crime. These 
achievements can be best appreciated if placed side by side with the balance 
sheet of the ICPC.  
 
Comparing the ICPC and the EFCC 
By all standards, the performance of the EFCC under Obasanjo was unprece-
dented in the history of anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria. In many areas that 
can be considered as central to financial crime – investigation, prosecution, con-
viction and recovery of illegally acquired assets – the EFCC has recorded signifi-
cant successes. For instance, between the time of its creation in April 2003 and 
October 2005, it received a total of 3,758 petitions, out of which 526 were inves-
                                                 
8  www.efccnigeria.org 
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tigated (The Punch, 23 October 2005). By 2 June 2006, the number of petitions 
received had reached 5,400, while the number of cases under investigation and 
prosecution was put at 2,103 and 550, respectively (The Guardian, 2 June 2006). 
The agency also recorded similar success in the area of loot recovery (cash from 
banks, buildings and other landed properties within and outside the country, ve-
hicles, ships, aircraft, company stocks, etc.). The total value of what was recov-
ered stood at $5 billion in June 2006. The proceeds usually returned to the vic-
tims, such as individuals who had been victims of 419, the well-known Nigerian 
scam. In one such case, celebrated in the media, $4.48 million taken from a Hong 
Kong national by fraudsters was returned to the owner on 26 September 2005. In 
other cases, funds were paid back to the public treasury, especially those seized 
from former and serving government officials,9 or those recovered from private 
companies which had defrauded the government,10 in such areas as tax evasion 
(ThisDay, 2 June 2004). The EFCC also helped to reduce losses in other public 
institutions, such as in the NNPC, where barrels of crude oil lost to illegal bun-
kering fell drastically from 110,000 to 3,000 barrels per day, according to official 
statistics (The Tribune, 2 June 2006). 
 
 
Table 5.4 Comparative performance of the ICPC and the EFCC 
 ICPC EFCC Total 
No. of petitions received  1,846 5,400 7,246 
Estimation of funds/assets 3.9 billion 725 billion 728.9 billion 
    recovered (in naira)  (June 2006)  
No. of investigations concluded 80 550 630 
No. of persons arraigned 185 300 + 485 
No. of persons convicted (2007)  20 145 165 
Note: Except where indicated, these data are valid as at 10 October 2006. 
Source: Gashinbaki (2004). 
 
 
In the area of arrest and prosecution, more than 3,000 persons were arrested 
and interrogated between April 2003 and June 2006. Furthermore, by 2 June 
2006 there were at least 550 ongoing criminal prosecutions (Vanguard, 2 June 
2006). The list of those prosecuted included at least one governor (Alamieye-
seigha of Bayelsa State); a former President of the Senate and some of his col-
leagues; a former Inspector-General of the Nigerian Police; ministers (at state 
                                                 
9  This included, for example, the £3 million retuned by Britain as part of the Abacha loot and more than 
N17.7 billion recovered from convicted former police boss, Tafa Balogun.  
10  The recovered funds includes those recovered by the Federal Inland Revenue Service and initially lost 
through tax evasion by private firms, such as the N80 million paid by Halliburton in 2004.  
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and federal levels); chairmen and managing directors of banks, private compa-
nies, and public parastatals or corporations; local government chairmen; busi-
nessmen; high-profile fraudsters; and common criminals. The list of convictions 
was also impressive, standing at 20 in November 2005, 35 in April 2006, and 55 
on 2 June 2006 (ibid.). The figure rose to 82 in August 2006. The relative success 
of the EFCC was not unconnected with the scope of its powers but also the 
commitment of its leadership and staff. In many ways, however, it was also a 
function of the availability of resources,11 made possible by international pressure 
and support (The Guardian, 11 October 2006; The Punch, 26 November 2005). 
Table 5.4 shows a comparative index of performance of the two anti-corruption 
bodies.  
But despite this level of achievement, the EFCC was widely criticised, even 
much more so than the relatively underperforming ICPC. The major source of 
criticisms was, firstly, that the agency was selective in its fight against corruption 
in the public sector, in the sense of going after only those that were perceived as 
not being in the good books of the powers that be. Secondly, the EFCC was also 
harshly criticised for its tendency to violate fundamental human rights. This sec-
ond criticism became much more pronounced when information emerged that 
one of its high-profile detainees, Maurice Ibekwe, a member of the Federal 
House of Representatives, had died in its custody (ThisDay, 23 March 2004). 
Thirdly, and perhaps more disturbingly, critical review of the list of convictions 
secured by the EFCC shows that the agency had very little success in prosecuting 
senior public officials, the brains behind much of the Nigerian corruption story. 
Most of those convicted were non-public officials. 
One of the EFCC’s first major convictions was secured on 6 June 2005, when 
a former bank chairman (Fidelity Bank Plc.) and owner of a stock-brokerage firm 
(Thomas Kingsley Securities), Kingsley Ikpe, was sentenced after a nine-month 
trial to a total of 153 years in prison, without option of fine, on 39 counts of steal-
ing and falsification of documents. His prosecution began in August 2004, fol-
lowing a petition from one of his clients, who accused him of fraudulently re-
ceiving N135 million from the client under pretext of procuring for him some 
shares in Nigeria Breweries Plc., a brewing firm based in Lagos (ThisDay, 7 June 
2005). Mr Ikpe was also ordered to pay N61 million in damages to his client and 
N7.55 million in fines to regulatory authorities for the offences he committed be-
tween May 2002 and September 2003.  
                                                 
11  In November 2005, the EFCC received 24.7 million euros (or N3.8 billion) from the European Union. 
The funds were to “provide the EFCC with required equipment and technical support, further improve 
the knowledge of the agency’s staff through training, in-country and overseas, as well as to strengthen 
the capacity of the judicial system to handle economic and financial crimes”. The total financial assis-
tance from the EU was put at $32 million (or N4.16 billion) in October 2006. 
100 
 
Another major conviction came on 15 July 2005. This involved one Mrs 
Amaka Anajemba, who was arrested and detained by the EFCC in January 2004 
for participating in a financial scam which cost a Brazilian bank some $242 mil-
lion, leading to its collapse. After a 12-month trial, Mrs Anajemba was sentenced 
to two and a half years in prison, following a plea bargain. Mrs Anajemba was 
also ordered to forfeit assets estimated at N3 billion and pay a further $25 million 
as restitution to the victims, excluding $5 million and N2 million in fines to the 
government of Nigeria. Mrs. Anajemba was not the ‘principal accused’ in this 
case; she was said to have taken part and benefitted from the crime by virtue of 
her marital connections. Her husband, Ikechukwu Anajemba, one of the principal 
accused, died before the trial commenced. 
On 17 November 2005, Emmanuel Nwude, a wealthy businessman and owner 
of several companies, and Nzeribe Edeh Okoli, two of the other principal actors 
in the $242 million Brazilian scam, were jailed for a total of 25 (5 counts of 5 
years each) and 12 years (3 counts of 4 years each) respectively, by a Lagos 
court. Nwude was ordered to forfeit several fraudulently acquired assets, includ-
ing 14 houses (situated in the states of Lagos, Abuja, Enugu, Anambra, Rivers, 
and in London), six luxury cars, and more than 100 million units of shares ac-
quired in some local banks and other companies. He was also ordered to pay 
$110 million as restitution to the victims of the crime and a further $10 million in 
fines to the Nigerian government. The second convicted, Nzeribe Edeh Okoli, for 
his part, was ordered to forfeit several landed properties, including a petrol sta-
tion under construction and an undisclosed number of buildings in his home state 
of Enugu. In addition, he was also forced to part with three of his companies 
(Emrus, Ocean Marketing, and African Shelter Bureau), which were to be liqui-
dated by the state, and pay $11.5 million to the federal government in fines 
(ThisDay, 18 November 2005). The trial of both individuals, which started on the 
23 July 2004, was concluded within 15 months. 
But while the EFCC was successfully prosecuting high-profile private indi-
viduals on fraud-related charges, it consistently failed to do so with members of 
the political class, whether appointed or elected. What explains this discrepancy? 
Does this mean that it has been too afraid to take on the ‘big political fish’? Or 
was it a deliberate strategy? On the contrary, the EFCC had consistently placed 
this group of citizens at the centre of its operations, arguing that the political 
class is the major cause of the endemic corruption that has held Nigeria down for 
decades. The problem, however, was that taking on members of the political 
class required not only substantial institutional capacity but also a considerable 
amount of political support. Just as in the case of the ICPC, this support was 
largely non-existent.  
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To backtrack for a moment: At the time it was created, the EFCC did not elicit 
the kind of strong reaction that greeted the birth of the ICPC. This was in spite of 
the overwhelming, some say draconian, powers that were given to it. Ironically, 
the same legislators that held up the ICPC Act for over a year rushed back from 
their Christmas holidays to consider and pass the bill on the EFCC into law 
within days without any significant change to the original bill presented by the 
Executive. Outside the threat of international sanctions (by the FATF), which had 
played a decisive role, these legislators, and Nigeria’s political class by exten-
sion, never considered the EFCC as a potential threat. The EFCC and its enabling 
Act were, as we noted earlier, essentially regarded as instruments specifically de-
signed for individuals outside the political class, such as the ‘419-ers’ and fraud-
sters in the banking sectors. This understanding pushed the Speaker of the House 
of Representative, Ghali Umar Na’abba, to argue that “the EFCC was meant to 
fight 419 and money laundering, and not corruption in public places, which is, 
according to him, the duty of the ICPC” (ThisDay, 6 February 2006). This was 
also the general view among the public.  
But soon after its creation, the EFCC gradually began to refashion itself, tak-
ing advantage of its almost draconian enabling legislation. This move, as it 
should be expected, brought it into a head-on collision with the political class, 
helping to expose the limits of institutional capacity and political backing for the 
war against corruption available in Nigeria. The inefficiency of the judiciary also 
did not help matters.  
The judiciary as a drag on the EFCC’s capacity  
According to the EFCC’s chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria’s inefficient judicial 
system is by far one of the most important obstacles to the effectiveness of the 
EFCC (Ribadu 2004), which explains the limited number of convictions secured. 
As at October 2005, the EFCC had won only 20 convictions, arising from over 
300 prosecutions, launched in various courts (Lagos, Abuja and Kaduna), in spite 
of 3,758 petitions received and 526 investigations concluded (The Punch, 23 Oc-
tober 2005). As we have noted already, the EFCC’s record of conviction rose to 
82 in June 2006. Apart from hiding the fact that very few outside the private sec-
tor are included in that list, 82 convictions was still a dismal record in seven 
years, especially in a country with such a high incidence of corruption as Nigeria. 
Indeed, in countries with similar institutions, but with far more people and com-
paratively lower levels of corruption, such as Hong Kong (Klitgaard 1988), Bot-
swana (Kawana 2001), or even Zambia (Doig et al. 2005), anti-corruption agen-
cies were known to have achieved far better rates of conviction (see Tables 5.5 to 
5.7). In Zambia, for instance, 5,841 petitions were received, 334 criminal prose-
cutions launched, and 91 convictions won within a period of four years (1997-
102 
 
2001). In Hong-Kong, the figure was even higher. Over a period of four years 
(1999-2003), 21,108 petitions were received and 2,672 pursuits initiated, out of 
which 302, 309, and 217 convictions were won in 1999, 2002, and 2003, respec-
tively. How did the judiciary impact on the performance of the EFCC? 
One way in which the criminal justice system impacted negatively on the op-
erations of the EFCC and slowed down the rate of conviction is the exercise of 
constitutional immunity by the heads of governments, particularly the 36 state 
governors. The question of constitutional immunity has already been dealt with 
in relation to the performance of the ICPC; thus, a detailed analysis is unneces-
sary here. It suffices to say, however, that like the ICPC, the EFCC’s attempts to 
probe and jail these functionaries were equally frustrated by their immunity 
against arrest and prosecution. Joshua Dariye of Plateau State and Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa are good examples. Both were accused of massive 
corruption by the EFCC, but for a long time could not be prosecuted owing to 
their constitutional protection. The prosecution of the latter was launched in De-
cember 2005, after he was impeached by legislators of his own state, who were 
compelled to act following his arrest in London on money-laundering charges. 
Governor Alamieyeseigha was subsequently convicted by a Lagos court for cor-
ruption and money laundering. Like Mr Alamieyeseigha, Governor Dariye of 
Plateau was also arrested for money laundering by the London police and man-
aged to return to Nigeria in violation of his bail conditions. But unlike the for-
mer, he remained in office as governor for over two years without being charged 
with any offence. When pressure from the EFCC on his state’s legislators to im-
peach him became unbearable, Dariye simply disappeared. Governor Ayo Fayose 
of Ekiti State also took the Dariye option after he was impeached by state legisla-
tors for allegedly looting over a billion naira in public funds. Just like Dariye, his 
immunity served as a cover for him to escape justice.  
 
 
Table 5.5 Performance index of the Independent Commission Against Corruption  
 of Hong Kong (1999-2003) 
Year Petitions  Investigations Prosecutions Convictions 
 received completed launched won 
1999 3,561 2,453 504 302 
2000 4,390 2,993 608 NA 
2001 4,476 3,093 535 NA 
2002 4,371 3,516 604 309 
2003 4,310 3,185 421 217 
Total 21,108 15,240 2,672 NA 
Source: Hong Kong (1999-2003). 
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Table 5.6  Performance index of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime  
 (DCEC) in Botswana (1994-2001) 
Year 1994- 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
 1996* 
Petitions received 2,528 1,511 1,525 1,023 1,475 1,841 9,903 
Investigations completed 536 675 NA 382 233 503** NA 
Prosecutions launched 141 173 NA NA NA 46 NA 
Convictions won 59 NA NA 23 20 24 NA 
* The DCEC began work in September 1994. 
Source: DCEC (1994-2001).  
 
 
Table 5.7  Performance index of the Zambian Commission Against Corruption 
 (1997-2001) 
Year Petitions Investigations Prosecutions Convictions  
 received  launched* launched  won 
1997 865 495 69 5 
1998 1,485 538 63 29 
1999 1,325 460 100 30 
2000 1,263 403 49 10 
2001 903 392 53 17 
Total 5,841 2,288 334 91 
* Available data on the Zambian Commission Against Corruption did not contain information on inves-
tigations completed.   
Source: Doig et al. (2005). 
 
 
Apart from constitutional immunity, which was enjoyed by only a handful of 
officials anyway, other legal loopholes connected to the Nigerian judicial system 
also had a negative impact on the anti-corruption work of the EFCC. These in-
cluded Sections 35(2) and 36(11) of the Nigerian Constitution. Nuhu Ribadu, 
then EFCC chairman, gave a full account of the relationship between these provi-
sions and the war against graft:  
Section 35(2) gives a right to any person arrested or detained to remain silent or avoid an-
swering questions until after consultation with his/her lawyer. Section 36(11) also provides 
that any person tried for a criminal offence shall not be compelled to give evidence at the 
trial. When the rights are claimed, they may at times lead to over-protection of the accused 
person while restricting the means of protecting the rest of the society in the sense of making 
it difficult to prove a case against them. (Ribadu 2004: 6) 
In political systems where there are very experienced investigators and prose-
cutors and an efficient judiciary, an accused’s refusal to talk may not necessarily 
pose such an insurmountable obstacle. But a lack of institutional capacity in Ni-
geria has ensured that this refusal has posed a significant problem to the anti-
corruption institutions.  
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A more serious obstacle, however, was the inadequacy of the law known as 
the Evidence Act, which regulates what can be accepted as exhibits in the courts 
and what cannot. Part of Nigeria’s colonial legacy, the Evidence Act was enacted 
by its colonial masters for an agrarian and pedestrian society. In recent times, it 
has become grossly inadequate to cover the present advancement in technology 
with the concomitant sophistication employed in the commission of economic 
and financial crimes. The legislation did not, for example, anticipate the arrival 
of new technologies: Computers, the internet, fax, mobile telephone, credit cards, 
etc., now widely used in the conduct of financial frauds. The presence of such 
technical loopholes has been successfully exploited by accused persons and their 
lawyers, to the detriment of prosecutors.  
While the Nigerian judiciary has often been criticised for being either too slow 
or too lenient on individuals accused of corruption, thereby contributing to the 
current atmosphere of systemic corruption, the fact remains that judges are mere 
interpreters of law and not makers of law. Anti-corruption laws, like all laws, are 
made by politicians, who also retain the powers of amending them when they be-
come obsolete or ineffective in achieving their original goals. Unfortunately, 
politicians that thrive on graft have no incentive to pass laws that have the poten-
tial of undermining their positions – unless, of course, a law is targeted at politi-
cal opponents. If for any reason such legislation is passed, perhaps unintention-
ally and involuntarily as was the case with the EFCC Act, we can expect these 
politicians to move to hobble its effective implementation. The politicisation of 
the EFCC’s activities by Nigerian politicians, which we discuss in the next sec-
tion of this chapter, can be understood within this context.  
 
The politicisation of the anti-corruption war: The EFCC and the 2007 elections 
Any close analysis of the EFCC’s record will reveal one glaring anomaly: An 
apparent difficulty in obtaining conviction of political figures, whether appointed 
or elected, serving or retired. This is in spite of the preponderance of this group 
in the anti-graft body’s investigations. Many people in Nigeria will easily point 
to the fact that political elites are often wealthy people, who can afford to hire the 
best lawyers and wage protracted legal battles with anti-corruption agencies. In a 
judicial system riddled with technical loopholes, it is not difficult to see why 
these individuals often escape justice. Yet, this is not the only explanation. An-
other part of the explanation is that Nigerian governments at all levels have a his-
torical bias towards ‘big men’ in general, and ‘political notables’ in particular, in 
terms of willingness to apply sanctions. To begin with, existing legislation often 
displays discriminatory sanctions, such that sanctions imposable for large-scale 
corruption (the domain of politically powerful persons) can sometimes be rela-
tively mild compared with those prescribed for the relatively minor offences usu-
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ally committed by ordinary criminals. Even the discovery of large-scale fraud 
committed by a ‘powerful man’ is never a guarantee that sanctions will follow. 
The individual, if well-connected, can often be provided an escape route or what 
is commonly referred to as a ‘soft landing’ or ‘political solution’ in Nigeria. The 
process typically involves some form of subterranean negotiations or lobbying, 
spearheaded by ‘concerned friends’ or ‘elders’, usually made up of traditional 
rulers and leading politicians from the community of the accused (Adekoye 
2005; The Punch, 7 April 2005). When this is successful, the ‘soft landing’ or 
‘political solution’ can take the form of total clemency or, where that is not po-
litically feasible, a light sanction which will then be followed by a gradual proc-
ess of political rehabilitation.  
Examples are not difficult to find. During the regime of General Ibrahim Ba-
bangida (1985-93), a number of political figures indicted for corruption during 
probes or judicial trials carried out by previous regimes, notably those of Gener-
als Murtala Mohammed (1975-6) and Mohammadu Buhari (1984-5), were par-
doned and rehabilitated with attractive political appointments. One example was 
General Samuel Ogbemudia, who was indicted as military governor of former 
Midwestern State for serious financial malpractices by an ‘Assets Investigation 
Panel’ set up by General Mohammed, but was pardoned and later appointed as 
chairman of Nigerian Railway Corporation (Nwankwo 1999: 56). Similarly, 
Seaka Miner, a former Secretary to the Military Government in Benue State, who 
was indicted by another commission of inquiry for massive diversion of funds in 
the period 1968-75, to the extent of being declared “unworthy of occupying a 
public post”, was also rehabilitated by Babaginda, who appointed him chairman 
of a public bank, the Nigerian Merchant Bank (ibid.: 57). 
This practice continued under the Fourth Republic, despite the declared war 
against corruption. As we have already noted, in 1999 the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, Salusi Buhari, was forced to resign his position, paving the 
way for his arrest and conviction (for two years with an option of fine) by an 
Abuja court for falsifying his age and academic records, which had enabled him 
to contest and win election as a member of the lower house of the federal legisla-
ture. But after a few years, Mr. Buhari was granted a presidential pardon (obvi-
ously after some subterranean negotiations), paving the way for his appointment 
in 2005 as a member of the board of the Nigerian Educational Research and De-
velopment Council. Mr Buhari was known to have played a crucial role during 
the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, and after that remained a 
loyal and influential member of Obasanjo’s party, the PDP. In yet another exam-
ple, Chris Ekpenyong, a former deputy governor of Akwa Ibom State, who was 
forced to resign his position following the commencement of impeachment pro-
ceedings against him by his state’s house of assembly, for “gross misconduct and 
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abuse of office”,12 was also rehabilitated with the chairmanship of the Federal 
Tourism and Hospitality Board (The Guardian, 2 September 2005). These are 
only a few examples of a practice that has become well institutionalised at all 
levels of government in Nigeria.  
One achievement upon which the EFCC regularly prided itself was the demys-
tification of the concept of the ‘big man’ who is above the law. The most visible 
evidence of this achievement was the successful prosecution by the EFCC of 
former Inspector General of Police, Tafa Blogun, on 21 November 2005. Mr Ba-
logun, a former boss of the EFCC chairman, was convicted by an Abuja court for 
offences linked to the embezzlement and laundering of police funds in excess of 
N18 billion, in violation of the EFCC Act. Ironically, the Balogun case did more 
to confirm the important place of the ‘big man’ in Nigeria, a kingdom where 
“some animals are more equal than others” (Jason 2005). Mr Balogun not only 
obtained a “negotiated retirement” (ThisDay, 20 January 2005); he received what 
amounted to little more than a slap on the wrist. After being arraigned on 56 
counts, Mr Balogun ended up being convicted for the lightest of offences: Con-
cealing vital information from the EFCC over his alleged business concerns and 
interests in some companies amounting to over N17.7 billion, in violation of the 
EFCC Act, for which he spent only six months in jail and paid half a million 
naira in fine (ThisDay, 22 November 2005). This was consequent upon a ‘plea 
bargain’ between Balogun and the EFCC. According to the latter, the decision to 
abandon other weightier charges, including the embezzlement and laundering of 
over N18 billion, was to “minimise the cost of prolonged litigations” and also to 
escape an unknown outcome (ibid.).  
The Balogun case, therefore, clearly underlined the lack of confidence in the 
capacity, effectiveness, and integrity of the judiciary in Nigeria. But more impor-
tantly, it also showed the wide scope for manoeuvre open to politically influential 
individuals in the country. However, a political solution or soft landing does not 
tell the whole story about the impact of local politics on the attempts to fight cor-
ruption. What do individuals, who for any reason (such as membership of rival 
political factions) fail to procure a political solution or soft landing, do when they 
are indicted for corruption? Nigerian political elites have other ways of under-
mining any attempt to scrutinise their records while in office. Politicisation of the 
work of the anti-corruption organs in order to weaken such bodies and protect 
oneself from imminent sanction was one of the most frequently employed op-
tions (Ribadu 2006: 6). As preparations for the 2007 elections drew near in the 
                                                 
12  Specifically, the allegations against Mr Chris Ekpenyong included “diversion of public funds to pur-
chase a family house in Texas, United States … failing to declare his assets to the Code of Conduct 
before assuming office … influencing the diversion of contract awards to his numerous companies 
and fronts, etc.” (The Guardian, 2 September 2005).  
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last few years of Obasanjo’s rule, this politicisation took two worrying dimen-
sions.  
The first was the subtle but increasingly apparent instrumentalisation and ma-
nipulation of anti-corruption agencies, particularly the EFCC, by the government. 
The main goal was to undermine political enemies or rivals, while at the same 
time protecting supporters of the government (ruling faction of the government in 
power) from sanctions. This move was greatly facilitated by the fact that, quite 
unlike the ICPC Act, the EFCC law did not insulate the EFCC chairman from the 
influence of appointing authorities (i.e. the President).13 Thus, it was not uncom-
mon to hear the President ordering the EFCC to investigate this or that person, 
and to see the EFCC submit reports of such investigation to the President instead 
of going straight to the courts. In such a system, one can expect that enemies of 
the administration will more easily be prosecuted, just as friends or supporters of 
the regime will be handled with kid gloves. 
To cite just one example among very many cases: Following relentless allega-
tions of massive corruption, particularly in the awarding of contracts, in one of 
Nigeria’s richest public institutions, the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), Presi-
dent Olusegun Obasanjo inaugurated a Committee on the Review and Verifica-
tion of Contracts Awarded by the Nigerian Ports Authority for the period 2001-3. 
The panel was inaugurated on 1 April 2005 with Nuhu Ribadu, the EFCC chair-
man, as the head. The report of this panel confirmed that the managers of the 
NPA, including its board, were guilty of various corrupt practices, including re-
fusal to observe existing financial regulations, inflation of contracts, payments 
for fictitious contracts, purchase of items that had no relevance, and mismanage-
ment of funds (notably pension funds), which cost the NPA billions of naira. To 
quote the report submitted by the EFCC head:  
All contract approving authorities in NPA, including the Board and Management of the 
NPA, Managing Directors, Executive Directors, General and Ports Managers, other catego-
ries of approving authorities, as well as the appraising officers who served during the period 
under review should be held responsible for deliberate and flagrant violations of extant gov-
ernment rules and regulations, governing the award of contracts (and) … appropriately sanc-
tioned for contract splitting and inflation of contract price in utter disregard to laid-down 
government rules and regulations. (cited in Sunday Punch, 5 March 2006) 
What was the government’s reaction to such flagrant disregard of its anti-
corruption policy? Contrary to the expectation of many people, the government 
                                                 
13  Indeed, Section 43 of the EFCC Act provides that “the Attorney-General of the Federation may make 
rules or regulations with respect to the exercise of any of the duties, functions or powers of the Com-
mission under this Act”. More importantly, Section 3 (2) states that “a member of the Commission 
may at any time be removed by the President for inability to discharge the functions of his office 
(whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or for misconduct or if the Presi-
dent is satisfied that it is not in the interest of the Commission or the interest of the public that the 
member should continue in office” (ECCC Act 2004 op cit.).  
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simply rejected the report for being “inconclusive” and asked that it be reviewed 
by the EFCC. The outcome of this review was never made public. Moreover, up 
until the day Obasanjo left office, no action had been taken against the indicted 
officers.14 The handling of this particular case raised many questions about the 
government’s preparedness to sacrifice its allies when they are fingered in cor-
rupt deals. It should be borne in mind that the chairman of the NPA at this time, 
Bode George, also doubled as the vice-chairman of the ruling PDP, in addition to 
being a key ally of President Obasanjo.  
Allegations that the anti-corruption policy was being misused or being selec-
tively applied are again confirmed by another incident which occurred in 2006. 
In the middle of 2006, the local media was flooded with allegations that huge 
sums of money (between N50 and 200 million, according to some sources) were 
being paid to members of the National Assembly through some local banks, 
based in Abuja, by Obasanjo’s foot soldiers. The payments were allegedly made 
to secure the support of the lawmakers, who were considering a constitutional 
amendment bill, which among other provisions sought to extend the tenure of 
President Obasanjo. Faced with relentless public criticism, the President directed 
the EFCC to investigate the allegations. When it had completed its investigations, 
however, the EFCC said it could not substantiate the claims (Reuters, 16 May 
2006).  
While the government’s penchant for ignoring the malfeasances of its closest 
allies has contributed greatly to undermining the effectiveness of anti-corruption 
agencies such as the EFCC, the government has not been the sole actor in this 
politicisation of the anti-corruption war. Members of the political opposition also 
did much to politicise the war against graft. When politicians in opposition point 
to the massive corruption by those in power and the selective application of sanc-
tions, which is likely to be true anyway, they do this not necessarily out of any 
principled opposition to corruption. Often they do so to cleverly position them-
selves as a credible alternative to those in power, or more commonly, to discredit 
those who are accusing them of corruption in order to avoid possible arrest and 
prosecution.  
During the period under review, it was very common to hear members of the 
opposition, especially those who were positioning themselves for the 2007 elec-
tions, say that the anti-corruption drive being conducted by Obasanjo was noth-
ing but a weapon to intimidate and eliminate political rivals or enemies, espe-
cially those who were opposed to his failed attempt to obtain a third term in of-
fice. This argument was not completely without its merits. As a matter of fact, 
the EFCC head had at least on one occasion openly stated that both himself and 
                                                 
14  The indicted officials were, however, later arraigned and convicted for corruption under President 
Umar Yar’Adua, Obasanjo’s successor in office. 
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his institution were committed to depriving ‘corrupt politicians’ the chance of 
using the 2007 elections as an avenue for returning to power15 (Daily Trust, 26 
May 2006; The Guardian, 8 September 2006). The truth, however, was that poli-
ticisation of the anti-corruption campaign was driven by political calculations on 
both sides of the political divide. No case illustrated this paradox better than the 
bitter political pitched battle which took place between then Vice-President 
Abubaka Atiku and his boss, President Olusegun Obasanjo, in 2006-7.  
The quarrel between Vice-President Abubakar Atiku and President Olusegun 
Obasanjo came into the open in 2006 when Atiku declared himself a candidate 
for the 2007 presidential election, apparently without the approval of Obasanjo. 
However, Abubakar Atiku had been at loggerheads with Obasanjo since well be-
fore 2006. According to media sources, their quarrel started just after the 2003 
election, when both were re-elected for a second term of four years in a highly 
disputed election. Atiku was said to have betrayed his boss by nursing a secret 
ambition to stand against him in that election. He was said to have dropped his 
plans only at the last minute when it became apparent that the plot would not 
succeed. Matters grew worse between the end of 2005 and early 2006, when 
Atiku refused to endorse Obasanjo’s bid for a third term in office, choosing in-
stead to ally himself with members of the opposition, who were mobilizing 
against the third term project (Ndibe 2006). Obasanjo, of course, lost his much-
cherished third term bid but not without a word for his deputy. On several occa-
sions, he had, even without mentioning Atiku’s name, left no one in doubt about 
his determination to scuttle his deputy’s presidential ambition. What other 
weapon could be deployed to achieve this goal but the anti-corruption war? 
On 24 August and 26 September 2006, Vice-President Abubakar Atiku was 
indicted by the EFCC and an administrative panel instituted by the President, re-
spectively for “abuse of office” and “diversion of public funds to companies con-
trolled by friends and business associates” (ThisDay, 7-8 September 2006). The 
importance of this indictment will become clearer when viewed within the con-
text of Section 137 (1)(i) of the 1999 Constitution, which provides that  
[A] person shall not be qualified for election to the office of President if he has been indicted 
for embezzlement or fraud by a judicial commission of inquiry or an administrative panel of 
inquiry or a tribunal set up under the Tribunals of Inquiry Act, a tribunals of inquiry law or 
                                                 
15  In one statement the EFCC boss boasted that “[w]e are going to work and work across and we will 
cover all areas and directions. For example if you are in public office today and you want to seek re-
election, we will check your assets declaration. When you resumed office you declared your assets. 
Today we know what you have. You cannot deceive anybody, we know what you have. If we see any-
thing that you cannot explain, then we take you through the justice process and therefore I think such 
a person is unfit to hold public office again. We are going to charge such people to court”. In another 
forum he stressed: “For what we are doing to succeed, we won't allow those who stole money to come 
and compromise the process (elections) … By fighting corruption, you are likely going to eliminate 
such people” (Daily Trust, 26 May 2006; The Guardian, 8 September 2006).  
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any other law by the Federal or state government, which indictment has been accepted by the 
Federal or state government respectively. (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999a) 
Contrary to the administration’s own established practice, the reports of both 
commissions were immediately accepted and gazetted by the government, further 
underlining the extent of political stakes involved in this case.  
While Atiku’s culpability may not have been conclusively established by his 
indictment by these commissions, established and controlled by his accuser, his 
subsequent response only served to reinforce our hypothesis that accusations and 
counter-accusations of corruption launched by politicians are mainly intended as 
weapons to discredit political opponents and/or avoid arrest and prosecution for 
corruption. For while the Vice-President consistently denied the allegations – 
which one of his spokesmen called “lies, fabrications, evil machination and con-
trived attempt to stop him from the 2007 election” (Daily Independent, 13 Sep-
tember 2006) – Atiku, as should be expected, did very little to prove his inno-
cence. Instead, he spent much of his capital trying to prove that the President, his 
supposed accuser, was equally corrupt if not more corrupt. After the publication 
of the reports which indicted him for corruption, Atiku released scores of very 
embarrassing documents, including photocopies of bank cheques, bank state-
ments, receipts, and even official documents, to press home his point that the 
President was equally engaged in corrupt practices (ThisDay, 12 September 
2006). This strategy proved very successful for Atiku from the point of view of 
public opinion, hardened by very disturbing allegations of corruption against the 
President (Ajaero 2006). The Vice-President was widely portrayed as a victim of 
‘political victimisation’, in a complex web of political struggle in which the anti-
corruption campaign was a mere political resource.  
Other political figures accused of corruption immediately took a cue from the 
Vice-President, thus adding to the crisis of credibility already rocking Nigeria’s 
most powerful anti-corruption agency. Sooner or later, it became the standard 
practice to portray every accusation of corruption as the creation of political op-
ponents, especially the government of the day, seeking to undo political enemies 
ahead of the 2007 elections. These types of allegations, according to such views, 
were undeserving of any serious attention; therefore, those who were accused of 
corruption did not need to defend themselves against specific allegations. It be-
came more rewarding to blame the government for witch-hunting its political op-
ponents. But what was the cumulative effect of such behaviour on Nigeria’s war 
against corruption? Politicians largely succeeded in moulding public opinion to 
see anti-corruption organs as ‘mere political tools’. In the end, despite its relative 
success, the EFCC, just like the ICPC, had to occupy itself not only with the war 
against corruption, but also with a battle to preserve its reputation, tarnished by 
the activities of a corrupt and obstructive political class.  
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Conclusion 
At the time of their inauguration, Nigeria’s new anti-corruption commissions, 
especially the ICPC, were widely considered as crucial actors in the country’s 
fledgling fight against corruption. This perception was partly informed by an 
awareness of the relative success of similar organisations in other parts of the 
world (notably Hong Kong and Singapore). However, after several years of their 
existence, these institutions failed to make as much impact as anticipated and, 
therefore, justify their existence. Despite their determined efforts to investigate, 
arrest, and prosecute corrupt elements within the government and civil society, 
corruption did not cease, nor were there signs suggesting that Nigeria’s corrupt 
politicians and public officials were going to be deterred. On the contrary, sev-
eral challenges surfaced which undercut the impact of these institutions, notable 
among them being legal loopholes in their establishing laws, insufficient funding 
and manpower, Nigeria’s slow and inefficient judicial system, and most impor-
tantly, successful attempts by politicians at politicising the work of these agen-
cies, resulting in a crisis of legitimacy for them. 
 
 6 
Federalism and the campaign 
against corruption  
Introduction 
Our discussions on the limitations of the Nigerian fight against corruption under 
the Obasanjo regime have so far centred on the poor capacities of the anti-
corruption agencies, the ICPC and EFCC, set up to advance the fight against cor-
ruption. As we have seen, insufficient capacity, limited commitment of the po-
litical leadership to the independence of these bodies – as seen in the apparent 
willingness of the former President to employ these institutions as tools to un-
dermine his political rivals – and of course, the inefficiency of the Nigerian judi-
cial system were not helpful to these bodies. Yet these explanations are only part 
of the story. Other factors equally left their own negative impact on Nigeria’s 
campaign against corruption in the Fourth Republic. One of the most important 
of these factors is perhaps Nigeria’s federal structure of government, adopted, 
ironically, to facilitate good governance in one of Africa’s most diverse coun-
tries. How did federalism scupper Nigeria’s latest quest to promote good govern-
ance?  
The Obasanjo-led anti-corruption campaign was, to all intents and purposes, a 
policy of one level of government, whereas the country, being a federal state, is 
made up of three levels of government, each relatively autonomous. Any suc-
cessful implementation of a national policy, such as the anti-corruption cam-
paign, clearly requires the active support of all the three levels of government, a 
large challenge in such a huge and diverse country as Nigeria. During the era of 
military rule, finding such support would never have posed any problem. The 
military logic of strong centralisation of power and espirit de corps had often en-
sured that national policies were more often than not decided by the central gov-
ernment and imposed on states and local governments, without provoking argu-
113 
 
ments or open resistance from the heads of these sub-national authorities, who 
were usually appointed by the central authorities. Under a supposedly democratic 
regime, complete with a federal constitution, the question arises: To what extent 
can a national policy, such as the Obasanjo-initiated anti-corruption policy, be 
imposed on all of Nigeria’s 36 states and 774 local councils? If the states and 
their local authorities withhold support for the programme, can such a policy ever 
succeed?  
In this chapter, we will try to show that the implementation of the Obasanjo-
led anti-corruption policy in Nigeria failed partly because various sub-national 
authorities were not fully committed to its success and took many steps to ensure 
its failure. It is true that the level of resistance to the anti-corruption fight varied 
from one state to another, depending on several factors, such as the level of re-
sources available locally, the leadership in each of the states (the personality of 
the state governor), and the character and level of local pressures for change or 
transparency. On the whole, however, Nigerian states demonstrated not only a 
very strong aversion to the anti-corruption agenda of the central government, but 
also a common unwillingness to initiate their own local anti-corruption measures 
that would have strengthened the drive against corruption.  
When the war against corruption began, it was widely promoted as a national 
struggle enjoying the support of all segments of Nigerian society. However, as 
the anti-corruption drive moved from the realm of official rhetoric in mid-1999 
to the domain of practical implementation in the year 2000 and beyond, two ten-
dencies became immediately observable among Nigerian states. On the one hand, 
some states refused absolutely to appropriate the policy of the federal govern-
ment by putting in place the equivalents in their states and hid behind the ‘federal 
system’ to challenge every attempt from ‘above’ destined to control corruption 
by local officials. Oil-rich Bayelsa State led this group. At the other end of the 
spectrum, other states openly supported the anti-corruption policy for strategic 
political reasons (electoral gains), even if they had no genuine intention to fight 
corruption in their respective states. A good example of this second group was 
Zamfara State, which pioneered the Shari’ah legal code in 1999 – in part to 
check corruption among citizens of the state – but showed little zeal to imple-
ment its most important anti-corruption provisions. First, we will take a look at 
the collective responses of the states, as a whole, to the federal anti-corruption 
agenda, before turning the searchlight on the unwillingness of the states to im-
plement local anti-corruption measures.    
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A federal anti-corruption policy and  
the revolt of federating states 
The Obasanjo-led anti-corruption policy was launched amid promises that the 
reforms would be felt in every nook and cranny of the federation. Yet, when de-
signing his anti-corruption programme, there was hardly any evidence to suggest 
that President Obasanjo held any prior consultation with the 36 state governors – 
or indeed with the 774 local government chairmen which the 1999 Constitution 
had effectively placed under the governors – on his proposed anti-corruption 
drive. Perhaps President Obasanjo was swayed by the popular assumption that, 
given the damage corruption had done to the nation’s quest to develop and the 
pressures for change being heaped daily on the incoming civilian leaders, every-
body would be in full support of his declared anti-corruption war. The fallacy in 
this thinking soon became apparent when the governors and their state legisla-
tures began to voice strong opposition and even took several successful measures 
against some of the actions taken by the central government in its quest to fight 
corruption. The role of Nigerian states and their local government councils in un-
dermining the anti-corruption campaign championed by Obasanjo, however, was 
most clearly observable in their reactions to the enactment of new national anti-
corruption legislation and subsequently in their reactions to the establishment of 
national anti-graft agencies, notably the ICPC and EFCC.1  
 
Reactions of state governments to national anti-corruption legislation 
During the civilian administration of President Obasanjo, Nigerian states reacted 
strongly to virtually all laws proposed by the federal government which they 
consider potentially ‘intrusive’. But their reaction to the passage by the National 
Assembly of the national anti-corruption law in July 2000 was unprecedented. 
The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000, which came into 
effect on 13 July 2000, contained several important provisions, among which was 
the one establishing the ICPC, charged with the responsibility of investigating 
and prosecuting corrupt public officials at all levels of government.2 Immediately 
the law was passed, a constitutional conflict between the federal government and 
most of the states of the federation ensued. Regardless of the fact that a great ma-
jority of the states were under the control of the same political party (PDP) as 
                                                 
1  Other aspects of Obasanjo’s reforms, including his policy of privatisation and economic liberalisation, 
reform of the public services, and recovery of looted funds diverted abroad also did not attract any se-
rious attention from the governors. 
2  Section 7(3) of the Act provides that the Act shall apply to “all public officers in Nigeria”, defined as 
“any person employed in any capacity in the public service of the federal, state or local government, 
public corporations and private company wholly or jointly floated by any government or its agency, 
including the subsidiary of any such company whether located within or outside Nigeria and including 
judicial officers and serving magistrates in area/customary courts or tribunals”. 
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Obasanjo, this conflict culminated in a challenge before the Supreme Court at the 
initiative of 32 of the 36 states of the federation. The position of the aggrieved 
states, which were not against an anti-corruption fight in principle, was that the 
federal government, according to the 1999 Constitution, had no power to adopt 
or implement an anti-corruption law across the whole federation as anticipated by 
the ICPC Act. For these governors, the federal government could make laws only 
to punish corrupt practices committed at the federal level of government and not 
in the states or local governments.  
The idea that the enactment of national anti-corruption legislation was a viola-
tion of Nigeria’s federal constitution was shared not only by Nigeria’s powerful 
state governors. It also found strong support in certain institutions of the civil so-
ciety, notably cultural and ethnic associations. The position taken by the Middle 
Belt Forum – a socio-political association which supposedly represented all the 
ethnic minorities of the Middle Belt or North-Central region3 – over the conflict 
between the EFCC and the leadership of Plateau State, over allegations of cor-
ruption against the latter, illustrated this fact. During the crisis, this association 
took a very critical position against the EFCC, which was seeking to prosecute 
the then Plateau State governor, Joshua Dariye, and some of his aides for corrupt 
practices. From the point of view of this association, the EFCC Act of 2004, 
upon which this anti-corruption agency relied to investigate the alleged corrupt 
practices of the Plateau government, constituted some kind of “meddlesomeness 
in the affairs of states in a Federal system, which guarantees the rights of states 
as federating units … (and which) is gradually returning the nation to the unitary 
system which Nigerians rejected and discarded in the 1960s” (ThisDay, 11 Octo-
ber 2006).  
This type of state/civil society alliance was perhaps explained by the fact that 
many of these ethnic associations and movements were financed directly or indi-
rectly by the state governors. However, some more or less independent voices 
also opposed the idea of an application of the federal anti-corruption policy in the 
36 states. The constitutional status of Nigeria’s anti-graft legislation and its nega-
tive implications for federal practice in Nigeria were also a source of great con-
cern to many leading legal luminaries. In this category were Rotimi Williams 
(now deceased) and Ben Nwabueze. While the former was essentially concerned 
with the limited powers of the federal government (National Assembly) imposed 
by the 1999 Constitution (ThisDay, 6 July 2000), for the latter, it was more a 
question of a grave infraction on the theory and practice of federalism. According 
to Nwabueze, who authored several newspaper articles denouncing the legisla-
tion, particularly the ICPC Act: 
                                                 
3  The North-Central region comprises the following states: Plateau, Benue, Adamawa, Kwara, Niger, 
Taraba, Kogi, Kaduna, Nassarawa, Bauchi, and Gombe. 
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More than being an infraction of the constitution, it is subversive of one of the foundation 
pillars of Nigeria’s governmental system, federalism, whose two cardinal principles it totally 
disregards, namely, the principles of the autonomy of the state government vis-à-vis the fed-
eral government and the exclusiveness of the power of each over certain matters as demar-
cated in the constitution … President Obasanjo’s anti-corruption crusade deserves our ap-
plause and full support, but not at the expense of the cardinal principles of our federal system 
on which depends, to a considerable extent, the stability and unity of the country. (The 
Guardian, 1 August 2000) 
Owing to the legal and political challenges mounted by the state governments, 
the ICPC could not commence full operation after it was inaugurated in Septem-
ber 2000, even as public criticism mounted. It remained in limbo until 7 July 
2001. On that date the power of the federal authorities to enact an anti-corruption 
law which is applicable to the entire federation was upheld by a landmark Su-
preme Court judgment. Ironically, this did little to alter the hostile and antagonis-
tic behaviour of state governments vis-à-vis the anti-corruption campaign. After 
the Supreme Court judgment, the states simply doubled their determination to 
challenge any extension of the federal government’s anti-corruption crusade to 
their states and local government councils.  
Indeed, the frustration of these sub-national authorities was compounded by 
the decision of the federal government to roll out more anti-corruption legislation 
and proposals, such as a proposal to reform Nigeria’s 774 local government 
councils in 2003 and the adoption of the Monitoring of Revenue Allocation to 
Local Governments Act in 2005. The local government reform was conceived to 
improve efficiency and accountability within the 774 local governments, while 
the adoption of the Monitoring of Revenue Allocation Act was intended to pun-
ish state governors and their finance commissioners (equivalent to the Minister of 
Finance at the federal level), who were frequently associated with massive diver-
sion of local government allocations. The local government reform was killed by 
the combined political opposition of the 36 state governors, who insisted on their 
undivided constitutional powers to control and monitor these highly corrupt po-
litical units (The Guardian, 30 June 2003). The Monitoring of Revenue Alloca-
tion to Local Governments Act, on the other hand, was challenged by three 
states: Abia, Lagos, and Delta. In 2005 these states, with the tacit approval of 
many others, jointly launched a legal challenge against the federal government at 
the Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of the Act. In their chal-
lenge, they averred that “having regard to the provisions of Section 7 and 128 of 
the Constitution … (the Federal Government) cannot by the ‘Monitoring of 
Revenue Allocation to Local Governments Act’, 2005 or any other Act of the 
National Assembly exercise oversight functions over Local Government admini-
stration in any State of the Federation” (ThisDay, 15 November 2005). 
During their conflict with the central government, the states also received the 
endorsement of other critical segments of their communities, notably their vari-
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ous Houses of Assembly. Thus, while the decision of the Supreme Court was be-
ing awaited, the chairman of the Conference of Speakers of State Houses of As-
sembly (a body which unites the heads of all the 36 State Houses of Assembly), 
Rotimi Amaechi, issued a statement on behalf of his colleagues to the effect that:  
The recent policy adopted by the Federal Government to fund (i.e. monitor) the local coun-
cils directly was a gross negation of the provisions of the Constitution and disrespect for the 
rule of law … If care was not taken the decision would make the councils not only more in-
ept in responding to the yearnings of the people, but corrupt and undisciplined. This policy is 
also capable of breeding anarchy and weakening our democratic process … the Conference 
had resolved to tackle the matter maturely even under provocation ... Our respective gover-
nors have pledged to handle the issue with the President or challenge the policy in court. 
(ThisDay, 23 June 2005) 
This struggle came to a climax in July 2006, when the Supreme Court invali-
dated the Monitoring of Revenue Allocation to Local Governments Act (The 
Guardian, 7 July 2006). The nullification of the revenue monitoring legislation 
probably brought some temporary improvement in the relations between the fed-
eral and state governments, but one important question was left open. If the mere 
enactment of anti-corruption legislation could provoke such outrage and strong 
negative reactions among state governments, would the implementation of the 
contents of any of such laws – particularly the establishment of implementation 
agencies such as the ICPC and the EFCC to fight corruption across the nation – 
not lead to a systemic breakdown? 
 
State governments’ reactions to national anti-corruption agencies 
Of course, if state governments had been angered by the mere enactment of na-
tional anti-corruption legislation, surely the establishment of anti-corruption 
agencies to implement provisions of the contentious anti-corruption laws could 
only result in a showdown between the two most important levels of govern-
ments. This was exactly what happened. After the creation of the ICPC and 
EFCC in 2000 and 2004 respectively, several state governors began launching all 
kinds of verbal assaults on these institutions, which many of them immediately 
dismissed as “illegal” and “intrusive”. One such governor, Ibrahim Turaki of Ji-
gawa State, went as far as describing them in the following terms: “What is 
EFCC? What is ICPC? They are not even in the constitution. I think Nuhu Ri-
badu (chairman of the EFCC) is going beyond his brief” (Daily Trust, 9 July 
2004). Another governor, Victor Attah of Akwa Ibom State, was even less dip-
lomatic, describing the EFCC as a “chicken without a head … (a) body which 
was set up to chase people all over the place” (Vanguard, 4 October 2006).  
This perception of anti-graft bodies as an unnecessary distraction in govern-
ance and a threat that must be dealt with at all costs was not a phenomenon that 
was limited to a few disgruntled state governors. It was a widely shared percep-
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tion among Nigeria’s 36 state governors. At the beginning of his tenure as chair-
man of the ICPC, Justice Mustapha Akanbi4 wrote letters to all 36 state gover-
nors soliciting their cooperation for his new organization. Justice Akanbi’s let-
ters, however, did not raise the enthusiasm of their intended beneficiaries. Many 
of the governors promised to respond later but never did. Some governors who 
did respond claimed that the ICPC was an “illegal” or “unconstitutional” body. 
Many others simply ignored the ICPC’s letter completely (Vanguard, 24 May 
2002). At the end of the day, only four governors promised to support the institu-
tion (ThisDay, 4 April 2005). 
Apparently not satisfied with merely criticising and contesting before the 
courts the legality of the anti-corruption bodies set up by the federal government, 
actions that had so far produced limited results, state governors soon began to 
take other more concrete steps aimed at undermining the effectiveness of the 
anti-corruption policy in their respective states and beyond. While a considerable 
number of the governors generally remained discrete in their battle with the 
agencies, there were a few who could not hide their disgust towards these institu-
tions, openly banning their officials from all cooperation with the two national 
anti-corruption agencies. According to their directives, their officials were not to 
answer to the invitations of these agencies for the purpose of investigations or 
offer any information whatsoever, including official documents and materials 
which could facilitate investigations.  
Abia State, in the south-eastern part of the country, was one of the most hostile 
of the states. In June 2004, following the receipt of a petition alleging the illegal 
diversion of federal allocations meant for local government councils in Abia 
State, the EFCC launched an investigation of the financial activities of the state 
government. Rather than cooperate with the EFCC, the government of Abia State 
went to court and obtained a temporary injunction restraining the EFCC from 
commencing any investigation of the financial activities of local governments in 
the state. Before going to court, the governor of the state, Orji Uzor Kalu, warned 
his officials against any form of cooperation with the anti-graft body (Tell Maga-
zine, 29 November 2004). In the end, the state managed to prevail over the 
EFCC. Thus, two years after he began his open battle, on 7 July 2006 Governor 
Kalu won a final and conclusive legal victory against the EFCC, when the Su-
preme Court invalidated the Monitoring of Revenue Allocation to Local Gov-
ernments Act of 2005, upon which the EFCC relied to conduct its investigations 
(The Guardian, 7 July 2006). This victory was felt very far beyond the borders of 
Abia State. It had a chilling effect on the effectiveness of the EFCC and greatly 
emboldened other states to openly challenge its authority.  
                                                 
4  Justice Mustapha Akambi was the chairman of the ICPC between September 2000 and August 2005. 
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Similar challenges were encountered by the ICPC. This fact was laid bare dur-
ing its battle with Ondo State, in the southwest. The ICPC’s struggle with Ondo 
State began in 2001, when the state, without prompting from outside, launched 
an investigation against one of its commissioners, who was accused of fraudu-
lently inflating the price of a public contract from N12 million to N35 million. 
The said official was later brought before a local court, Ondo State Chief Magis-
trate Court. Some three days after his arraignment, other senior officials of the 
same government, including a director-general and two other directors of a pub-
lic parastatal, Owena Mass Transport Corporation (OMTC), were indicted by an 
official inquiry for various corrupt practices leading to the effective collapse of 
their parastatal. The accused officials were subsequently ordered to refund a total 
sum of N8.7million, N230,000, and N100,000 respectively to the state (The 
Punch, 2 September 2001). Coincidentally, these incidents came at a time when 
the Supreme Court was adjudicating on a legal challenge to the constitutionality 
of the ICPC Act, brought by all of the 36 state governments. When the ICPC in-
dicated its interest in the files, the Ondo government refused to release them or 
cooperate in any way with the anti-corruption agency. To top matters off, the 
state government banned the agency from setting foot in its territory (ibid.).  
This type of hostility and obstructive behaviour was also encountered in sev-
eral other states. The cumulative effect was to render the work of these anti-
corruption institutions difficult if not impossible. The then chairman of the ICPC, 
Mustapha Akambi, highlighted the effectiveness of the actions of the state gov-
ernments against the ICPC in the following words: “When we have cases in the 
States, we find that some of the governors … tend not to make necessary facili-
ties available to us … When we are prosecuting someone in a state, may be the 
person belongs to the same party with the governor or they relate in a certain 
way, they make it difficult for us” (ibid.). 
Confrontations between state governments and the various national anti-
corruption bodies went beyond mere refusal of the state governors to make nec-
essary facilities available to the anti-graft agencies. In some states of the federa-
tion, the activities of both anti-corruption agencies also resulted in varying de-
grees of physical violence, usually at the instigation of governors accused of cor-
ruption. The case of Governor Joshua Dariye of Plateau State was a good exam-
ple. Between 4 and 7 December 2005, some officials of the EFCC sent to arrest 
three close collaborators of this governor – Miss Christabel Bentu,5 a bank chief 
(the branch manager of All States Trust Bank in Jos), and one of the governor’s 
younger brothers – all of whom were accused of helping the governor loot over 
                                                 
5  Miss Christabel Bentu and Governor Dariye were both arrested in London on 2 September 2004 for 
money-laundering offences. They both escaped to Nigeria, having been granted conditional bail by a 
British court.   
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N1.16 billion from the state treasury, were attacked by supporters and employees 
of the Plateau State government before they could complete their mission (The 
Punch, 8 December 2005). As a consequence of the attacks, some of the EFCC 
officials suffered grave bodily injuries, and their vehicles were severely damaged 
by their attackers. These attacks, which were allegedly directed by the governor 
with the assistance of his security agents,6 also resulted in the damage of all evi-
dence and the escape of one of the key suspects, the younger brother of the gov-
ernor (The Guardian, 12 February 2006). 
Why did the federal government prove so impotent in protecting its own offi-
cials against aggression by state governments? The obstructive activities of Gov-
ernor Joshua Dariye and his men represented a gross violation of provisions of 
both the EFCC and ICPC Acts, which in theory could be punished by imprison-
ment upon conviction.7 According to Section 38 of the EFCC Act, an obstructive 
act of such a kind will attract fines of up to N5,000 and/or 5 years’ prison term 
upon conviction (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2004). In reality, however, such 
provisions were rarely invoked or applied, the reason being that the constitutional 
immunity against prosecution granted to state governors and their deputies, the 
initiators of these acts, as well as the limited powers of the federal government 
imposed by Nigeria’s federal Constitution, had made any such application incon-
ceivable. The devastating consequences on the performances of these agencies 
can only be imagined. Even though an overwhelming majority of the governors 
were consistently fingered in several serious cases of corruption, only one gover-
nor (Governor Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State) was successfully tried for cor-
ruption under the Obasanjo administration. Even then, this was only possible af-
ter he was impeached by his state’s legislators. 
Why would these anti-corruption institutions not try to get around their prob-
lems with the governors through some other innovative methods? The process of 
impeachment could have been a short-cut to that goal. Fully aware of its limited 
powers under a federal constitution, the anti-corruption agencies, especially the 
                                                 
6  Governor Dariye’s violent disposition was later confirmed by a public warning he issued to the EFCC 
that “enough is enough for EFCC ... I am from Mushere and we eat dogs, my brothers from Pankshin 
eat dogs also, likewise Anaguta and Berom; if these dogs (EFCC) come from Abuja again, we will eat 
them. When next they come, they might end up in our pot of soup” (The Guardian, 12 February 
2006). 
7  For example, Section 41 of the ICPC Act (2000) provides clearly that “any person who refuses any 
officer of the Commission access to any premises, or fails to submit to a search by a person authorised 
to search him … assaults, or obstructs any officer of the Commission or any person authorised by the 
Commission in the execution of his duty … fails to comply with any lawful demand, notice, order or 
requirements of an officer of the Commission in the execution of his duty … fails to produce to or 
conceals or attempts to conceal from, an officer of the Commission any book, document, or article, in 
relation to which such officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting or believing that an offence under 
this Act or any other law prohibiting corruption has been committed, or which is liable to seizure … 
shall be guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for one (1) year without option of fine”. 
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EFCC, did on several occasions turn for succour to state legislatures, who can in 
theory remove corrupt governors from power through the process of impeach-
ment. The problem, however, was that such a political approach can hardly be 
effective in Nigeria’s clientelist political system. Nigerian state assemblies most 
of the time sided with their governors – who were more often than not their po-
litical godfathers – instead of supporting the war against graft being spearheaded 
by the federal government. The record of the Plateau State House of Assembly 
provides yet another illustration.  
As already noted, on 2 September 2004 Governor Joshua Dariye was arrested 
during a visit to London, by agents of the London Metropolitan Police, who sus-
pected him of laundering the proceeds of corruption. On the basis of information 
received from the British officials, the EFCC decided to open an investigation 
into the ‘Dariye affair’, which established the culpability of Mr Dariye. Given his 
constitutional immunity against arrest and prosecution, the EFCC had no choice 
but to pass on his file to the Plateau State legislature for further action (The 
Guardian, 15 December 2005). The alternative was to suspend action on the case 
until Dariye left office at the end of his tenure on 29 May 2007. In the face of 
widespread public demand for action against executive banditry on the part of the 
state governors, such an alternative would have been a public relations’ blunder. 
As was the case with several other state legislatures which had ignored reports of 
serious corrupt practices involving their governors, the Plateau lawmakers 
bluntly refused to take any action. Instead, they offered their unflinching support 
to the embattled governor, proving again that decentralisation has not been very 
helpful to Nigeria’s war against corruption. 
But was federalism actually to blame for the collective hostility of Nigerian 
states to the Obasanjo-led anti-corruption war? The governors often argued that 
their opposition to Obasanjo’s anti-corruption drive was born out of a genuine 
quest to protect constitutionally guaranteed fiscal and political autonomy, the 
hallmarks of federalism. The hollowness of this argument, however, was under-
lined not only by the massive corruption authored by some of these governors, 
but also by the refusal of a great majority of states to initiate local measures to 
check corruption in their states, as well as by the seeming incapacity of those 
who had announced their own anti-corruption initiatives to go beyond official 
rhetoric, underlining at the same time their insincerity and their capacity to frus-
trate the federal anti-corruption policy. The experiences of two states, Zamfara 
and Bayelsa, can be used to illustrate this fact. 
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A new era of state-based anti-corruption initiatives?  
Between local autonomy and electoral gimmick 
In their official pronouncements, state governors regularly declared their inten-
tion to combat corruption in their respective states. Yet, in reality, few state gov-
ernors showed much interest in replicating the various anti-corruption pro-
grammes introduced by the Olusegun Obasanjo administration at the national 
level in their own state, despite overwhelming evidence of corruption. The states, 
and by extension their local governments, were content with challenging the anti-
corruption policy of the federal government. While the majority of the states 
(Bayelsa State is a leading example) failed to design or implement even a single 
local anti-corruption initiative, a few states – such as Zamfara – took some sym-
bolic steps in this direction, including passing anti-corruption laws and establish-
ing anti-graft bodies, but demonstrated incapacity or unwillingness to bring cor-
rupt officials to book in practice, thereby encouraging the spread of corruption in 
the country, especially at the grassroots level. In the remaining sections of this 
chapter, we will highlight the experiences of Bayelsa and Zamfara states, which 
in our view represent these two contradictory tendencies among Nigerian states.  
 
Bayelsa State: Anti-corruption war and the ‘Devil’s excrement’ 
During the presentation of his 2005 appropriation bill to his State House of As-
sembly in December 2004, Governor D. S. P. Alamieyeseigha declared that his 
“government was determined to restructure, re-professionalise and fortify public 
institutions, eliminate waste, inefficiency and corruption, and ensure greater 
transparency, accountability and efficiency in the delivery of services” (The 
Guardian, 20 December 2004). Paradoxically, just twelve months after that 
speech, Mr Alamieyeseigha was impeached by the same body for “gross miscon-
duct”, corruption, and abuse of power. Alamieyeseigha’s impeachment on 8 De-
cember 2005, the very first under the Fourth Republic, followed his arrest and 
detention in London on 15 September 2005 for money-laundering offences 
(Newswatch, 12 December 2005). The uproar and international embarrassment 
which his arrest provoked,8 as well as the covert political pressure and threats 
emanating from the central government,9 paved the way for his speedy removal 
                                                 
8  A few weeks after his arrest, Governor Alamieyeseigha was arraigned before a London Court on 
charges of laundering funds derived from corruption. Rather than wait for the conclusion of his trial to 
prove his innocence, Alamieyeseigha, taking advantage of a temporary bail granted him by the presid-
ing judge, fled to Nigeria on 21 November 2005, where he enjoys constitutional immunity against ar-
rest and prosecution.  
9  The legislators were allegedly threatened with possible criminal prosecutions for funds they had di-
verted in the name of “constituency development projects” if they should refuse to impeach the gov-
ernor. 
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and subsequent arraignment before a Lagos High Court on charges of corrupt en-
richment (Daily Independent, 24 November 2005). 
Although the factors that enabled Alamieyeseigha’s impeachment were in-
separable from his ordeal in London, the events which culminated in his removal 
in disgrace from office had their roots at home. Prior to his arrest in London, the 
governor and several high-ranking officials of his government had figured 
prominently on the list of corrupt officials being investigated by the two main 
federal anti-corruption agencies (the ICPC and EFCC) for massive fraud and di-
version of billions of naira in public funds into overseas accounts. Just to recap, 
in one particular case, following from a 2003 investigation initiated by the ICPC, 
the governor was accused of “approving several dubious contracts and payments 
totalling N1.7 billion in favour of eight fictitious companies”, in respect of con-
struction projects effected at the site of a new university floated by the state, the 
Niger Delta University (NDU). The governor was also said to have awarded 
other contracts totalling N667.3 million to another set of fictitious companies 
through the Bayelsa State Tenders Board, presided over by him. Despite these 
flagrant abuses, the ICPC could neither arrest nor arraign Governor Alamieye-
seigha before the law courts, thanks to Section 308 of the Nigerian Constitution 
which grants all 36 state governors and their deputies’ immunity against such le-
gal actions. The EFCC had to adopt a very innovative approach to get around this 
dilemma, by transferring Alamieyeseigha‘s files to the British authorities. The 
strategy paid off when the British arrested him while on one of his numerous for-
eign trips.  
This air of pervasive corruption that reigned in Bayelsa State is perhaps ex-
plained by several factors. One of them is certainly Nigeria’s oil-defined political 
economy, or what is commonly referred to as the “oil curse” and the “Devil’s ex-
crement”, to borrow the expression of a former Venezuelan oil minister and 
founder of OPEC, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso. Following the persistent demand 
for local resource control, championed by Nigeria’s oil-bearing states, the adop-
tion of Nigeria’s fourth post-independence constitution, the 1999 Constitution, 
came with a provision requiring the payment of 13% of all oil revenue to Nige-
ria’s nine oil-producing states according to their productive capacity (the princi-
ple of derivation).10 But rather than serve as a source of prosperity and happiness, 
the decentralisation of oil wealth only sharpened the greedy appetites of the local 
power elite in these states, while at the same time serving as a source of incentive 
for them to oppose the federal anti-corruption campaign.  
Bayelsa State was by all accounts among the worst offenders. Created in Oc-
tober 1996, Bayelsa is a relatively new state in Nigeria. Yet, it is considered one 
                                                 
10  This formula came into effect in the year 2000, even though it had been a constitutional requirement 
since 29 May 1999. 
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of the richest, accounting for some 30% of Nigeria’s 2.5 million barrels of daily 
crude oil production. Thanks to the new revenue allocation, the state, along with 
Akwa Ibom, Delta, and Rivers states, which collectively account for roughly 
80% of Nigeria’s crude-oil production, have received huge funds in federal allo-
cations since the democratic experiment began in 1999. Between June 1999 and 
December 2005, for instance, it received some N300 billion (or $2.5 billion) in 
federal transfers. In comparative terms, Zamfara State, which has zero oil pro-
duction, received only a little more than a third of that amount (N80 billion) dur-
ing the same period (see Table 6.1).  
 
 
Table 6.1  Federal allocations to Bayelsa and Zamfara (in billions of naira) 
 (1999-2005) 
Year Bayelsa State Zamfara State 
1999 (May-Dec) 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2,729,569 
20,170,579 
24,601,106 
28,028,005 
40,164,821 
68,388,398 
94,575,383 
2,470,778 
7,383,901 
9,401,386 
10,252,025 
12,757,507 
17,673,425 
19,027,521 
Total* 287,678,678 80,872,600 
*  This amount excludes the allocations for the month of May 2002 for both states, which were unavail-
able at the time the data were being compiled, as well as funds received from the Excess Oil Revenue 
Accounts (non-anticipated revenue received thanks to rising crude oil prices). 
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria (undated). 
 
 
But despite this huge windfall, Bayelsa State was characterised by socio-
economic backwardness, poverty, and youth unrest. Many of these problems 
were rooted in corruption and official mismanagement. Governor Alamieye-
seigha was later found guilty of diverting over $1 billion in the five years he was 
in office (The Guardian, 21 December 2005). Most of the $2.5 billion he col-
lected as his state’s share of Nigeria’s oil rents was wasted on white-elephant 
projects which provided avenues for top officials to siphon off millions of dol-
lars. Social spending was neglected. As a consequence, all socio-economic indi-
cators collected between 1999 and 2005 pointed to a state marked by a high inci-
dence of poverty (see Table 6.2). Not surprisingly, the state also became one of 
the major theatres of youth violence, with kidnappings and sabotage of oil instal-
lations by local people demanding a fair share of the oil wealth as a regular fea-
ture of social life (Donnelly 2005). At the same time, widespread poverty engen-
dered a sense of total dependence on the state, which in turn encouraged political 
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clientelism. Attempts to address these problems – many of which are also validly 
attributable to the many years of criminal neglect and marginalisation by the fed-
eral government – through large-scale construction of social amenities and other 
projects resulted in massive diversion of funds by local officials, particularly in 
an era of huge influx of oil rents. 
The Bayelsa predicament clearly underlines the difficulty inherent in any at-
tempt to promote accountability and good governance in resource-rich communi-
ties (Sachs & Warner 1995; Jacques 2005; La Commission pour l’Afrique 2005) 
and the resistance this usually provokes. During the period June-July 2005, for 
instance, an independent and comprehensive evaluation of the state of govern-
ance in the 36 states was organized by the National Planning Commission, in col-
laboration with several international institutions (donors active in Nigeria, such 
as the World Bank, DFID, EU, and UNDP) and members of civil society. This 
exercise, the first of its kind since 1999, was based on four measurement indices: 
(a) policy; (b) fiscal management and budget process; (c) service delivery; and 
(d) communication and transparency. According to the evaluators, none of the 
four main oil-producing states (Bayelsa 0%, Delta 45.1%, Rivers 49.8%, and 
Akwa Ibom 37.6%) figured among the seven best performers (Enugu 62.0%, 
Ekiti 61.7%, Abuja FCT 55.7%, Kano 55.4%, Lagos 55.3%, Jigawa 51.3%, and 
Ebonyi 51.0%) (Ekwedike 2005). Ironically, Bayelsa State was the only state that 
was not evaluated, having refused to submit itself for such an exercise, for rea-
sons undisclosed (ibid.). 
 
 
Table 6.2  Comparative socio-economic data for Bayelsa and Zamfara states (2004) 
 Bayelsa Zamfara National 
Population* 1,703,358 3,259,846 140,000,000 
Literacy level (English language) 59,3 10,0 44,2 
Literacy level (Nigerian languages)  62,8 69,2 45,2 
Rate of primary school enrolment  96,1 69,9 81,2 
Access to energy (gas/electricity) 4,8 12,5 32,2 
Access to potable water 13,2 64,9 50,5 
* Federal Government of Nigeria, National Population Commission, Abuja, 2007. 
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria (2005). 
 
 
The impact of natural resources on good governance in Nigeria was also high-
lighted by several other works, including a 2002 comparative study of three Ni-
gerian states (Kano, Delta and Ondo), authored by Leonard Wantchekon and 
Tamar Asadurian, which found that, in general, the “states that are highest recipi-
ents of transfers have experienced increased income inequality and poor eco-
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nomic indicators, suggesting that there is little accountability. While states that 
have benefited the least from oil rents have fared much better” (Wantchekon & 
Asadurian 2002: 4). The same fact was vividly demonstrated again by statistics 
published in 2004 by the National Population Commission, showing that apart 
from its superior attainment in Western education, which is largely explained by 
historical factors (Aka 2000), Bayelsa State, as shown in Table 6.2, hardly 
showed any advantage in the area of socio-economic development over states 
with far slimmer resources or budgetary allocations, such as Zamfara State. 
The style of management of public budget in Bayelsa State under Governor 
Alamieyeseigha (1999-2005) can provide insight into why the state had little or 
no real advantage in the area of socio-economic development over states with far 
slimmer resources or budgetary allocations. By 2004 and early 2005, the usual 
award of inflated contracts to oneself, relations, and political cronies, which had 
hitherto characterised politics in Bayelsa gave way to a much more destructive 
form of neo-patrimonial governance, where budgetary appropriations were sys-
tematically exploited to enrich those who were in charge, including the state gov-
ernor. One way of achieving the latter goal consisted in concentrating huge pub-
lic expenditures on over-priced white-elephant projects with little or no relevance 
to public welfare, but which offered unlimited opportunity for officials to line 
their pockets through kick-backs paid by contractors. Conversely, important so-
cial services such as education, health, potable water, and other anti-poverty ini-
tiatives, offering far less opportunities for criminal enrichment, were under-
funded. An analysis of the state’s 2004 and 2005 budgets reflected this fraud.  
According to figures compiled from the state’s N76 billion (or $560 million) 
2005 budget proposal (The Guardian, 20 December 2004), as posted on the 
state’s official website, the total capital vote for education was only N130 mil-
lion. According to the breakdown, the state’s secondary schools (managed by the 
Bayelsa State Post-Primary Schools Board), which numbered 149 in 2004, re-
ceived N118 million for renovation and maintenance, purchase of learning mate-
rials and equipment, etc. For the same purposes in 2004, N106 million was of-
fered. To purchase books (N5 million) and equipment/furniture for libraries in 
the state, managed by a central agency, Bayelsa State Library Board, a total of 
only N7 million was on offer. The budget for 2004 was more or less identical. 
The pattern of expenditure showed little deviation even in the health sector, 
where the Ministry of Health, charged with running all state health institutions, 
including 16 newly established hospitals, received a total of N38.5 million as 
budgetary allocation for capital expenditure in 2005, against the N29.2 million 
received in 2004. A breakdown shows that N9.5 million was voted for office fur-
niture and equipment, N10.5 million represented funds set aside to equip the new 
hospitals, while N18.5 million was for medical equipment.  
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Other key social services suffered the same fate. For example, water supply, 
under the supervision of the Bayelsa State Water Board, did not fare any better, 
with a meagre N20.5 million allocation. Of this amount, N500,000 was voted for 
office equipment and furniture, while N20 million was for the purchase of re-
agents/water analysis equipment. The same sum was given in 2004. Electricity 
supply, under the Bayelsa State Electricity Board, also received scant attention. 
In 2005, a total of N7 million – N2 million for office equipment and furniture 
and N5 million for spare parts – was all that was voted. This was even higher 
than the N2 million spent on the same item in 2004. In order words, all the four 
critical social sectors, education, health, water supply and electricity, received a 
combined N196 million, representing only a minute fraction of the state’s N76 
billion. But by far the most ridiculous expenditure contained in the 2005 budget 
drafted by Governor Alamieyeseigha was the N2.9 million offered to a certain 
“Poverty Eradication Committee”, an institution whose functions were never 
clearly stated but widely understood to have been created to fight poverty in the 
state. 
The self-serving inclination of the Bayelsa leadership is not apparent until one 
considers a list of some carefully crafted expenditures in the same budget, de-
signed to benefit only those in power. Thus, a clinic serving the Office of the 
Governor was granted a massive N100 million for the year 2005. The same Of-
fice of the Governor received another hefty N100 million for office equipment 
and ‘minor’ repairs, while a further N85 million was expended on unknown ex-
penses, bringing the total expenditure on the governor’s office to N285 million. 
A total of N145.1 million was set aside for the same expenses in 2004. Even 
more revealing, the largest chunk of the N76 billion budget was reserved for a 
number of white-elephant projects, such as the construction of a secretariat for 
civil servants in the state, which gulped some N1.7 billion (excluding the 400 
million expended on the same project in 2004), and the construction of a new of-
ficial residence for the governor and his deputy at the cost of N1.2 billion. To se-
cure and equip this huge edifice, N800 million and N300 million were voted re-
spectively in the 2005 budget, bringing the total cost of the new government 
house to N2.5 billion. It should be noted that this sum does not include the N600 
million spent on the project in 2004. Thus, while the total capital budget for edu-
cation, health, water supply and electricity in 2005 was a mere N196 million, the 
construction and equipment of a single residence for the governor has cost the 
state close to N3 billion as at 2005. Other independent estimates are even consid-
erably higher (Polgreen 2005).  
Disturbing as this case may be, this pattern of misallocation of funds is in no 
way unique to Alamieyeseigha’s Bayelsa State. Other oil-producing states were 
also neck-deep in similar malfeasance, a good example being Rivers State, gov-
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erned by Peter Odili. In his own 2006 budget, estimated at N160 billion ($1.2 bil-
lion), Governor Odili spent N10.7 billion (roughly 6% of the budget) to maintain 
his office (the Governor’s Office). This sum excluded the N500 million spent on 
‘gifts’ and ‘souvenirs’ for his visitors, N4.3 billion used as ‘grants’ and ‘dona-
tions’, and a hefty N5 billion in security budget, to be spent according to his dis-
cretion. In the same budget, Governor Peter Odili had also reserved another N3 
billion (equivalent to $60,000 per day) to take care of his frequent overseas trips 
(Transport and Travel Allocation), far above even what the President of Nigeria 
was getting. The 32 members of his state legislature received N690 million 
(about $5.4 million at the time) for their own travel expenses, of which $2.8 mil-
lion was earmarked for foreign trips. This is separate from the $2.8 million given 
to the legislatures as sitting allowance (not salaries). Like Mr Alamieyeseigha in 
Bayelsa State, Peter Odili was not as generous when it came to vital social ser-
vices to benefit a greater number of his poor citizens. It suffices to know that a 
meagre sum of N2.8 billion was all that was given to the state’s Ministry of 
Health, out of a budget of N160 billion, in spite of its pre-eminent status as a 
“priority ministry” (Africa Confidential, 21 July 2006). 
One may well ask why Nigeria’s decentralised system proved so incapable of 
instigating bottom-up pressures for political or financial accountability. The an-
swer perhaps can be found in Nigeria’s unique brand of clientelist politics: Selec-
tive distribution of patronage, which served to legitimise what ordinarily would 
have been considered a criminal breach of public trust. During his reign in office, 
Governor Alamieyeseigha perfected the well-known strategy of redistributing the 
dividends from oil rents among top officials and co-opted members of the politi-
cal class in the state, apparently to stave off demands for greater transparency 
and accountability. In furtherance of this strategy, for instance, the governor ap-
proved and paid N100 million to each of the 24 members of the state legislature 
in 2005, under the pretext of financing constituency development projects in their 
respective constituencies, despite the apparent illegal nature of this decision.  
To begin with, the payments were never contained in the original version of 
the state 2005 budget submitted to the State House of Assembly in December 
2004, suggesting that it was an afterthought. Furthermore, the payment was a fla-
grant violation of the principle of separation of powers, which underlies the 
presidential system prescribed by the 1999 Constitution. Under a presidential 
system, such functions are normally reserved only for the executive arm of gov-
ernment. Not surprisingly, the move generated considerable controversy in the 
state. To make matters worse, Governor Alamieyeseigha regularly purchased and 
distributed luxury cars to top officials of the state government. These cars be-
came a major distinguishing factor between an affluent and flamboyant politico-
bureaucratic elite and a dispossessed population mired in miserable poverty.  
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One of the consequences of such high-level waste and corruption by the man 
charged with the responsibility of steering the ship of the state government was 
the spread and proliferation of similar malfeasances at the lower levels of ad-
ministration in the state – that is, in all the 24 ‘local councils’ in the state.11 A 
clear picture of the extent of decay among these lower levels of government was 
given by the governor himself, in a February 2000 speech: 
The expectation was that the new local government areas would provide a veritable training 
ground for up-coming leaders. This is in spite of the numerous advantages of decentralising 
government programmes. In the same vein, the new local government areas were created to 
check the spate of rural-urban drift, and to provide employment opportunities for our teem-
ing youth population. From our observation, however, most of the people entrusted with the 
responsibility of administering the new local government areas lacked basic leadership quali-
ties. They were found wanting in probity, transparency, mature judgement and sense of di-
rection. I have learnt to my utmost dismay that some of the former chairmen exhibited finan-
cial indiscipline through over-inflation of contract values, frivolous spending and gross mis-
management, among other sharp practices. Some chairmen used their station in the local 
government councils as conduit-pipes to siphon scarce resources. These vices are not only 
damnable, but negate the very purp.ose for which the local government areas were created. 
(Nengi 2001: 173) 
Governor Alamieyeseigha’s lamentations were intended only to fool the 
Bayelsa public. The governor had no intention of acting to bring these venal local 
officials to book. Indeed, when complaints against the officials persisted, they 
were simply replaced (ThisDay, 6 June 2005). None of them was charged or pun-
ished for any offence, underlining the governor’s already well-known position on 
the war against corruption. Just as Governor Alamieyeseigha was unwilling to 
promote accountability, such attempts from other institutions or individuals were 
also not tolerated. Indeed, he left no one in doubt about his preparedness to crush 
any potential rival or state institution seeking to act as a check on his power over 
Bayelsan oil resources. The governor, who also went by the appellation of the 
“Governor-General of the Ijaw Nation”, even boasted that no one could chal-
lenge him in Bayelsa State (Newswatch, 24 October 2005). Indeed, his desire to 
monopolise the control and redistribution of oil rents in Bayelsa State was legen-
dary. Throughout his tenure in office, Mr Alamieyeseigha ran a policy requiring 
that all expenditures (contracts and purchases) by the state or any of its agencies 
amounting to a million naira and above be conducted with the formal approval of 
the governor. All challenges to this policy were met by swift and harsh response. 
One such move in 2002 by the State House of Assembly, in the form of a bill 
seeking to empower each of the three arms of government (executive, legislature, 
and judiciary) to control its own budgetary allocations, with a view to insuring 
their independence vis-à-vis the executive, provoked an epic political battle be-
                                                 
11  The official number of local governments in Bayelsa State is 8. The additional 16 local councils cre-
ated by the State government were not recognised by the federal government.  
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tween the legislators (who were constitutionally charged with overseeing the ac-
tivities of the executive) and the governor. This conflict ended with the im-
peachment of the incumbent Speaker of the State House of Assembly and, subse-
quently, the abandonment of the proposed bill, titled the Self Accounting Bill.12 
The corrupt and wasteful style of the Bayelsa governor, and most especially 
his patrimonialist style of administration, provoked deep-seated discontent and 
widespread complaints among the population. But in the absence of any effective 
institutional checks and balances to executive power, such as the legislative arm 
of government or an organized and independent civil society, such popular de-
mands for accountability could only amount to mere wishful thinking. Certainly, 
there were a few courageous moves instituted by concerned citizens seeking to 
force a change of policies. Unfortunately, however, these efforts either failed or 
were ignored. In 2001, for instance, a former collaborator of Governor Alamieye-
seigha filed a suit against him before an Abuja High Court, alleging widespread 
mismanagement of resources.13 This complainant specifically requested the court 
to order the establishment of a “special committee” for the purpose of managing 
or overseeing the proper utilisation of all available resources for the development 
of the state, contrary to what obtained under the administration of Mr. Alamieye-
seigha (Newswatch, 24 October 2005). Unfortunately, this request, and indeed 
the entire suit, was rejected by the court. A second suit brought by a group of two 
indigenes of the state in 2005, seeking to halt payments being made to the state 
legislatures (in the name of constituency development projects) and all projects 
already commenced in this respect, also suffered the same fate (The Guardian, 
10 August 2005). Having bought the support of other members of civil society 
(several armed militia groups, NGOs, traditional rulers, cultural movements, 
etc.), the looting of Bayelsa State resources simply continued uninterrupted until 
the day the governor was impeached. 
In effect, a local anti-corruption campaign for Bayelsa State was not even an 
issue to be envisaged. Apart from a 2003 decision to set up the Bayelsa State 
Project Monitoring and Implementation Committee, allegedly to encourage 
transparency in public contracts and expenditures (but in actual fact to calm crit-
ics of the government), no other anti-corruption measure was adopted or imple-
                                                 
12  This information was given to the author during a personal interview with a member of the state legis-
lature, Nelson Belief, in September 2004. The interview took place in his office at Yenagoa, the state 
capital. 
13  Perekeme Richard Kpodoh, one-time governorship aspirant under the platform of All Nigeria People’s 
Party, ANPP, and Director of Operations in the state between 1999 and 2001, said he took his former 
boss to court because “this restiveness we have been witnessing in the State is as a result of his reck-
less spending. If our money is judiciously used you will find peace in the State and the youths would 
be appropriately engaged … When the head is rotten, everybody in the government is rotten … They 
keep on misbehaving, building houses of their own everywhere, buying flashy cars, while the masses 
are suffering on the streets” (Newswatch, 24 October 2005). 
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mented. To further illustrate the state of anti-corruption efforts in Bayelsa State 
under the administration of Governor Alamieyeseigha, it should be noted that 
throughout his over six years’ tenure in office as governor, not a single piece of 
legislation with the potential of controlling corruption was proposed or passed, 
nor was any individual put on trial for corruption. Even if this had been done, it 
would almost certainly have amounted to mere window-dressing. As the case of 
Zamfara clearly shows, states that had no intention of fighting corruption could 
still pass anti-corruption legislation and even establish anti-graft bodies, while 
doing nothing to arrest and prosecute corrupt officials. 
 
Fighting corruption in the name of God: Zamfara State and the Shari’ah debacle 
In 2000, two important pieces of legislations entered into force in Zamfara State. 
These were the Shari’ah Penal Code Law (No. 10) 2000 and the Shari’ah Crimi-
nal Procedure Code Law (No. 18) 2000 (Zamfara State of Nigeria 1999, 2000a, 
2000b, 2001). These laws, in some ways, represented a concretisation of a prom-
ise made by the governor, Sani Ahmed, during his election campaign, to reform 
the state criminal justice system along the lines of the Shari’ah model. Shari’ah-
based legislation is not an entirely new phenomenon in Nigeria, despite the con-
troversies and protests that have greeted the adoption of these laws. But before 
now, Shari’ah was essentially a civil code, adopted to regulate disputes and civil 
affairs among Muslims in the northern part of the country. The transformation of 
Shari’ah into a penal code caused many problems, notably bloody inter-ethnic 
and religious conflicts. Many of these problems have been examined in detail 
elsewhere and therefore need no further elaboration here (HRW 2004). However, 
one of the dimensions of Shari’ah implementation in Zamfara that has so far re-
ceived little or no attention was its effectiveness or ineffectiveness as a tool for 
curbing corruption. As one of the officials charged with its implementation 
rightly pointed out, the legislation aimed not only to satisfy religious obligations, 
but also to help purge society of all forms of corruption: 
The first objective of Shari’ah implementation is to make our peace with our creator, to live 
in the knowledge that we have submitted to His supremacy and accepted Him as the sole 
law-giver. The second objective is to establish a just, compassionate and fair society bonded 
in brotherhood. Such type of society however can only be built on the qualities of honesty, 
transparency, selflessness and piety. It must therefore be part of the mission of a Shari’ah-
guided society to promote and inculcate these qualities. This is why the fight with corruption 
is an integral part of Shari’ah implementation. (Gusau 2002: 1) 
How did the Shari’ah code address the corruption question in Zamfara State? 
The law, as a matter of fact, did contain several important anti-corruption provi-
sions. Apart from outlawing several forms of social immorality and crimes – 
theft, fraud, prostitution, fornication and adultery, the possession, sale and con-
sumption of alcohol, rape, sodomy, incest, homosexuality, and murder, all of 
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which would now attract severe punishment (caning, amputation, execution by 
stoning) – other more ‘secular’ corrupt acts were equally covered. These in-
cluded illegal diversion of funds by public officials or agents of private institu-
tions (“criminal breach of trust”) and illegal acquisition (for example, through an 
intermediary) of public assets. These acts were to be punished by 10 to 15 years’ 
imprisonment. The said assets would also be confiscated, possibly followed by 
some 40 strokes of the cane to be publicly administered. Other corrupt acts pro-
hibited included the falsification of documents (5-14 years’ imprisonment), giv-
ing or acceptance of bribes (5-7 years), and abuse of powers by judicial and po-
lice officers (5 years). These offences would also attract between 30 and 50 
strokes of the cane. 
Aware of the high level of poverty in the state (Federal Government of Nigeria 
2005: 64) and particularly the hostility of the central government to any imple-
mentation of Shari’ah as a criminal code, a number of new local institutions were 
created supposedly to facilitate the implementation of the code. These included 
the Zamfara State Poverty Alleviation Programme (ZAPA), Zamfara State His-
bah Commission (also known as the Shari’ah Police), Shari’ah Courts, and the 
Zamfara State Anti-Corruption Commission (ZSACC). Within the framework of 
the ZAPA, salaries of civil servants were increased by 60% in 2000 (Salihu 
2004: 23), and soft loans to workers to build houses or purchase vehicles were 
also offered. Others measures taken within the framework of the ZAPA included 
purchase and distribution of fertiliser and agricultural equipment for farmers, and 
soft loans to unemployed youths to establish small businesses, such as the pur-
chase of commercial motorbikes.14 
The Zamfara State Hisbah Commission was the second local institution cre-
ated to help implement Shari’ah. According to its enabling law, the functions of 
the Commission included measures to “ensure proper compliance with the teach-
ings of Shari’ah throughout the State”, and to “take every measure necessary to 
sanitize the society of all social vices and whatever vice or crime is prohibited by 
Shari’ah” (Zamfara State of Nigeria 2003). The phrase “take every measure nec-
essary” seemed to be a kind of carte blanche for this organization to arrest, de-
tain, and prosecute those who contravened the codes of Shari’ah, a move that 
would certainly bring it into direct confrontation with the central authorities, es-
pecially the national police. But this was not the case, as the law in Sections 27-
38 also provided that “in exercising its powers … the Commission and all its 
staff at Local Government Councils and ward levels shall have power to arrest … 
and thereafter hand over the arrested person(s) to the Police”.  
                                                 
14  The exact number of motorbike purchases is unknown. However, one journalist during our interview 
estimated that the state may have spent over N947 million on bikes alone. This was in October 2004. 
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Lastly, the Zamfara government also created several Shari’ah courts in differ-
ent parts of the state to try Muslim offenders only. According to the law, trials 
had to commence in the Lower Shari’ah Courts and proceed to the Upper 
Shari’ah Courts, before going to the Shari’ah Courts of Appeal, all administered 
by the state. But where any of the parties was not satisfied, he or she might pro-
ceed to the Federal Courts of Appeal (the nearest being in Kaduna) and possibly 
to the Supreme Court of Nigeria (in Abuja).  
One major lacuna in the Shari’ah code was probably the decision to exclude 
non-Muslims from the jurisdiction of these courts,15 a decision that was intended 
to minimise conflict between the adherents of the two dominant faiths in Nigeria, 
Christianity and Islam. Even then, this loophole was effectively corrected with 
the adoption on 15 September 2000 of the Zamfara State Anti-Corruption Com-
mission (establishment) Law No. 17 2000,16 more-or-less a copy of the Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000, adopted by the federal govern-
ment only a few months earlier. This law established the Zamfara State Anti-
Corruption Commission (ZACC), a body similar to the ICPC. The ZACC even 
had powers to arrest and prosecute for corruption in the private sector and could 
launch an investigation without waiting for formal petitions from members of the 
public, quite unlike the ICPC. In addition, some offences under the Zamfara Act 
could attract far more severe punishments, a good example being diversion of 
public funds or assets, which could attract up to 15 years in jail as against a 
maximum of 7 years under the ICPC law. 
At face value, the adoption of Shari’ah in Zamfara State showed that this state 
had gone some way to support the anti-corruption drive of the federal govern-
ment. In spite of its religious and therefore controversial character, this legisla-
tion and indeed some of the institutions created under it had the potential to 
strengthen or extend the fight against corruption spearheaded by President 
Obasanjo, if they were faithfully implemented. However, as Daniel Bach has ar-
gued, its application, even in its most cruel forms (amputation of hands for steal-
ing), in the end did nothing to check the total impunity enjoyed by local political 
elites frequently associated with the diversion of huge sums of money (Bach 
2003). It could even be argued that fighting elite corruption was never the central 
                                                 
15  Section 3 of the Code clearly stated: “Every person who professes the Islamic faith and or every other 
person who voluntarily consents to the exercise of jurisdiction of any Shari’ah Court established under 
the Shari’ah Courts (Administration of Justice and certain consequential changes) Law, 1999, shall be 
liable to punishment under the Shari’ah Penal Code for every act or omission contrary to the provi-
sions thereof of which he shall be guilty within the State.”  
16  The Zamfara State Anti-Corruption Commission (Establishment) Law 2000 was later replaced by 
another Act, the Zamfara State Anti-Corruption Commission (Establishment) Law, 2003. The latter 
contains more or less the same provisions associated with the former, except that henceforth one 
member of the commission must be a lawyer, and that in the exercise of its functions the commission 
should not be subjected to the control of any other authority.  
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question or preoccupation. According to this view, the adoption of Shari’ah by 
Zamfara, and 11 other states in quick succession, was only a part of internal po-
litical struggles and electoral mobilisation (Nouhou 2005: 265). Facts gathered 
from a close observation of politics and governance in the state between 1999 
and 2007 largely support this claim. 
Contrary to frequent claims made by officials of the Zamfara State govern-
ment that the provisions of Shari’ah had largely been applied (Zamfara State of 
Nigeria 2004), there was no evidence at the time of our fieldwork pointing to a 
strict and unbiased application of the code. As a 2004 Human Rights Watch re-
port correctly pointed out, after a few years of Shari’ah, many people in Northern 
Nigeria had simply become disillusioned with the way Shari’ah was being im-
plemented in their states (HRW 2004). While there was little doubt as to the pre-
paredness of the authorities to apply the most severe sanctions, such as caning, 
amputation, or even death sentences (ironically, sentences reserved for the most 
minor infractions, such as petty theft, consumption of alcohol, prostitution, and 
adultery – whose perpetrators are more often than not the poorest and weakest in 
the society),17 the principles of equality, generosity, equity, and justice which 
Shari’ah preaches were routinely ignored. This fact was vividly underlined by 
one of the journalists in the state we interviewed: 
Shari’ah has scored partial success, in the area of social morality, alcoholism, prostitution or 
prostitutes (who were given financial incentives to leave). Crime such as stealing, robbery, 
etc. has been checked by the State (Zamfara Agency for Poverty Alleviation) … But for me, 
Shari’ah have scored only 30% because the governor have a policy to get his supporters into 
big post to enrich themselves; that is why you see big houses everywhere, even the governor 
himself encourage it … In the government circles, Shari’ah hardly applies.18 
Only in one rare incident did the application of Shari’ah catch up with a 
highly placed official. This occurred in January 2002, when a Shari’ah court 
convicted a serving judge for drunkenness in Kaura Namoda, near the state capi-
tal Gasau. He received 80 lashes, administered in a market square by his father-
in-law before a crowd of enthusiastic spectators. Otherwise, the determination to 
implement Shari’ah was never demonstrated concretely with respect to numerous 
delinquencies by political elites and top public officials, who account for other 
more serious forms of ‘immorality’, such as diversion of public assets, inflation 
of public contracts, financial fraud in the accounts’ departments of public institu-
                                                 
17  Our investigation in 2004 actually confirmed that there was a dramatic decline in these offences after 
the implementation of Shari’ah. According to the Public Relations Officer of the Nigerian Police, 
Zamfara, “the minimal level of crime in the state was attributable to its small size and the religious 
orientation of its inhabitants”. The situation was reinforced by “the fear of Shari’ah”. This information 
was provided during a personal interview with this police officer on 19 October 2004. 
18  This was based on a personal interview with one of the journalists working for The Path newspaper 
(Sokoto), at Gusau, on 22 October 2004. 
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tions, payments of bribes, and the extortion of tribute from peasants by tradi-
tional rulers (particularly in the rural areas), to mention but a few. 
The poor attention paid to these issues was confirmed by the records of the 
ZACC, provided during a personal interview with the leaders of the commission. 
Notwithstanding their attempt to present the institution as an effective one, by 
citing some unsubstantiated success in the recovery of diverted funds and assets, 
large numbers of suspended highly placed officials, and the heightened aware-
ness created about corruption in the state,19 the ineffectiveness of the ZACC was 
clearly apparent. For example, this institution received around 432 petitions, 
treated 300, but had won zero convictions as at October 2004. When asked to ex-
plain the reasons for such a dismal performance despite the deluge of complaints, 
the managers of this institution said they considered the large number of petitions 
from the public as a sign of public confidence in the institution. Probed further on 
this, they argued that the rarity of convictions was due to the fact that “the ac-
cused often accept easily their culpability and commit through legal bargain to 
return the asset or funds diverted”. According to them, the commission was also 
seeking to avoid a situation where “innocent people are punished”. 
Despite being sapped by a chronic shortage of manpower and administrative 
structures,20 the ZACC occasionally made some brave efforts to call influential 
political figures to account. These efforts were undermined, however, by a lack 
of political will at the highest level of authority in the state. A very notable ex-
ample, which became emblematic of the hypocrisy of the ruling elite and the 
most celebrated corruption scandal in the period 1999-2004, was the case of two 
commissioners (in charge of the ministries of Education and Scientific Educa-
tion) and their permanent secretaries, who were officially accused of embezzling 
public funds. The scandal broke in 2003 following an investigation by the 
ZACC, which confirmed that these officials had indeed utilised their offices to 
divert N9 million (or 50% of the funds allocated for the feeding of students in the 
state’s special secondary schools).  
Under both the Shari’ah code and the anti-corruption Act of 2000 as amended 
in 2003, all the diverted funds had to be returned and those who were involved 
immediately suspended from their positions. In the case of conviction, the cor-
rupt officials could receive up to 15 years’ prison term each. But this never came 
to pass. The Zamfara anti-corruption commission was forced to abandon the case 
“so as not to create problems” in the state. While we could not confirm if and 
                                                 
19  In October 2004, we conducted several interviews with top officials of the Zamfara State Anti-
Corruption Commission, including its chairman.  
20  At the time of our visit in October 2004, the chairman of the commission was the only lawyer working 
in the commission. For trials, the commission must rely on the Ministry of Justice. There was also 
only one specialist in finance and accounting. This official was on secondment from another agency 
and was invited to help strengthen the commission. 
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how much money had been returned by the accused officials, the sanctions rec-
ommended by the anti-corruption body were never strictly applied. Rather than 
20 months on suspension, or even outright dismissal, the concerned officials re-
ceived only a paltry 3 months’ suspension,21 at the end of which they were both 
redeployed to head new ministries (Ministry of Social Welfare and Ministry of 
Animal Health, respectively).  
No official explanation was given for this decision. During an interview, how-
ever, one journalist provided some insights into the rationale for this soft treat-
ment for corrupt high officials:  
The two commissioners were treated kindly because they are part and parcel of the govern-
ment (Executive) which the anti-corruption commission submitted its report to. They are po-
litically influential … One is even a childhood friend of the governor, who came from the 
same town (community) with him, attended the same schools, and grew up together.22 
The decision provoked much criticism among the citizenry for months, as al-
most all the individuals we spoke to expressed some form of disgust and a feel-
ing of betrayal by their governor, who was perceived to have turned to a selective 
application of sanctions. But surprisingly, a number of citizens in the state at the 
time of our visit in 2004 continued to express the view that their governor was 
“someone honest”. This ambivalent feeling was captured by the response of an-
other journalist we interviewed in October 2004: 
When Shari’ah was launched, an estimated 2 million people witnessed it … Most of those 
people hoped it will solve their socio-economic problems. Today, the political system has 
prevented the economic components of Shari’ah from being actualized. The ANPP, the rul-
ing party here (Zamfara), is not an Islamic party. The political system is characterised by in-
sincerity, main problem of Nigerian democracy, elites looking for their selfish interests. The 
governor is sincere, but his supporters, allies and others around him don’t share his philoso-
phy in terms of real Shari’ah.23 
Soon, however, this image of personal honesty began to crumble in the face of 
mounting evidence of wrongdoing by the same governor and his close officials. 
In mid-2006, for instance, the EFCC announced that it had opened a corruption 
investigation against the Zamfara governor, Sani Ahmed, and some of his senior 
officials. The probe followed a petition submitted to the anti-graft body in Febru-
ary 2006 by the chairman of one of the local governments in the state (Gumi lo-
cal council) alleging the illegal diversion of N700 million belonging to the 14 lo-
cal government councils in the state. The then EFCC boss, Nuhu Rubadu, de-
scribed the scandal as “a case of direct stealing” (ThisDay, 28 September 2006). 
                                                 
21  The information was provided by the chairman of the commission during my interview with him on 
21 October 2004. 
22  The journalist in question was the Gasau correspondent of The Sun newspaper, a local daily with its 
head-office in Lagos. The interview took place on 23 October 2004. 
23  Our interview with this journalist, who works for The Guardian newspaper, took place in the state 
capital on 23 October 2004. 
137 
 
After investigations were concluded, seven of the officials involved were brought 
to court for diverting public funds. The governor himself was spared only be-
cause he enjoyed constitutional immunity against arrest and prosecution.  
Conclusion  
Throughout his tenure in office, President Obasanjo did much to create the im-
pression that his much-advertised fight against corruption was a national struggle 
against a very destructive national affliction. This was not the case, however, as 
we have seen in this chapter. Many Nigerian states considered his anti-corruption 
policy as an unnecessary intrusion into or infringement on the affairs on autono-
mous federal units, which is against the spirit and letter of the federal Constitu-
tion of Nigeria. The cases of Bayelsa and Zamfara states, as well as many others 
cited in this chapter, show clearly that the adoption of a pro-federal posture by 
Nigerian state governors had little to do with a genuine intention to fight corrup-
tion in their respective states or preserve Nigeria’s federal system of government. 
This also demonstrates that while the presence of federalism may not necessarily 
condemn Nigeria to a life of endemic corruption (all federal states do not suffer 
similar levels of corruption), the country’s decentralised system requires that 
more innovative ways be found to ensure a more effective implementation of its 
anti-corruption policy in its 36 states and 774 local governments. The question is 
then, what are these other innovative ways? A growing body of literature has 
emphasised the crucial role of civil society (Devas & Grant 2003). The extent to 
which Nigerian civil society promoted President Obasanjo’s war against corrup-
tion is the focus of the chapter that follows. 
 
 7 
Civil society and the war  
against corruption  
Introduction 
From the perspective of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the war against graft in Nigeria 
is yet to start. It will begin the day CSOs plan their own programmes, source their own 
funds, and take the initiative in executing programmes. It will start when CSOs can muster 
enough strength to compel the President, Vice-President, governors of states and deputy 
governors of states, to shed their pretence or immunity and declare their assets publicly and 
subject themselves to the same kind of probe as anyone else. The war will start when civil 
society forces the same people, as well as all legislators, to make known to Nigerians the 
sources of their wealth. It will start when CSOs are able to achieve the recall of a single leg-
islator or the resignation of a sole minister, commissioner, local government chairman, on 
the charge of corrupt practices … These are actions within the realm of possibility of CSOs. 
At present, we are caught in a merry-go-round of workshops, conferences, summits, interac-
tive sessions, or ‘hot lines’ and monitoring of what government is doing. CSOs of the NGO 
type are in danger of merely becoming agents of the state or extensions of state programmes. 
To become true CSOs, we should develop a national action plan for the fight against corrup-
tion. Then we can seize the initiative from government. (Asobie 2005: 16) 
With the exception of the press and spontaneous movements, previous strug-
gles against corruption waged by successive governments in Nigeria had gone on 
without the active participation of non-state actors and institutions, otherwise 
known as civil society. On the other hand, the Obasanjo years (1999-2007) were 
marked by a heightened participation of civil society – local and international 
NGOs, labour unions, professional, cultural, and religious associations, and even 
groups emanating from the organized private sector, all of which now partici-
pated in the war against corruption in Nigeria (ibid.: 8). How can this rapid trans-
formation be explained in a country where the war against corruption had tradi-
tionally been conducted and imposed from above? And what were the conse-
quences of this increased role of civil society for the anti-corruption campaign 
pursued by the Obasanjo regime? 
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To begin with the first question, the transformation in the role of civil society 
was facilitated by at least three factors. The first factor was the logic of democ-
ratic transition. That is to say, the passage from an authoritarian regime to de-
mocracy offered more possibility for the population to organize and participate 
more actively in the making and implementation of public policies (Chowdhurry 
2004; Lewis 2004: 118). The second factor concerned the impact of globalisa-
tion, in terms of the work of international actors and institutions that aggressively 
pushed for the formation, promotion, and consolidation of CSOs, henceforth re-
garded as indispensable partners in the promotion of good governance. The third 
and perhaps more important factor was the Obasanjo anti-corruption strategy it-
self. Contrary to what happened in the past, the anti-corruption strategy initiated 
by the Obasanjo administration had indirectly encouraged a more active role for 
civil society in the fight against corruption. A good example was the provisions 
in the EFCC and ICPC Acts which required the two main anti-corruption agen-
cies to mobilise members of the civil society behind the war against corruption 
and receive petitions on alleged corrupt practices from them.  
In terms of the contribution of civil society to the war against corruption, the 
activities of NGOs can offer significant insights. In recent attempts to promote 
good governance in developing countries, NGOs have tended to be more vocal 
than other sections of the civil society (Atlani-Duault 2005). During the Oba-
sanjo era, the number of these organizations and their diversity grew very rapidly 
in Nigeria (Pérouse de Montclos 2005). While it is difficult or even impossible to 
know the exact number of these organizations at any given moment, there was 
substantial evidence suggesting that they were intervening in virtually every do-
main of public life, including the struggle against corruption. Indeed, a good 
number of them were created specifically to help advance the struggle against 
corruption. Our review of Nigeria’s press, covering the period between 1999 and 
2006, revealed that there were nearly 40 such NGOs. Transparency in Nigeria 
(TIN), which is the local branch of Transparency International; Exam Ethics Pro-
ject (EEP), which specialises in combating fraud and corruption in the educa-
tional system; Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), a loose coalition of some 50 
anti-corruption NGOs; African Network for Environmental and Economic Jus-
tice (ANEEJ); Independent Advocacy Group (IAG); and Convention on Business 
Integrity (CBI), which focuses on the struggle against corruption in the business 
and private sector – these were about the most dynamic and active among these 
NGOs.  
But despite their high visibility, these NGOs shared their anti-corruption role 
with other actors of the civil society. The list includes the mass media, profes-
sional associations, labour unions, employers’ associations, the organized private 
sector, and ethno-religious movements. Like NGOs, the intervention of these 
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various organs of civil society in public life preceded the Obasanjo administra-
tion; however, they developed a deep interest in corruption during the Obasanjo 
era. A more balanced assessment of the contributions of civil society, therefore, 
will also require a critical review of the activities of these other civil society ac-
tors. In this chapter, we will argue that, overall, CSOs have been of little help in 
Nigeria’s campaign against corruption because their overall contribution, while 
showing some improvement from that which obtained in the past, was largely 
weak and inefficient compared with what was prescribed in the academic litera-
ture on development policy.  
The influence and capacity for action of CSOs was undermined by a lack of 
independent sources of funding, which eroded their autonomy, and the absence 
of helpful legislation and practices, such as one granting free access to informa-
tion in a state that has elevated official secrecy to more or less a religion (Asobie 
2005). Their preoccupation with material issues (Momoh 1996) and inability to 
go beyond primary group (ethnic, religious, etc.) solidarity (Iredia 2005) further 
contributed to making them less effective than they could have been. In addition, 
there was the lack of capacity among the leaders of these organizations, the ri-
valry and poor networking between different associations, the hostile attitudes of 
government, and in many instances the rent-seeking behaviour of those at the 
helm of affairs in these organizations. All these made it possible for politicians to 
instrumentalise them for political gains. These challenges were not new. At-
tempts to create anti-corruption associations in the past had collapsed owing to 
the same reasons (Falola 1998). The challenges also did not apply only to NGOs 
or associations formed to promote the struggle against anti-corruption; almost all 
actors and organizations which formed part of the civil society were touched in 
one manner or the other by these weaknesses (Eteng 1997; Aiyede 2003: 9). Be-
fore looking at the role played by each of these actors during the Obasanjo era, 
we will briefly look at the concept of civil society from a normative point of view 
and its development into a force for good governance.  
The concept of civil society  
The definition of the concept of civil society has remained a source of disagree-
ment among scholars despite its visibility in the literature of the social science for 
decades (Harbeson et al. 1994; White 1994; Offerlé 2003). However, in recent 
times two opposing approaches have emerged in the general literature on civil 
society. The first approach, regarded as the conventional approach, defines civil 
society as those formal organizations or associations which seek to advance the 
general interest in particular domains. These organizations are sometimes known 
by the appellation ‘civic advocacy groups’. According to this approach, these as-
sociations are those that must be “formally organized with specific and limited 
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purposes, participatory internal government, and the autonomy to act beyond the 
immediate interest of their members … They must also confront the state while 
upholding its authority. That is, force the state to reform” (Kasfir 1998: 6). 
Schmitter and Diamond are among the most well-known defenders of this essen-
tially normative approach. For them, civil society includes only those organiza-
tions who “agree to act within preestablished rules of a civil nature, that is, con-
veying mutual respect” (Schmitter 1997: 240), and who “eschew violence and 
respect pluralisme as well as the law and other social and political actors” (Dia-
mond 1994: 6; Diamond 1997: xxxi). According to this view, most associations 
present in Nigeria (including cultural, ethno-religious, extremist, and violent 
groups like youth militias, which have become increasingly visible across the 
country since 1999) – which, in the words of Hadenius & Uggla (1996: 1623), 
are “pronouncedly hierarchical”, or in the words of Gyimah-Boadi, present 
sometimes some “not-so-civil demands” (Gyimah-Boadi 1996: 129) – should not 
be considered part of the civil society.  
But can the concept of civil society be validly limited to civic advocacy 
groups, or only to ‘associations of general interest’, to borrow the concept of 
Roger Sue (Sue 2003: 107)? Several Africanists have argued that any approach 
which seeks to exclude actors such as ethno-religious associations is not rooted 
in empirical facts. They contend that groups or movements which have weak so-
cial roots cannot explain much, particularly in Africa (Fatton Jr. 1991: 720; Kas-
fir 1998; Howell 2001: 185). Nelson Kasfir offers two reasons why this approach 
is defective. Firstly, “seemingly modern organizations are usually permeated by 
tribal and ethnic divisions at early stages. Secondly, family, tribe, and clan-based 
associations may also be the locus of social and political change” (Kasfir 1998: 
185). Kasfir and other authors, therefore, have offered a more inclusive approach. 
It is in this sense that Michael Walzer defines civil society as “the space of unco-
erced human association and also the set of relational networks – formed for the 
sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology – that fill this space” (Walzer 1991: 
293). In the same sense, Mutuwafhethu J. Mafunisa notes that civil society in-
cludes organizations which are separate from the legislative, administrative, and 
judicial authority of the state. They include, according to him, labour unions, re-
ligious groups, cultural and religious associations, sport clubs, student groups, 
political parties, and ethnic groups adhering to their own code of conduct and 
norms (Mafunisa 2004). 
This second approach to civil society corresponds more to the Nigerian socio-
political terrain. In Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, several other non-state actors 
who fall outside the notion of ‘civic organizations’ participate more or less in 
civic affairs, including the struggle against corruption (Guyer 1994). These actors 
include student movements, religious bodies, ethnic and cultural groups, tradi-
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tional leaders, labour unions, NGOs (notably those working in areas such as hu-
man rights, struggle for democratisation, and social justice), professional associa-
tions, and the media. One can also observe roles being played by some commit-
ted citizens as individuals. In the latter category, for instance, we find the radical 
lawyer and human rights’ activist, Gani Fawehimi, and the late ‘Afrobeat King’, 
Fela Anikulapo-Kuti (Idowu 1997; Idowu et al. 2002). These two individuals 
during their lifetimes were well-known for their individual struggles against au-
thoritarianism and political corruption. The role of intellectuals, including nota-
ble writers such as Wole Soyinka and Chinua Achebe, also cannot be ignored 
(Achebe 1983; Soyinka 1996). The return to democracy gave these actors and 
associations, including those interested in the struggle against corruption, more 
visibility and impetus. The rate of formation of such associations and move-
ments, and the growing scope of their activities (as reported by the local media) 
under the Fourth Republic, was a confirmation of the hypothesis of civil society 
as a ‘watchdog’ of society and its rulers.  
 
The challenge of good governance: What role for civil society? 
Since the 1980s, the central role of institutions in the advancement of good gov-
ernance (democratisation, public accountability, and development of a market 
economy) in developing countries has received growing attention from research-
ers, international development institutions, Western governments, and donors. 
These actors were largely disappointed by the outcome of neo-liberal policies 
imposed on Third World countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Robinson 2004). The 
policies, also known as ‘market-based approaches’, rejected or called for a mini-
mal role for state institutions, while glorifying the market, which they conceived 
as a solution to the problems of corruption and development. After the results of 
these policies became well known, researchers began to insist that the promotion 
of good governance must unavoidably be preceded by the (re)construction and 
strengthening of institutions or “national integrity systems” (World Bank 1989, 
1992, 1997; Pope 2000), which comprise the executive, legislative and judiciary, 
the administrative apparatus, independent regulatory organs, the media, and civil 
society. In this neo-institutionalist approach, the role of civil society as an agent 
of development and good governance became particularly important (Adedeji & 
Otite 1997; Kisubi 1999; Howell & Pearce 2001; Transparency International 
2002). The arguments were summarised by Rob Jenkins:  
Development requires sound policies and impartial implementation. These can only be de-
livered by governments that are held accountable for their actions. Accountability, in turn, 
depends upon the existence of ‘autonomous centres of social and economic power’ that can 
act as watchdogs over the activities of politicians and government officials. Civil society 
consists of both the associations that make up these ‘centres’ and the ‘enabling environment’ 
that permits them to operate freely. It is an arena of public space as well as a set of private 
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actors. Therefore, aid to the ‘democracy and governance sector’ … must be earmarked to 
support both individual associations as well as the political milieu in which they carry out 
their functions. (Jenkins 2001: 252) 
This “instrumentalisation of the civil society”, to borrow the phrase of Jude 
Howell and Jenny Pearce (Howell & Pearce 2001: 117), was even more visible in 
academic literature and reform policies aimed at combating corruption in coun-
tries of the South. As Robin Theobald has suggested, whilst overall anti-cor-
ruption strategy in a given country is usually an admixture of a range of policies, 
these tend to coalesce around three central elements: The establishment of an 
anti-corruption agency, the general reform of the public sector, and the promo-
tion of a strong civil society (Theobald 2000: 149). Indeed, it is now widely ac-
cepted that in the absence of a vigorous civil society, administrative measures 
aimed at combating corruption will achieve little (Watt et. al. 2000: 51). The 
combination of a weak civil society and weak state “allows small, predatory po-
litical machines to more easily dominate an unorganized electorate … and take 
control of the institutions of the state” (Szeftel 1998: 235), while the develop-
ment of an effective civil society comprising a plurality of social groupings able 
to confront and contest the state has played and continues to play a central role in 
the maintenance of an accountable and publicly available state (Doig 2000: 16). 
However, neo-institutionalists are not ignorant of the limitations of their pre-
scriptions. Thus, Alan Doig has also underlined the contradictions which can 
emerge from this approach in a country torn by ethnic divisions, such as Nigeria. 
As he observes, in a country like Nigeria there is a thriving level of local civil 
society, albeit lacking in resources and often working outside formal structures, 
but promoting this as part of the democratisation process may force to the fore-
front sectional rather than national or public-interest perspectives (ibid.: 31). This 
argument has been reinforced by Robin Theobald (2000: 154):  
The fundamental structures of power within a given state will almost certainly be replicated 
within its civil society. Accordingly, in a state where structures of authority and power are 
articulated primarily through patriarchal and clientelistic-type ties, it is inevitable that such 
relationships will penetrate civil society associations. And, of course, the resulting tendency 
for such societies to be compartmentalised into vertical blocs will be seriously reinforced 
where the state is fragmented by ethnic, regional, religious and other similar formations. 
Other limitations of this ‘bottom-up approach’ were highlighted in the work of 
Nunnenkamp (1995: 15), who notes:  
Bottom-up approach obviously relies on supportive measures by government authorities … 
Better access of marginalised groups to the formal economic and legal system requires a 
change in political and bureaucratic attitudes by definition. Hence, the bottom-up approach 
does not provide an alternative to top-down attempts at greater participation and better gov-
ernance. Rather, both approaches may supplement each other in countries revealing at least a 
minimum of domestic reform-mindedness. 
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Similarly, after a review of the literature on civil society in the developing 
countries, Robin Theobald (2000: 153) concludes:  
The outlook for a vigorous civil society in less developed states is not encouraging. Poverty, 
low levels of literacy, geographical and social isolation, and, probably most important of all, 
the unrelieved burden of surviving from day to day, hardly conduce to participating in and 
organizing those associations that will constitute an effective check on the actions of gov-
ernment. 
Despite these pessimistic assessments, the consensus in academic and public-
policy literature remains more or less favourable to the view that civil society is 
an indispensable actor in the struggle to promote good governance (Langseth 
2001; Eigen et al. 2004). This optimism has been reinforced, it seems, by the ex-
periences of countries such as the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia (Assefa & 
Mesfin 2001; Bujra & Adejumobi 2002; Bujra & Buthelezi 2002; Otayek 2002). 
For instance, the fall of President Wahid of Indonesia in 2001 was attributed 
partly to the activities of civil society in that country (Bolonggaita Jr. 2003: 17). 
Civil society groups played key roles not only in the overthrow of presidents 
Marcos and Estrada in 1986 and 2001, respectively, but also in the economic and 
political reforms which followed their removal (Clarke 2000). NGOs in Thailand 
were also said to have played similar roles, particularly with the adoption in 1997 
of a “people’s constitution”, which contained strong anti-corruption components 
(Bolonggaita Jr. 2003: 17). The contribution of civil society to good governance 
therefore springs from two perspectives. The first is that civil society helps to 
plant values and civic behaviours among its members and thus helps to construct 
a vision that is supportive of good governance. Secondly, through its ‘advocacy’ 
and ‘networking’ roles, civil society seeks to influence or force political leaders 
to adopt positions that conform to their good governance agenda.  
The question then is, to what extent did these ideas apply to Nigerian civil so-
ciety groups under Obasanjo? 
 
Evolution and growth of civil society in Nigeria 
Even though literature abounds on the origin of civil society in the West (Ehren-
berg 1999; Kaviraj & Khilnani 2001), very few researchers have studied the ori-
gin of the same institutions in Africa. A few scholars who have done so have 
traced the origin and evolution of civil society in Africa to the colonial and post-
colonial experience of the continent. Along this line, Jude Howell and Jenny 
Pearce have argued that the emergence of civil society in Africa can be traced to 
three historical periods. These are the period of colonisation, the post-colonial 
period, and the period involving the introduction of Structural Adjustment Pro-
grammes and democratic transitions (Howell & Pearce 2001). Their analysis has 
been confirmed partly by the work of Otite and Kawonise, who affirm that the 
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activism of civil society or ‘popular participation’ can be linked to two historical 
periods: The (pre)colonial period, with “indigenous or premordial organizations 
or associations which are ethnically bound”, and the post-colonial period, with 
“modern non-indigenous or civic associations and organizations with nation-
wide culture” (Otite & Kawonise 1997: 35). Otite & Kawonise, however, recog-
nise the possibility of a fusion between the two spheres; that is to say, these or-
ganizations can at the same time be indigenous and non-indigenous. This could 
be seen in the formation of ethnic associations beginning in the colonial period, a 
phenomenon which had developed as a reaction to colonisation and intra- and 
inter-ethnic tensions in the new society (ibid.: 37).  
During the period of colonial domination, these ethnic associations – and also 
labour, student, and especially nationalist movements – constituted the arrow-
head of opposition in a struggle that eventually ended colonisation (Bangura 
1999: 8). However, during the period that followed independence, right up to the 
1980s, civil society in Africa (with the notable exception of the independent 
press, which relentlessly sought to hold politicians accountable, notably in the 
particular case of Nigeria) suffered a decline in the face of monopolisation of the 
political arena by successive authoritarian regimes. The economic crisis which 
ensued in the wake of increasing militarisation of the society in the 1980s facili-
tated the return of the traditional civil society or ‘organized labour’ (ibid.), which 
protested against the impoverishment of the population, a condition which wors-
ened with the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programmes1 put in place by 
African regimes under the direction of the IMF and World Bank (Otayek 2002: 
194).  
The period of economic crisis was characterised by an unprecedented spread 
of new CSOs. This involved essentially human rights’ campaign groups, who 
demanded, with the financial support of the international community (particu-
larly American foundations), an end to authoritarian regimes. In the particular 
case of Nigeria, the best-known associations in this regard were the following: 
The Civil Liberty Organization (CLO), founded in 1987; the Committee for the 
Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), founded in 1989; the Niger Delta Human 
and Environmental Rights Organization, which became active in 1995; and the 
Campaign for Democracy (CD) founded in 1992 (Pérouse de Montclos 2005: 
194). These associations were largely confined to the city of Lagos, which until 
1990 was the economic and political capital of Nigeria, before they began to 
spread to other cities (Amuwo 1995; Olukoshi 1997). Although these organiza-
tions were largely interested in the restoration of democracy and respect for hu-
                                                 
1  These programmes were first adopted in Nigeria in June 1986 by General Ibrahim Babangida’s re-
gime. 
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man rights, as their names suggest, their influence was felt elsewhere and went 
beyond the struggle for the restoration of democracy (ibid.: 17). 
The collapse of the Structural Adjustment Programme and, more importantly, 
the transition-to-democracy project under the Presidency of General Ibrahim Ba-
bangida – following the annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential elections and 
the political crisis which it provoked – led to the radicalisation of these associa-
tions and the emergence (especially during the more dictatorial Abacha regime, 
1993-8) of a larger number of new civil society associations and organizations, 
including new independent media houses. These events were, of course, unfold-
ing at a time of profound changes in the policies and behaviour of the interna-
tional community, which increasingly favoured democratisation in countries of 
the South, and so a larger role for the civil society (Biekart 1999; Amuwo 2001). 
These conditions permitted these associations to profit easily from the financial 
and political support of the international community and, ultimately, to mobilise 
the population and force democratic reforms, culminating in the end of military 
rule in Nigeria on 29 May 1999 (Aiyede 2003: 9). 
The installation of the Fourth Republic in 1999 opened another stage in the 
development of civil society in Nigeria. This development had two major conse-
quences. Firstly, and as we have already noted, the years 1999-2007 were marked 
by the widespread creation of new civil society associations and organizations, 
notably including new anti-corruption NGOs (see Table 7.1). There was also a 
noticeable transformation in the orientation and mode of operation of hitherto ex-
isting associations, which saw such NGOs changing their focus to other areas or 
domains. A good example is the case of associations which had been formed  
 
 
Table 7.1  List of anti-corruption NGOs in the Fourth Republic 
Name of association City/State  Leader(s) 
1.  Kaduna Discussion Group (KDG) Kaduna Yusuf Mamman &  
   Lawan Gwadabe 
2.  Association of Nigerians Against Corruption Abuja NA 
3. Youth United for a Better Nigeria (YUBEN) Abuja NA 
4. Clear View Foundation Abuja NA 
5.  Exam Ethics Project Lagos/Abuja Ike Oyechere 
6.  Nationwide Action Against corruption NA NA 
7.  Winners and Associate NA NA 
8.  Independent Campaign Against Corruption NA NA 
9.  Transparency and Integrity Foundation NA NA 
10.  Against Vision Incorporated NA NA 
11.  The Movement For New Nigeria (MNN) NA NA 
12.  The Ethics, Due Diligence and Good  Lagos/Abuja Ike Oyechere  
 Governance Empowerment Project  
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 (Project Edge) 
13. Legal defence and Assistance Project  NA NA 
 (LEDAP)* 
14. Zero Corruption Coalition Lagos/Abuja Lilian Ekeayanwu 
15. African Network for Environmental  Benin Rev. David Ugolor 
 and Economic Justice (ANEEJ)* 
16. Anti-Corruption Youth Movement of  Abuja Ume Bassey 
 Nigeria (ACYMN) 
17. Centre for Public Accountability (CPA) NA NA 
18. Coalition for Public Accountability  NA Bowo Olateru- 
 and Development (COPAD)   Olagbegi 
19.  Taraba Transparency Network (TTN)** Jalingo, Taraba Ahmd Yusuf 
20.  Youths’ Information Network  NA NA 
21.  Transparency In Nigeria Lagos.Abuja Dr. Assisi Asobie 
22.  Crystal Vision Incorporated NA NA 
23.  Independent Advocacy Group Lagos Prof. John Ayoade 
24.  Convention on Business Integrity Lagos Dr. Christopher  
   Kolade 
25.  Bayelsa Transparency Initiative Yenagoa, Bayelsa Festus Gbasa 
26.  Vanguard for Transparent Leadership  Abuja Femi Aduwo 
 and Democracy (VATLD) 
27.  Probity and Ethics Society NA NA 
28.  Zamfara Patriotic Alliance  Gusau, Zamfara NA 
29.  Global Network for Islamic Justice*  Gusau, Zamfara NA 
30.  Democrats for Good Governance NA Uchendu Agulu &  
   Eugene Ezeoke 
31.  African Centre for Democratic Governance* Abuja Kunle Animasaun 
32.  Centre for Constitutional Governance* Lagos Beko Ronsome-Kuti 
33.  Socio-Economic Rights and  Lagos Prince Adetokunbo  
 Accountability Project (SERAP)*  Mumuni 
34.  Transition Monitoring Group (TMG)** Abuja/Lagos Richard Akinola 
35.  Labour Election Monitoring Team (LEMT)** Abuja/Lagos Angela Odah 
36.  Electoral Reform Network (ERN)** Abuja/Lagos John A. Kolawole 
37.  Justice Development and Peace  NA Olawale Fapohunda 
 Commission (JDPC)* 
38.  Muslim League for Accountability (MULAC)** Lagos/Abuja Rekiya Momoh 
39. The CLEEN Foundation NA NA 
40. Transparency and Anti-corruption Walsh NA Oluwafemi Victor  
 Campaign (TRAC)  
*  These were associations that were also involved in other spheres of activities outside the campaign 
against corruption. 
**  These were coalitions of several other local associations or NGOs, the largest being TMG (170 
associations) and ERN (73 associations). The number of constituent associations for TTN, LEMT 
and MULAC were unknown at the time of this source.  
Source:  “Nigerian Civil Society Statement on the General Elections of April 12th and 19th 2003”, in 
Africa Policy E-Journal, 13 May 2003. 
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before 1999 to fight against military rule and promote the restoration of democ-
racy.Having achieved those aims, these associations or organizations quickly 
changed their focus so as not to become isolated in the new political dispensa-
tion. In a global context where the war against corruption is an absolute priority, 
many Nigerian NGOs joined the bandwagon to combat corruption and install a 
policy of good governance. In consequence, the struggle against corruption in 
Nigeria was now no longer the exclusive preserve of the media or even anti-
corruption NGOs. To put it differently, the importance given to fighting corrup-
tion in Nigeria under the Obasanjo administration ensured that everybody had to 
be interested in the campaign. 
Nigerian civil society in an era of good governance 
As noted earlier, the number and capacities of the different civil society institu-
tions in Nigeria witnessed an upswing during the years 1999-2007. Who were the 
most important actors, and what strategies or approaches did they adopt to chal-
lenge endemic corruption in Nigeria? Two different strategies or approaches 
have been observed. On the one hand, there were organizations and actors who 
favoured a collaboratory approach by developing a good rapport with the authori-
ties (regular consultation, execution of common projects, and forging of consen-
sus around certain ideas).2 On the other hand, there were also those who pre-
ferred an antagonistic approach (negative criticism, regular publications of data 
on acts of corruption by state functionaries, initiation of law suits, and even pro-
test marches against the authorities). The approach of these latter associations is 
usually explained by their mistrust of the authorities. However, both types of or-
ganizations were also involved in some form of education and mobilisation of the 
public. In the final analysis, they were also all engaged in the struggle to elimi-
nate all types of corruption, including electoral fraud.3 How successful were they 
in this struggle? In order to better answer this question, we will consider only a 
few among the most active of these actors. We first describe their structure (goals 
and strategies), and then we analyse their specific contributions to the war against 
corruption. 
                                                 
2  The ICPC, for example, maintained official and cordial working relations with several anti-corruption 
NGOs, notably Youths United For A Better Nigeria (YUBEN), Association of Nigerians Against Cor-
ruption (ANAC), Clear View Foundation, Youths’ Information Network, Exam Ethics Project, Na-
tionwide Action Against Corruption, Transparency In Nigeria, Transparency And Integrity Founda-
tion, and Crystal Vision Incorporated, to mention just a few. 
3  All post-1999 elections in Nigeria have been marked by a strong civil society participation, especially 
at the level of election observation. For instance, during the 2003 general elections, NGOs such as 
Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), Labour Election Monitoring Team (LEMT), Electoral Reform 
Network (ERN), Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC), Muslim League for Account-
ability (MULAC), and the Federation of Muslim Women’s Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN) 
played key roles in observing the elections.  
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Anti-corruption NGOs 
As indicated earlier, the term anti-corruption NGO applies to organizations 
formed uniquely or principally to help combat corruption and raise integrity in 
public institutions. By definition, these associations should be the most active in 
the fight against corruption, assuming they are effective. As Richard Holloway 
(head of Pact Zambia, an NGO fighting corruption in Zambia) has suggested, to 
be effective, an anti-corruption NGO must have a strong support base, be well 
run, possess some skills in the field of advocacy, focus on ‘winnable issues’, and 
be sustainable (Holloway 1999). The question is, how many of these anti-cor-
ruption NGOs in Nigeria met these criteria?  
In some sense, anti-corruption associations are not new phenomena in Nigeria. 
According to one study, conducted by Toyin Falola, anti-corruption associations 
or movements had been in existence in Nigeria as far back as the 1950s. Among 
the oldest was the League of Bribe Scorners, founded in June 1950 by some stu-
dents in one of Nigeria’s most renowned secondary schools, Kings College, lo-
cated in Lagos. In the mid-1950s, the Anti-Bribery and Corruption Society of 
Nigeria was also very active (Falola 1998: 154). These associations were not, 
however, NGOs in the true sense of the term, as they lacked permanent organiza-
tional structures. Anti-corruption NGOs became noticeable beginning only from 
mid-1999, with the return of civil democratic rule and the launching of Oba-
sanjo’s anti-corruption project. Since then, their number and organizational ca-
pacity have been growing. A review of the Nigerian press between 1999 and 
2006 reveals that there were close to 40 such associations, most of them based in 
Lagos and Abuja (see Table 7.1). Some of the most active ones and their contri-
butions are described below.  
 
• Transparency in Nigeria (TIN) 
Transparency in Nigeria, the local arm of Transparency International, figured 
among the most visible and active anti-corruption NGOs in Nigeria. Initially 
based in Lagos before moving to Abuja, TIN carried out its anti-corruption ac-
tivities through a network of regional units or administrative representatives 
based in six cities: Lagos, Jos, Kano, Maiduguri, Nsukka, and Uyo. Its major line 
of activities included consultancy and research on different aspects of corruption. 
TIN also organized workshops, seminars, and conferences for public institutions, 
their employees, the general public, and other members of civil society to discuss 
corruption and anti-corruption strategies. It was also very active in the domain of 
advocacy and lobbying of the authorities with a view to getting them to adopt 
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anti-corruption legislation or positions,4 such as initiating criminal pursuits 
against corrupt officials (ThisDay, 7 March 2003).  
During the period under review, TIN committed significant resources in the 
area of public education, networking, and collaboration with like-minded NGOs. 
One of the issues that attracted its attention was the provision of Section 308 of 
the 1999 Constitution, which granted immunity against arrest and prosecution to 
certain categories of public officials (the President, Vice-President, and all the 36 
state governors and their deputies). For many years, TIN campaigned for the re-
moval of this provision, an idea which also enjoyed the support of a large section 
of Nigerian society. Nevertheless, this campaign failed to succeed, even after it 
was included in the list of amendments proposed by the National Assembly, 
which attempted unsuccessfully to carry out a general revision of the 1999 Con-
stitution in 2005-6.5  
In other words, to the end of Obasanjo’s rule in 2007, TIN remained essen-
tially a mere ‘advocacy group’. This was despite the fact that it had privileged 
access to policy makers at the time. The popularity of its parent institution, TI, 
and the fact that some members of the Obasanjo government – including Presi-
dent Obasanjo himself and Mrs Oby Ezekwesili, who served as the head of the 
Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU), popularly known as the 
Due Process Office (an institution charged with installing a new fiscal and budg-
etary discipline in public procurement) – were founding members of TI were 
simply not enough to guarantee the adoption of its prescriptions.  
 
• Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC) 
Zero Corruption Coalition, run by a former coordinator of TIN, Lilian Ekeayan-
wu, was one of the most popular anti-corruption NGOs in Nigeria during Oba-
sanjo’s time. ZCC was actually a coalition of some 50 smaller anti-corruption 
movements (ThisDay, 4 March 2003). Just like TIN, its approach involved forg-
ing a close collaboration with public institutions, including the various anti-
corruption agencies and other CSOs, with the aim of educating the population on 
how to eradicate corruption. Although largely civil in its approach, the ZCC 
sometimes adopted confrontational positions when it thought this was necessary. 
For example, during the conflict between the National Assembly and the ICPC in 
2003, it openly criticised the legislators for their actions, which it said were de-
signed to undermine the powers of the ICPC. There were other instances when 
                                                 
4  TIN’s advocacy role became particularly visible during the crisis that followed the move by the fed-
eral parliament to amend the ICPC Act in order to stave off the ICPC’s quest to investigate the leader-
ship of the lawmaking body for alleged corrupt practices. 
5  The legislatures later voted to suspend the constitutional review exercise in its entirety, following sus-
picions that the Obasanjo Administration was intent on using the exercise to achieve a prolongation of 
its term in office.  
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the ZCC also took radical initiatives to advance the struggle against corruption 
when the authorities were not forthcoming. In 2001, the Nigerian government 
decided, with the financial support of some international financial institutions, to 
commission a scientific study (involving households, enterprises, and public offi-
cials) on the level and causes of corruption in Nigeria. The report of this study, 
which was supposed to dictate the future direction of anti-corruption policies, 
was submitted to the government in June 2003. Although the report simply con-
firmed what everyone already knew – that corruption was systemic and high in 
Nigeria – yet, after six months, its contents remained unknown to the public. 
Confronted with this foot-dragging by government, the ZCC took the initiative to 
publish the report in workshops it organized for this purpose across the country 
(Williams 2003).  
The government subsequently published the report, but refused to implement 
its findings (Federal Government of Nigeria 2003), thus highlighting the limits of 
the activism of the ZCC. Like TIN, the ZCC also engaged in several failed politi-
cal battles, including the battle to get the National Assembly to pass the Freedom 
of Information Bill, which did not materialise until after Obasanjo left office in 
2007. Similarly, its push for the adoption of what it called a ‘Coordinated Na-
tional Anti-Corruption Plan’ was unsuccessful (ThisDay, 7 December 2004). 
 
• Exam Ethics Project (EEP) 
The Exam Ethics Project, led by Ike Onyechere, was one of the best-known 
NGOs in Nigeria. Founded in 1996, the focus of EEP was on fraud and corrup-
tion in the educational system, with a particular interest in examination malprac-
tices (falsification or sale of marks and certificates by teachers, students, parents, 
educational institutions, and their agents). During Obasanjo’s time, the Nigerian 
educational system was regularly rocked by allegations of serious, sometimes 
high-level, corrupt practices, such as the one which occurred in May 2005, when 
the Academic Staff Union of Universities revealed that “some university Vice-
Chancellors had complained of demands of money from them by Ministry of Fi-
nance Officials in order to release allocated funds … Some Vice-Chancellors co-
operated and paid” (The Punch, 20 May 2005). A few weeks after this allegation, 
the Minister of Education and a vice-chancellor of a federal university lost their 
jobs, following allegations that they had paid N55 million in bribes, described as 
‘welfare package’, to some members of the Senate, including the Senate Presi-
dent, in order to inflate their budget (ThisDay, 23 March 2005). These practices 
were not new occurrences in Nigeria. During the Obasanjo years, however, EEP 
succeeded in persuading the public to acknowledge that these acts were assuming 
a frightening dimension, thereby attracting the attention of public authorities.  
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Before the intervention of EEP, most of the steps taken by the Obasanjo gov-
ernment to curb these malpractices proved to be ineffective. One of them was the 
adoption of the Examination Malpractice Law No. 33 of 1999. Although widely 
hailed as a necessary step in the fight against examination malpractices, this law 
was rendered ineffective by lack of implementation. Up until the time Obasanjo 
left office in May 2007, nobody had been convicted under the law. On 29 March 
2004, the Federal Ministry of Education issued a strong warning to all institu-
tions involved in these practices, stating that they would no longer be recognised 
as examination centres. Any institution caught involving itself in these acts, ac-
cording to the directive, would be suspended for six years by the government. 
The ministry also directed the various examination bodies in the country to begin 
the publication of the names of schools, teachers, and principals of schools in-
volved in examination fraud (ThisDay, 30 March 2004). All this was not enough 
to arrest the practice. Some states, notably Ondo State, later joined in the struggle 
against examination fraud, by adopting similar positions or measures, including 
their own anti-examination fraud legislation (The Punch, 29 November 2005). 
According to a law adopted on 28 November 2005 by Ondo State, any principal, 
teacher, or individual charged with conducting examinations who engages in ex-
amination fraud or encourages such practices would be liable to imprisonment 
for up to four years. Students who were implicated in such crimes could earn a 
three-year prison term, with the option of a fine amounting to N50,000. To facili-
tate the implementation of this law, an institution was established: Ondo State 
Examination Ethics and Disciplinary Committee. This institution, and all the 
other measures taken, ultimately proved ineffective.  
The situation, however, took a more positive turn with the arrival of the EEP, 
which in the end did more than any other institution (including the government) 
to tackle the problem of examination malpractices. Through the EEP, the nation 
learnt that examination fraud in Nigeria was big business, sometimes perpetrated 
by organized syndicates. According to one of its reports, examination malprac-
tice was a business exceeding N100 billion annually (The Punch, 20 May 2005). 
But how did the EEP, a local NGO, manage to have so much impact where the 
government had failed so dismally? 
To tackle the problem of widespread examination malpractice, the EEP first 
began by launching workshops, seminars, and conferences for students, parents, 
teachers, and those running the educational institutions. It also organized what it 
called ‘Exam Ethics Week’, celebrated every year with the participation of the 
principal actors in the education sector (ThisDay, 30 May 2004). But more im-
portantly, it published a report on examination fraud and a National Exam Mal-
practice Index (EMI, a ranking of Nigeria’s 36 states and the 6 geo-political re-
gions, according to the level to which their students were implicated in examina-
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tion malpractices) each year. The aim of this exercise was to attract the attention 
of the public to these crimes. The EMI was based on the conduct of students dur-
ing the Senior Secondary Certificate Examination (SSCE), organized by the West 
Africa Examination Council (WAEC) and the National Examination Council 
(NECO). The report for the year 2004, published on 5 October 2005, confirmed 
that examination fraud had increased by 276% between 1999 and 2003 Accord-
ing to figures released by the EEP, the rate of increase between 2003 and 2004 
was only 40%, confirming the effectiveness of its intervention. The conclusions 
of the report also drew a correlation between corruption among political actors 
and examination fraud, when it noted that “there is direct relationship between 
examination malpractices in educational institutions and corruption in the wider 
society” (Vanguard, 18 October 2005).  
To further its struggle, the EEP wrote petitions to the authorities (including the 
Police, EFCC, and ICPC) in which the names of certain individuals and educa-
tional institutions involved in examination fraud were noted. One of the petitions 
submitted to the EFCC and written on 29 April 2005 demanded investigations 
into reports published in local media, which indicated that certain university 
vice-chancellors had paid bribes to officials of the Ministry of Finance in order to 
access their budgetary allocations. A second petition, dated 16 May 2005, was 
addressed to the ICPC. It contained the names of individuals and educational in-
stitutions allegedly involved in examination fraud in the university entrance ex-
amination, the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board Examination. A third 
petition, also written on 16 May 2005, was to the Inspector General of the Nige-
rian Police. This petition demanded an intensification of investigation of exami-
nation malpractices, the publication of the reports of such investigations, and the 
prosecution of those individuals and institutions indicted (ibid.). 
Thus, even though the efforts of the EEP did not succeed in wiping out fraud 
and corruption in Nigerian educational institutions, they nevertheless succeeded 
in forcing the problem to the top of the national policy agenda, and in some in-
stances forced the authorities to invoke preventive or punitive measures (arrest, 
criminal pursuit, and administrative sanction, including dismissal from office) 
against individuals implicated in these practices. This was a rare success for an 
NGO in Nigeria. 
 
• Convention on Business Integrity (CBI) 
The Convention on Business Integrity, led by some well-known Nigerian intel-
lectuals, including Dr. Christopher Kolade, Professor Alex Gboyega, and Profes-
sor Ladipo Ademolekun, was another NGO dedicated to combating corrupt prac-
tices in Nigeria during the Obasanjo era. The CBI was actually the first anti-
corruption NGO created under the Fourth Republic. It was created in 1999 spe-
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cifically to fight corrupt practices among private companies, especially those that 
do business with the state. This was thought to be necessary at a time when the 
government’s anti-corruption drive was largely focused on the public sector.6 
This vision or mission allowed it to create and maintain relations with several 
other anti-corruption NGOs and private companies, all in a bid to advance the 
struggle against corruption in the private sector.  
But even though it was mainly concerned with corruption in the private sector, 
the CBI was not oblivious of the fact that widespread corruption in the public 
sector can hamper business. The CBI was also engaged, therefore, in the lobby-
ing of government officials with a view to persuading them to adopt and imple-
ment governance reforms. In furtherance of this objective, it financed several re-
search studies and published reports justifying the adoption of specific govern-
ance-enhancing policies.  
At the end of Obasanjo’s rule, however, the CBI’s only significant achieve-
ment was the development and adoption of a Code of Business Integrity, also 
known as the Business Integrity Pact, which obliges all the firms and institutions 
who are signatories to the pact to abstain from all types of corrupt practices, par-
ticularly the payment of bribes in order to win contracts. Thus, although its ac-
tivities received much support from international organizations, including SA-
PAG and DFID, which bankrolled some of its key projects, the CBI could not 
make much impact on the anti-corruption agenda.  
 
• African Network for Environmental and Economic Justice (ANEES) 
The African Network for Environmental and Economic Justice, led by Reverend 
David Ugolor, is one of the few NGOs based outside Abuja and Lagos, Nigeria’s 
political and economic capitals respectively. It has its capital in Benin City, the 
capital of Edo State, in the South-South Region. The ANEES, partly because of 
its unique geographic location (Edo State is one of the oil-producing states in the 
Niger Delta), largely focused its attention on the sale and management of oil 
revenue, and in particular on the financial activities of the oil-bearing states of 
the Niger Delta region, namely Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, 
and Edo (ThisDay, 31 January 2004). Within this limited context, the NGO was 
able to push aggressively for reforms. 
In December 2004 it organised, with the support of the Heinrich Böll Founda-
tion, a meeting which united 53 individuals representing NGOs, community-
based organizations, universities, the media, and other groups. At the end of their 
                                                 
6  Until 2003, there was no effective mechanism for dealing with fraud and corrupt and unethical prac-
tices among managers and employees of private companies. The ICPC, established in 2000, was not 
empowered to investigate fraud or corruption within the private sector. This lapse was corrected only 
with the establishment of the EFCC in 2003. 
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meeting, the participants demanded the repeal of the immunity-granting Section 
308 of the Constitution. The meeting also announced their determination to put in 
place a common institution, the NigerDelta Budget Monitoring and Transparency 
Network, which will monitor federal allocations to and management of funds by 
the six states in the South-South region. The meeting further resolved that 
[T]he governors of the region should publish details of revenue accruing to their states since 
1999 in local and national media for public scrutiny … Government at all levels (should) 
provide quarterly independent audit reports of their annual budget for public consumption … 
(and there should be a) quick passage of the Freedom of Information Bill by the Senate to 
make information available on the operations of government to Nigerians. (The Punch, 23 
December 2004). 
The ANEES was also very much involved in pushing for policies seeking to 
promote transparency in the mining and petroleum sectors. At this level, its ac-
tions were mainly directed towards the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transpar-
ency Initiative, NEITI, (ANEES 2007). Thanks to the ANEES and other allied 
NGOs, a comprehensive study or audit of the Nigerian petroleum sector from 
1999 to 2004 was carried out in 2005. The analysis of the report of this study, 
which found that many oil companies and public institutions were engaging in 
fraud, including tax evasion,7 was published in February 2006 (ThisDay, 19 Feb-
ruary 2006). Unfortunately, after this event, the NGO could not record any other 
major breakthrough in its fight against graft in the Niger Delta. 
 
Political NGOs and movements 
Paradoxically, the most radical measures against corruption or persons perceived 
to be corrupt were engaged in by groups and movements founded by politicians 
and other politically motivated individuals. One example, as we already saw, was 
in 2001, when a former ally of ex-governor Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State in-
stituted a court action before an Abuja High Court, in which he accused the gov-
ernor of mismanaging the oil revenues accruing to the state. In his suit, he also 
requested the court to order the establishment of a special account to manage all 
the resources for the development of the state (Newswatch, 14 October 2005). 
However, this plea was rejected by the court, which maintained that the peti-
tioner lacked the locus standi to institute the case in the first place. This sad out-
come did not prevent other groups from pursuing the same course of action. 
Thus, in 2005 another suit was instituted by a group of citizens, this time seeking 
                                                 
7  Some of the companies named included Chevron, Amni International Petroleum, Texaco Overseas, 
Agip Energy, Nigerian Petroleum Development Company, Pan Ocean Oil, Moni Pulo Ltd., Dubri Oil, 
Addax Petroleum, Continental Nigeria Ltd., and Cavendish Petroleum Ltd. The loss in state revenue 
arising from the fraud perpetrated by these entities was estimated at $509.7 million (N71 billion) in 
2006. The public institutions which were responsible for this fraud were the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CNB), Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), and the Federal Inland Revenue Service 
(FIRS).  
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to halt illegal payments to members of the Bayelsa State House of Assembly, 
payments being made under the pretext that they were going to initiate some de-
velopment projects in the members’ respective communities (The Guardian, 10 
August 2005). Again, this suit also did not produce the anticipated result before 
Mr. Alamieyeseigha was finally impeached in December 2005 for corruption. 
Similar initiatives were also seen in other states of the federation. One exam-
ple was the case of an Akwa Ibom-based lawyer, Assam E. Assam, who wrote 
several petitions to the EFCC beginning in 2006. In one of his petitions, he al-
leged that the governor of his state (Akwa Ibom), Victor Attah, and his associates 
looted billions of naira from the state treasury through white-elephant projects 
and contract scams. Most of the contracts were not only inflated but were 
awarded to the governor’s private companies and cronies without following the 
necessary procedures. One of the dubious contracts executed, according to Mr 
Assam, was the purchase of 1,000 luxurious BMW cars (Newswatch, 3 April 
2006). The authorities later confirmed that a purchase was made, but that only 
140 cars were bought. However, the petition did not produce its intended result – 
the prosecution of Governor Attah and his allies – up to the time the governor left 
office in May 2007. 
In the northern state of Bauchi, widespread fraud, waste, and diversion of pub-
lic funds by constituted authorities also forced some citizens to form local anti-
corruption associations. Through the activities of these movements, some of the 
serious fraud committed by public officials in this state was brought to public 
knowledge. One of the most significant revelations concerned the purchase of 
over N4 billion worth of luxury vehicles, in a state ravaged by high incidence of 
poverty and illiteracy. According to these civil society actors, these vehicles were 
overpriced, a good example being the purchase on 26 January 2001 of four Toy-
ota (4x4) vehicles, at a staggering cost of N360 million or N90 million 
($750,000) each. Several state officials, according to these groups, grew rich 
from this fraud, including the state governor, Ahmadu Adamu Mu’azu, who was 
able to construct personal buildings around the country, including 18 houses in 
Abuja alone. Between October 2005 and January 2006, these groups sent at least 
three petitions to the EFCC and ICPC, accompanied by documents and other 
proofs (ibid.).  
The activities of these groups, notably those of the Committee of Patriotic 
Citizens of Bauchi State (CPCBS) and the Patriotic People of Bauchi State, did 
not end with sending petitions alone. On 24 January 2006, the CPCBS launched a 
suit before an Abuja High Court, requesting the court to order the EFCC to begin 
investigations into the activities of Governor Mu’azu and other officials impli-
cated in financial fraud. Unknown to it, both the EFCC and the ICPC had already 
commenced investigations on the basis of the petitions. That the efforts of these 
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movements could provoke investigations by these bodies shows how relevant 
they are to the anti-corruption fight. 
In Kwara State, also in the northern part of the country, a group known as 
Kwara Ekiti Indigenes (KEI) also made similar moves, when it sent a petition to 
the highest regulatory organ for the judiciary in Nigeria, the National Judicial 
Council (NJC), protesting the appointment in January 2006 of a Chief Judge for 
the state. According to KEI, Justice Saka Yusuf had falsified his age in order to 
qualify for the post of Chief Judge of Kwara State and therefore had to be re-
moved from his position. The law required that any judge who attains the age of 
65 or had spent 35 years in service must proceed to compulsory retirement. But 
according to data supplied by the judge himself (and posted on the state’s per-
sonnel list), he was born on 25 December 1940 and joined the public service on 7 
July 1975. On 23 January 2006, KEI announced that it had found a document in 
the custody of the Registrar of the Federal High Court at Ilorin (capital of the 
state), which showed that the judge in question was actually born on 26 June 
1936 and had joined the judicial service on 15 February 1972 (The Guardian, 10 
April 2006). If we accept the first document, the judge was 66 years, while ac-
cording to the second, he was 69 years old at the time of his appointment as 
Chief Judge of Kwara. In the end, their petitions forced the NCJ to write to the 
judge demanding an immediate explanation for the “serious discrepancies” ob-
served in his records, although no disciplinary action was subsequently taken.  
Similar initiatives were also used by other civil society actors against officials 
of the national government, a good example being the suit by Gani Fawehimi, a 
well-known social critic and good-governance advocate, against President Oba-
sanjo over some corrupt practices. Specifically, Obasanjo was accused by Mr. 
Fawehimi of organizing a launching event, using some intermediaries, during 
which he received cash gifts totalling N7 billion under the pretext that the money 
would be used to construct a Presidential Library in his home town at the end of 
his tenure in 2007. In his suit, instituted on 23 July 2005, Mr Fawehimi called for 
a thorough investigation by the ICPC and EFCC of all contracts awarded by the 
government of Obasanjo since 1999, the sources of the funds given for the con-
struction of the Presidential Library, and its confiscation by the court. More im-
portantly, he requested the court to declare that  
Obasanjo’s (action), in launching the library and receiving monetary gifts from government 
contractors and beneficiaries while still exercising powers as President and Minister of Pe-
troleum Resources, amounts to corrupt practices and abuse of power contrary to Section 15 
(5) of 1999 Constitution; and also a flagrant disregard of the Code of Conduct for public of-
ficers contained in Item 1 Fifth Schedule, Part 1 of same Constitution. (ThisDay, 24 May 
2005). 
Fawehimi’s suit had not succeeded up to the time Obasanjo left office in May 
2007. 
158 
 
In June 2003, a little-known NGO called Legal Defence and Assistance Pro-
ject (LEDAP) commenced its own legal proceedings before a Lagos High Court 
against the wives of the President, Mrs Stella Obasanjo (now deceased),8 Vice-
President, Mrs. Titi Abubakar, and 22 other persons, all wives of state governors. 
The suit was intended to force these individuals to account for the large sums of 
money they had allegedly received in the name of foundations9 created by them 
(Vanguard, 28 January 2004). It was in the same vein that the Socio-Economic 
Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) launched a suit in June 2005 before 
a Lagos High Court against the Code of Conduct Bureau, one of the national in-
stitutions put in place to fight corruption. SERAP was irked by the Bureau’s 
“negligence in carrying out proper investigation and making public names of 
public officers keeping and running foreign accounts while still in govern-
ment”.10 During the proceedings, SERAP demanded  
an order of mandamus compelling the bureau to immediately investigate all serving public 
officers running, keeping and maintaining foreign accounts … an order compelling the Bu-
reau to publish the names and identities of such serving public officers that have been inves-
tigated by it and to publish the outcome of its investigation (and) to compel the Bureau to 
embark on the prosecution of such serving public officers who are keeping, running and 
maintaining foreign accounts, before the Code of Conduct Tribunal as envisaged by the Tri-
bunal Act, Cap. 56 Laws of the Federation 1990. (Vanguard, 3 June 2005) 
It is important to note that SERAP was also responsible for a petition in April 
2006 to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education. This petition 
called the attention of the Special Rapporteur, Vernor Munoz, to the massive di-
version of funds meant for Universal Basic Education, a programme of the fed-
eral government launched in 1999 to give at least nine years of free education to 
Nigerian children. According to the NGO, massive fraud and corruption orches-
trated at all levels of government by state officials, who refused to halt the prac-
tices, especially in the educational sector, had led not only to the non-education 
of five million children, but also “failure of the government of Nigeria to train 
the required number of teachers, gross under-funding of the nation’s educational 
institutions, lack of motivation of teachers, non-available class rooms seats and 
pupils sitting on bare floor, non-availability of books and other teaching materi-
als” (Vanguard, 21 April 2006). In its view, therefore, an investigation of the is-
                                                 
8  Mrs Stella Obasanjo died in November 2005 in a Spanish hospital. 
9  The foundations in question included Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation 
(established by the wife of the Vice-President, Titi Abubakar); New Era Foundation (run by Lagos 
State First Lady, Oluremi Tinubu); Idia Renaissance (a pet project of Mrs Eki Igbinidion, wife of the 
governor of Edo State); and Delta Manna Foundation (which was owned by the wife of the governor 
of Delta State). Indeed, virtually all the ‘first ladies’ in Nigeria were involved in one NGO or another.  
10  The Code of Conduct Bureau was charged with the responsibility of ensuring that all public officers 
declare their assets at regular intervals and refrain from keeping foreign bank accounts. It also moni-
tors their asset declaration forms, which cannot be released to members of the public, to ensure strict 
compliance.  
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sue by the UN was urgently needed to exert pressure on the Nigerian authorities 
in order to get the latter to respect their obligations relative to cultural, social, and 
economic rights (ibid.). 
Clearly, NGOs and social groups have played an important role in the fight 
against corruption, initiated by the Obasanjo administration. Even though they 
played marginal roles during the formulation of some of its anti-corruption pro-
gramme, these NGOs sought to contribute to its implementation. This has been 
repeatedly confirmed by several events. Their inclusion and active role in the 
comprehensive audit of the Nigerian petroleum sector (1999-2004), a project that 
was completed in 2005 as part of the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI) (Akosile 2006) and published in February 2006 (ThisDay, 19 
February 2006), is one example. The formulation of new policy on recruitment, 
promotion, and discipline of police officers announced on 14 March 200611 is 
another one (The Punch, 15 March 2006). Indeed, it would seem that these 
NGOs have succeeded in forcing the government to consider them as important 
partners in the actualisation of the anti-corruption project. 
But despite making substantial inroads into the policy implementation process, 
these institutions proved incapable of influencing in a sustainable way govern-
ment policies and the behaviour of government officials. This was clearly dem-
onstrated by their collective failure to force the adoption of the Freedom of In-
formation Bill.12 In other words, the effectiveness of these organizations has been 
very limited. The limited access to information about government activities was 
the main obstacle faced by these non-state actors, but other factors were also cru-
cial.  
Firstly, these associations lacked sufficient resources and the competence nec-
essary to make them credible watchdogs over government. The overwhelming 
majority of them survived thanks to funds from foreign actors (Western govern-
ments, donors and NGOs, or international financial institutions). The conse-
quences of this were not very positive. These NGOs were frequently denounced 
by citizens and government as “agents of imperialism because they receive funds 
from outside and are often managed by Nigerians who studied in the West” 
(Pérouse de Montclos 2005: 129). Many others, who were not funded by foreign 
organizations, were firmly under the control of politicians. In other words, only a 
few could pass as professional associations genuinely engaged in the promotion 
                                                 
11  This policy was prepared by the Police Service Commission (PSC) in collaboration with two local 
NGOs, CLEEN Foundation and Open Society Justice Initiative. According to the policy, 85% of po-
lice recruitments will now be based on merit, while 10% are to be reserved for women. 
12  The Freedom of Information Bill was submitted to the National Assembly for consideration in July 
1999, but was passed into law only in 2011. Thus, despite pressures from NGOs, notably Transpar-
ency in Nigerian, Media Rights Agenda, and many others, the bill remained in the National Assembly 
for twelve years. 
160 
 
of good governance. Most were largely ‘local political movements’,13 formed, 
financed and manipulated by politicians to advance vested interests, including 
exposing and discrediting their political rivals (Amakiri 2004). Many NGOs 
themselves also fell prey to corruption scandals, because of the rent-seeking be-
haviours of their leaders14 (Newswatch, 27 October 2003). 
If anti-corruption NGOs and associations produced mixed results in their bat-
tle against corruption in government, other institutions or organs of civil society, 
notably labour unions, professional associations, and religious organizations, 
were a complete failure.  
 
The labour unions 
Although labour unions are well known for their popular struggle for the im-
provement of the well-being of the downtrodden, their participation in the strug-
gle against corruption in Nigeria has hardly been contemplated. This is notwith-
standing the strong repercussions of corrupt practices on the well-being of work-
ers, and the unions’ large membership, which stood at 4 million spread across 42 
affiliate unions in 1995 (Otobo 1995: 35). Better known as Organized Labour or 
the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), these unions did not change their attitude 
to corruption following the arrival of Obasanjo. Their attention continued to cen-
tre on issues that touch ‘directly’ on the well-being of workers (salaries and in-
demnities, conditions of service, retirement, redundancy, etc.). A common expla-
nation for this was the association of corruption with politics. The position of la-
bour, which was generally expected to stay out of party politics,15 was to leave 
the issue to the government of the day.  
Much later into the regime of President Obasanjo, however, labour unions be-
gan to take more than a passing interest in the anti-corruption fight championed 
by the Obasanjo administration. The unions seemed to have finally discovered, 
after waiting in vain for the promised democratic dividends to materialise, that 
                                                 
13  Some good examples were the Bayelsa Transparency Initiative (BTI) in Bayelsa State and the Zam-
fara Patriotic Alliance (ZPA) and the Global Network for Islamic Justice (GNIJ) in Zamfara State. 
The first two NGOs were created and financed by politicians who were opposed to the administration 
of the governors of Bayelsa and Zamfara states, respectively, while the last NGO was created to help 
enforce the Shari’ah code instituted by the governor of Zamfara State. The BTI was originally respon-
sible for the petitions against the Bayelsa governor, before later transforming into an ally of the gov-
ernor. However, when it wrote to the ICPC to withdraw its petition, its request was denied.  
14  Several associations were affected by this problem, including the Committee for Defence of Human 
Rights (CDHR), a well-known NGO that in October 2003 was divided into two warring camps. Ac-
cording to one local weekly magazine, Newswatch, “the real bone of contention was the struggle to 
take charge of the N30 million grant given by the Ford Foundation”. One observer quoted by the 
magazine described the warring parties as “wolfs in sheep clothing who claimed to be defending the 
interests of the masses but are actually fighting for their pockets”.  
15  Some labour leaders have tried to reorganize the movement into a ‘labour party’. All of these efforts 
have so far ended in failure.  
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the well-being of their members and that of other members of the public were in-
separable from the conduct and activities of political leaders. Slowly the unions 
began to take, with some reluctance, several initiatives aimed at supporting the 
war against corruption. One of the steps taken by the unions was their criticism 
of some of the measures engaged in by the Obasanjo administration in its bid to 
fight corruption as inadequate, or even hypocritical. In one particular comment in 
2004, the President of the NLC, after reviewing Obasanjo’s effort to combat cor-
ruption, observed:  
Five years into democracy, Nigeria is rated second most corrupt nation. This 
means things have not changed since five years ago … Even in government cir-
cles, there is complete confusion about how to proceed. People steal, not because 
they needed it, but out of habit and as a way of life. And when they steal, they do 
that invariably out of government treasures … When I see the President lament 
about corruption, I also think of other tools available. There has to be a system 
of reward or sanction that must be awarded subtly. This government has re-
warded corrupt people. Look at the yearly honours lists, people who are known 
with one character or the other have been listed. (ThisDay, 8 November 2004) 
After that speech, the NLC took a few more concrete steps against specific 
government policies and institutions considered as going against the anti-cor-
ruption policy. One example was the letter addressed to the Governor of the Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria in April 2005. In the letter, the NLC expressed its strong 
disappointment with and disapproval of the bank’s decision to write off N82 bil-
lion in debts owed it by eight distressed private banks. In its opinion, the debt 
write-offs were another form of “subsidising mismanagement of resources and 
criminal abuse committed by bank directors”, who in its opinion should be inves-
tigated. In the same petition, the NLC also protested against the bank’s donation 
of N50 million to certain committees of the National Assembly, reasoning that 
this was an attempt to bribe legislators who were opposed to the reforms an-
nounced by the bank. A copy of the letter was sent to the President, requesting 
his intervention in the matter (ThisDay, 4 April 2005). 
Similar measures were directed at some public officials suspected of involve-
ment in corruption. One of them was the petition sent to the anti-corruption 
agencies (the ICPC and EFCC), the Police, and the President and Commander-in-
Chief, in May 2004 alleging corrupt diversion of public funds by the Senate 
President and some of his colleagues in the Senate. These public officials, ac-
cording to the NLC, had awarded several phoney contracts. They had also shared 
N1.1 billion and incurred huge expenses through many official trips and medical 
treatments overseas. In the petition, the NLC noted:  
The immediate challenge for your agencies is to live up to their mandate of enforcing the law 
by investigating these allegations … If we fail to handle this matter in accordance with the 
law, the corruption perception crisis that the country faces worldwide would worsen. In addi-
tion, the government will have no moral authority any longer to call on the workers and peo-
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ple of Nigeria to make sacrifices in the national interest, nor even to pay taxes since there is 
no certainty that their taxes will not end up in private pockets. (ThisDay, 17 May 2004) 
The unions also indicated that if these institutions refused to act on its petition, 
“(c)ongress shall have no alternative but to mobilize its membership and tax-
payers against these agencies of the executive branch … in the quest of the right 
to know and the rule of law” (ibid.).  
This threat was never carried out by the NLC, nor was any action taken 
against the accused officials. The Senate simply opted for a ‘political solution’, 
meaning that the Senate President and his colleagues were pardoned after offer-
ing their apologies.16 The inability of the NLC to take a strong stand against cor-
ruption and thus influence the anti-corruption war can be explained by several 
factors. Notable among them were the precarious economic situation of the aver-
age Nigerian worker, ignorance among a great number of workers, the dubious 
links with politicians maintained by some labour leaders, and the ethno-regional 
differences that define politics in the country (Otobo 1995). A fifth – and perhaps 
the most important – factor responsible for the incapacity of the labour unions 
was the problem of credibility, deriving from the involvement of labour leaders 
in the same practices.  
The question of the credibility of civil society groups can be better appreciated 
when one considers the role of professional associations.  
 
Professional associations 
Before the commencement of the Fourth Republic, the very idea of professional 
associations (lawyers, university teachers, bankers, accountants, auditors, doc-
tors, journalists, etc.) participating in the fight against corruption was almost un-
thinkable.17 Nevertheless, these associations are very influential institutions, ca-
pable of playing significant roles in the running of any society. The Nigerian 
government understood this fact quite well, even though these associations them-
selves seemed unaware of the extent of their power. Right from the launch of the 
anti-corruption campaign, the role of these associations in promoting public pol-
icy in general, and anti-corruption policies in particular, was frequently stressed. 
This role can be examined from two perspectives. 
                                                 
16  The Senate President lost his position in March 2005 after investigation by the EFCC indicted him for 
demanding and receiving N55 million in bribes from officials of the Ministry of Education, allegedly 
to inflate the ministry’s budget. 
17  Some of the best-known professional associations in Nigeria include the Nigerian Bar Association 
(NBA), the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN), the Institute of Chartered Manage-
ment Auditors, the Nigerian Institute of Public Relations (NIPR), the Nigerian Union of Journalists 
(NUJ), the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), the Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT), and the 
Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU).  
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Firstly, a considerable number of’ individuals who are involved in corrupt 
practices are themselves members of professional associations. During the 33rd 
Annual Accountants’ Conference, organized by the Institute of Chartered Ac-
countants of Nigeria (ICAN), in Abuja on 21 October 2003, President Obasanjo 
made this point clear, especially as it affects the local level of government. Ac-
cording to Obasanjo, 
[A]t their inception, local government areas were perceived as veritable mechanisms for the 
development of rural areas. What we observed since May 1999 is complete aberration. There 
is nothing to show for the disbursement of huge funds to the 774 local governments in the 
country … Without doubt, the waste was possible partly because of the absence of honest 
and dedicated chartered accountants in most of these local government areas. In some cases, 
accountants or otherwise have collaborated with fraudulent public officials to defraud gov-
ernment. (ThisDay, 22 October 2003) 
Therefore, it could be reasoned that if these associations could design meas-
ures to sanction their members who are found to be corrupt, the government’s 
anti-corruption campaign would be greatly boosted. Indeed, the growing in-
volvement of these professionals in corruption – notably lawyers (who pay bribes 
to judges in the course of court trials), bankers (who orchestrate frauds which 
have been responsible for the collapse of several banks), and accountants and 
auditors (who initiate, aid, and abet fraud in the numerous audit and account de-
partments of public and private institutions) – led to repeated calls from President 
Obasanjo on the leadership of these associations to act.  
Pressures from Obasanjo actually produced some reactions from some of these 
associations. For instance, in 2006 the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) an-
nounced its intention to begin to investigate and possibly sanction any of its 
members implicated in corruption (ThisDay, 14 March 2006). This threat, how-
ever, was not followed through, even when one of its prominent members, the 
former Inspector General of Police, Tafa Balogun, was indicted and subsequently 
convicted for massive diversion of public funds amounting to N17 billion (This-
Day, 22 November 2005). The first real sanction came from the Institute of Char-
tered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN), which expelled one of its members in 
March 2006. Ironically, this individual committed the offence while working as a 
manager in the finance department of ICAN located in Lagos. He was said to 
have diverted some N93,000 from the accounts of ICAN. The sanction precluded 
him from working as a chartered accountant in the country. This case was one of 
several cases brought before the Accountants Disciplinary Tribunal, set up by 
ICAN to deal with fraud orchestrated by members of the association (The Guard-
ian, 9 March 2006). Similar action was taken by the Chartered Institute of Stock-
brokers (CIS), which suspended one of its members for three months for “indis-
criminate sale of some shares” belonging to his clients, an act which violated the 
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ethics of the profession. Several other corruption cases were also said to be be-
fore CIS’s disciplinary panels (The Guardian, 20 April 2006).  
Secondly, the role of professional associations does not stop with the applica-
tion of sanctions on members accused of unethical conduct and corruption. The 
knowledge and advice of these associations can also be indispensable for the 
government in the design and application of anti-corruption policies. The only 
problem is that the government did not take any meaningful measure to tap the 
knowledge and advice of these actors. Government’s lack of confidence in pro-
fessional associations was underlined by the crisis which erupted between the 
ICPC and the National Assembly in 2003, when the former attempted to investi-
gate the financial activities of the latter. To ward off the ICPC challenge, the leg-
islators decided to amend the ICPC Act to reduce its powers and get rid of its 
chairman. During the amendment procedure, the NBA was invited to provide 
some input. When the association gave an opinion contrary to the expectation of 
the legislatures, its opinion was ignored and the amendments which they criti-
cised were adopted (The Guardian, 24 February 2003). The level of involvement 
of professional associations in Obasanjo’s anti-corruption fight was correctly 
summarised by the President of the Nigerian Institute of Public Relations 
(NIPR), Senebo Sofiri Brown, in the following way: “civil society has not been 
fully mobilized and given access in the country to become direct stakeholders 
participating in shaping policy and helping in the governance process. That is 
why Obasanjo (was) the only evangelist in the forest on the issue of corruption” 
(ThisDay, 14 December 2003). 
 
Business associations and employers of labour 
Business associations, better known as the organized private sector, are made up 
of the heads of private, and to lesser degree, public commercial firms, and the 
organizations themselves are grouped in various associations according to their 
line of business. Good examples of the latter include the Nigerian Association of 
Chambers of Commerce, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA), which unites all 
the different chambers of commerce; the Bankers’ Committee (bringing together 
all the managing directors of banks and the Governor of the Central Bank of Ni-
geria, who chairs the body); the Institute of Directors (IoD), made up of manag-
ing directors of leading private companies; the Manufacturers Association of Ni-
geria (MAN); and the Nigeria Employers Consultative Association (NECA). For 
obvious reasons, these associations have shown more interest in the anti-cor-
ruption programme initiated by Obasanjo than labour unions or professional as-
sociations.  
Firstly, the consequences of widespread corruption – including weak eco-
nomic growth, insecurity of private investments, lack of necessary public infra-
165 
 
structure, and poor or uncertain business climate – impact more directly on the 
operations of businesses than on, for example, professional associations. Private 
companies are generally considered the main victims of corrupt practices, par-
ticularly extortion perpetrated by public institutions or officials – although in re-
ality, private businessmen also promote corruption in public institutions through 
bribery and collusion with public officials. A second reason why businesses ap-
peared to be more interested in the war against corruption was because fraud and 
other corrupt practices perpetrated by agents of private enterprises against their 
principals were also on the rise in the country. Ernest Shonekan, former Head of 
State of Nigeria (August-November 1993) and chairman of several private com-
panies, summed this up as follows: “although the focus when we talk about cor-
ruption in Nigeria is typically the public sector, it is fair to say for all practical 
purposes that the private sector organizations also serve as agents of corruption. 
It is also true that private sector organizations could end up being victims of cor-
ruption” (Shonekan 2003, cited in ThisDay, 1 December 2003).  
To assist the government to wipe out corruption, the organized private sector 
adopted two approaches, which were pursued simultaneously. The first approach 
involved putting pressure on the government to adopt reforms, through lobbying 
of key political actors (the President, ministers, members of the National Assem-
bly, etc.). One way this was done was by releasing memoranda, especially during 
the preparation of national budgets. This was a good means for the employers to 
express their concerns and defend their interests on public policies, such as the 
anti-corruption campaign of the government. One such memorandum, published 
in October 2003 and signed by the MAN, NECA, and NACCIMA noted: 
Except corruption is minimised, our quest for foreign investments would not be realised … 
Government should not relent in its efforts to wipe out the cankerworm, no matter the pres-
sure from various quarters. The modus operandi of the anti-corruption law should be expedi-
tiously reviewed, and immediate prosecution of offenders, particularly those that are highly 
placed, should be carried out … This will send a signal of the seriousness of government on 
this matter … Public-Private sector partnership in the monitoring of projects should be en-
sured. All stakeholders in the economy (government, private sector businesses, religious 
bodies, cooperative associations and the civil society) should be encouraged to form coali-
tion to monitor public sector projects and report regularly on the state of implementation to 
the public. This will minimise corrupt practices and ensure timely completion of projects … 
Government should emphasise the need to implement reforms, such as tender procedure, 
procurement system and asset declaration system, etc. to ensure greater transparency in the 
system … There should be much leadership by example in the anti-corruption crusade. The 
Executive, Legislative and Judicial arms have joint responsibility in this matter while all op-
erators in the private sector of the nation’s economy must also fall in line. The bad eggs still 
in public and private sectors should be exposed and made to face prosecution by the Anti-
Corruption Commission. The Anti-Corruption Commission should be refocused and well 
equipped, in terms of manpower and funding, and be given the power to bite. (The Guardian, 
20 October 2003). 
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The second approach involved introducing some reforms and anti-corruption 
mechanisms in their own institutions, as required by the ‘Code of Best Practices 
for Corporate Governance in Nigeria’ (ThisDay, 17 November 2003), established 
by the Obasanjo government. A good example of such mechanisms was the 
Business Ethics and Arbitration Committee, established by the NACCIMA. This 
institution was responsible “for stamping out corruption and other business mal-
practices as much as possible and ensuring the implementation of the NACCIMA 
code of ethics for transacting business (which prohibited the payment of bribes to 
public officials) by members of the chamber having signed the code of ‘islands 
of integrity’ pact to combat corrupt acts” (ThisDay, 1 December 2003). The 
committee also worked out ways to support the federal government in drastically 
minimising the incidence of corrupt practices, with a view to restoring the confi-
dence of investors once again in the Nigerian economy (ibid.). There was also, 
this time from the Banker’s Committee, the Sub-Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessionalism, established in December 2001 to “identify practices considered un-
ethical in the industry, develop an acceptable code of ethics and professionalism 
as well as put in place effective machinery for enforcing compliance with the 
code” (ThisDay, 23 December 2003).  
According to figures published by the Sub-Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sionalism, petitions against bank workers reached 240 in December 2003 (ibid.). 
Even though the report of this body could lead to the suspension or even dis-
missal of any banker indicted for unethical conduct, there is no evidence to prove 
that this body has been effective. Indeed, the increasing number of cases of fraud 
reported by the regulatory authorities, notably in the banking sector (Federal Re-
public of Nigeria 1999-2007a, 1999-2007b), is an eloquent testimony of the weak 
commitment or failure of the leaders of these organizations to stamp out corrup-
tion in their midst.  
 
Ethno-religious organizations 
The campaign against corruption launched by Obasanjo brought to the fore the 
question of the role of religious and cultural movements in any effort to promote 
good governance in Africa. In the literature on African politics, religious and cul-
tural movements are usually portrayed as primitive organizations which are ob-
stacles to political stability and good governance and therefore undeserving to be 
included as members of civil society. These analyses hide or underestimate the 
historical role these groups have played in Africa, and Nigeria in particular, as 
agents of change, development, and modernisation. Furthermore, non-state actors 
do not have to play ‘positive’ roles all the time to be considered as members of 
civil society. In any case, whether religious and cultural movements play positive 
or negative roles in the political process of a nation depends on other system-
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specific factors. For instance, their role in the attempt to combat corruption in 
Nigeria has been largely negative because these organizations have for too long 
been politicised in Nigeria, becoming part of the struggle for control of political 
power and economic resources. These movements also failed to play constructive 
roles in the struggle against corruption because they themselves had been infil-
trated by the same scourge of corruption.  
During Obasanjo’s eight-year campaign against corruption, religious and cul-
tural movements regularly denounced corruption and abuse of office by public 
officials, which they saw as threats to national development. They also repeat-
edly called on government to tackle these vices vigorously. Yet these organiza-
tions did not hesitate to protect and defend their members when they were ac-
cused of the same corrupt practices they were denouncing. More importantly, 
these groups, especially religious bodies, were themselves not immune from cor-
ruption. Indeed, many religious leaders and institutions were accused of different 
types of corrupt practices,18 ranging from financial exploitation of their adherents 
to diversion of funds belonging to their organizations (Magbadelo 2004; Van-
guard, 27 April 2005; Daily Independent, 11 July 2006). Religious institutions, 
especially the churches and mosques, also attracted strong criticism for their ten-
dency to tolerate, if not promote, their members who are known to have acquired 
their wealth through questionable means. Indeed, in one of his speeches, Presi-
dent Obasanjo, a self-proclaimed ‘born-again Christian’, denounced this collu-
sive behaviour: 
From one end of the country to the other, from one church to another, we are unanimous in 
our condemnation of corruption. Nevertheless, corruption continues unabated in our country 
… I appeal to you to reject offerings from those whose earnings have come under justifiable 
suspicion. It is condemnable that today some of our churches give places of rank to those 
who thrive on corruption … The Church will never be able to exonerate itself if our country 
remains corrupt. (The Guardian, 16 November 2004) 
Nevertheless, experience in Nigeria since the days of the struggle to install 
democratic rule in the 1990s, and in many other countries, shows that socio-
cultural associations – especially religious and ethnic associations, which com-
                                                 
18  In March 2006, a priest in an Anglican Church located in Abeokuta, Ogun State, was suspended by 
his congregation and ordered to submit himself for investigation by a committee set up by the church. 
He was accused of demanding and receiving bribes of N300,000 from a private company which won a 
contract of N1.4 million for the installation of a standard public address system. Mindful of the possi-
bility of a cover-up, some members of the church even threatened to lodge complaints with the EFCC 
(Vanguard, 27 April 2005). In a similar incident, a pastor in one of the branches of the Celestial 
Church of Christ (one of the largest churches in Nigeria), Paul Maforikan, was dismissed in July 2006 
for diverting N50 million belonging to the church. A statement was released by the church confirming 
his complicity: “We have for sometimes now condoned Pastor Maforikan and can no longer bear his 
attitude. The Church is bankrupt. It is a pity that a Church leader would take all the money belonging 
to the Church, he has fraudulently liquidated the account of the Church to the tune of N50 million. We 
hereby remove him as our head and appoint another person to take over from him” (Daily Independ-
ent, 11 July 2006). 
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mand much legitimacy and influence in Africa – can participate in the struggle 
for good governance (Otayek 2002: 194). This fact was acknowledged by Presi-
dent Obasanjo, who several times called on these institutions to join in the fight 
against corruption. In one of his speeches, the President stated that “(t)he chal-
lenge before the church today is to make Christians give up corruption” (The 
Guardian, 16 November 2004). In another statement underlining the role of reli-
gious institutions in promoting good moral behaviour in society, the President, 
after being confronted by evidence of rising cases of extortion and bribery among 
police officers at all levels, ordered that churches and mosques be constructed in 
all police barracks to bring police officers closer to God.  
President Obasanjo’s call received the support of a few religious leaders. 
Some of these leaders accepted the crucial role and responsibility of the civil so-
ciety, and religious bodies in particular, in the struggle. Thus, for Kana Mani, the 
Archbishop of the Church of Nigeria (Anglican Communion) in Maiduguri, 
Borno State:  
Corruption should be fought at all levels of the nation’s life … Nigerians should support the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) in its war against corruption in the coun-
try. This is a noble exercise and there should be no sacred cow spared whether the sacred 
cow is red, blue, tall, fat, short or green. All establishments, including religious bodies must 
gallantly fight bribery and corruption. (ThisDay, 19 November 2003) 
The Archbishop of the Church of Nigeria’s call was repeated by a handful of 
other leading religious leaders across the county. But most religious leaders, 
however, remained indifferent, if not uncommitted. At least two reasons ac-
counted for this position.  
The first was a perception, widely shared in Nigeria, that the struggle against 
corruption was the business of the government. For instance, when Obasanjo 
suggested that churches and mosques be constructed in all police barracks to 
bring police officers closer to God, the idea was immediately rejected by several 
religious leaders, including the Archbishop of the African Episcopal Church, 
Reverend Emmanuel Odufale, who stressed that “the action was incapable of 
stamping corruption from the Force except the leaders themselves show good ex-
amples and did the right thing” (The Punch, 12 August 2005). For a large number 
of religious leaders, therefore, the fight against corruption was definitely the re-
sponsibility of the government of the day. Therefore, when things go wrong, it is 
because the government has failed to do its job. This is even more the case when 
the principal offenders are agents of the government.  
Secondly, if religious authorities were not active in the struggle against cor-
ruption, it was also partly because they viewed the government as insincere or 
not serious with its anti-corruption policy. Many religious leaders, in a marked 
departure from the past, made this point by openly criticising the government and 
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Obasanjo himself for his incapacity or unwillingness to address the problem. One 
church leader19 noted: 
So many robbers exist in our tiers of government today. They rip open the treasuries at will, 
freely roam our streets enjoying encomium from the people whose commonwealth they stole 
… The people who break into houses with guns are not as bad as the ones we harbour in the 
various tiers of governments … Obasanjo knows them. It is they he gives employment and 
appointments to. Most of our politicians are not only corrupt but are thieves. The Independ-
ent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) has had so many reports and complaints yet the 
thieves freely go about the streets flaunting the people’s wealth against them. (ThisDay, 14 
April 2003) 
This view was corroborated by another religious leader, who argued:20  
Though Government has laws that prescribed penalties for corruption and had gone further 
to establish commissions like the ICPC, EFCC, among others, it has no tangible result to 
show for the efforts … It is disheartening that in this country, some public office holders 
found guilty of corruption are removed from office only to be reappointed into higher posi-
tions. This is nothing but a mockery of the fight against corruption … The Federal Govern-
ment and other stakeholders (should) empower the ICPC and EFCC to enable them carry out 
their duties effectively. (ThisDay, 27 December 2003) 
Even more conservative religious groups, such as the Catholic Bishops Con-
ference of Nigeria (CBCN), an association that unites all the Catholic bishops in 
Nigeria, spoke out against Obasanjo’s anti-corruption project, noting that:  
... morality, integrity and uprightness are daily being called to question. Fraud and deceit 
have become adopted as a way to success. A great number of people are being poisoned by 
materialism and dominated by the spirit of consumerism. Corruption has been elevated to a 
national culture, despite the much touted anti-corruption measures. (The Guardian, 9 March 
2004) 
These statements show clearly that while Nigerian religious leaders were very 
much aware of the negative impact of corruption on the daily life of their adher-
ents, they were unwilling to acknowledge the crucial role of religious institutions 
in promoting public morality.  
An ambivalent attitude towards the anti-corruption struggle was even more 
common among cultural movements or ethnic associations, whose position on 
the policy tended to fluctuate from support to criticisms, sometimes depending 
on the perception of political interests at stake. Typically, these actors will usu-
ally criticise the governments for not doing enough to fight corruption, denounce 
people accused of corruption and push for sanctions against them, especially 
when none of their members is involved. But in other cases, they will denounce 
                                                 
19  Senior Apostle J.O. Daniel, president of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in Kwara State 
and member of the Cherubim and Seraphim Church spoke at the ‘63rd Pre-National Confer-
ence/Convention Press Conference’ of the Cherubim and Seraphim Church Movement, on 13 April 
2003.  
20  Reverend Dauda Marafa was a former president of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in 
Bauchi State and president of the Good News ECWA Church at Bauchi.  
170 
 
government’s anti-corruption initiatives, notably when a member of the group is 
the accused, in an effort to defend and protect him or her, or instrumentalise the 
initiatives in pursuit of their selfish goals. We will give just a few examples to 
show how this contradiction works. 
The first case involved the harsh reactions of two ethnic associations known as 
the Eastern Mandate Union (EMU) and Igbo Youth Movement (IYM) to the de-
cision of the Obasanjo administration to remove the Auditor-General of the Fed-
eration. The auditor-general, himself an Igbo from the south-eastern region of the 
country, had published a report in February 2003 which showed that virtually all 
public institutions at the federal level were engaging in massive fraud and diver-
sion of public funds. Contrary to public expectation, the action of the auditor-
general was dismissed as unacceptable by the government, which also accused 
him of “gross insubordination and incompetence” and declared his report a “cal-
culated attempt to embarrass the government” (ThisDay, 25 February 2003). This 
action by a government that had made a fight against corruption a policy priority 
drew widespread criticism from a cross-section of the public, but more so from 
the EMU and IYM. Both quickly issued public statements on the government’s 
reaction, which they described as “too petty and a contradiction of the anti-
corruption posture of the government (which) confirms the fears of Nigerians 
about the insincerity of this regime as regards the anti-corruption crusade” (The 
Guardian, 21 February 2003).  
The second incident concerned The Niger Delta Youth Congress (NDYC), an-
other regional association which was no less scandalised by the decision of 
President Obasanjo and his party, the PDP, to offer strategic political appoint-
ments to the wife and the son of their party’s chairman (Issa-Onilu 2006), and 
what was more disappointing, to the former deputy-governor of Akwa Ibom 
State, who was removed from office by his state’s legislators for corrupt prac-
tices.21 In a well-publicised statement, the NDYC condemned these actions of the 
government as “insensitive, condemnable and unpatriotic”, actions which accord-
ing to them could “send wrong signals everywhere and may be construed by dis-
cerning minds that Mr. President may also be on the same boat”. In their view, if 
the federal government under Obasanjo’s watch “wants to be taken seriously in 
its war against corruption, if it wants the world not to regard its present war 
against corruption as mere sloganeering and grandstanding, it should act as a 
                                                 
21  The accusations against Mr Chris Ekpenyong, as we saw earlier, included that he diverted public 
funds in order to purchase a family house in Texas, United States. He was also said to have failed to 
declare his asset to the Code of Conduct before assuming office, while equally influencing the award 
of public contracts to his own companies and some others fronting for him (The Guardian, 2 Septem-
ber 2005).  
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willing partner in this battle” at all levels of government (ThisDay, 1 September 
2005; The Guardian, 2 September 2005).  
Ethnic associations also reacted strongly when corrupt practices were commit-
ted against their interests or home communities, even if the said acts were or-
chestrated by persons from the same ethnic background or community as mem-
bers of these associations. The petition submitted to the EFCC in September 
2004 by a cultural association, Ideato North Youth Forum, was one example. In 
the petition prepared by their lawyer, the association, which is open to every 
youth from the area (Ideato North local government area, Imo State), accused a 
former chairperson of the local government of diverting funds amounting to N12 
million. Part of the funds represented payments made to some ghost workers, 
while others were siphoned off through contracts for the construction of roads, an 
abattoir, an orphanage, public buildings, etc., all of which were executed in com-
plete disregard of existing financial regulations. In the end, the association de-
manded appropriate sanctions against this official (ThisDay, 3 September 2004).  
The actions of these three ethno-regional groups clearly show the capacity of 
ethnic associations to advance the struggle against corruption if they choose to.  
But these movements could also act as a distraction in the war against corrup-
tion. We will provide a few examples. In 2005, some Ijaw and Ikwerre communi-
ties (in Rivers State) filed a law suit before a Rivers State High Court in May 
2005 against the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) for alleged “corrupt practices and 
perversion of justice”. According to these communities, the CJN had custody of 
15 official cars, including two chauffeur-driven cars for each of his wives, paid 
for by the Supreme Court. What was more disturbing to them, the CJN had 
placed public funds meant for the salaries and allowances of judges into an inter-
est-yielding account, with the intention of sharing the proceeds with other top of-
ficials of the Court (ThisDay, 31 May 2005). In their petitions, delivered by their 
lawyer, Reginald Mc-Pepple, these communities requested that the CJN be re-
moved from office and brought to trial, while the Inspector General of Police 
should be ordered to launch investigations into his activities. Unknown to many, 
the real decision to file a suit against the CJN was motivated by other unrelated 
issues. These communities were actually involved in litigation at the Appeal 
Court against some oil companies, which they had accused of polluting their en-
vironment. Having concluded that their case would soon end up at the Supreme 
Court, headed by a “corrupt” CJN whom they thought could not be relied upon, 
they decided to take pre-emptive action, using these allegations to disparage and 
discredit the CJN. Other accusations, which they said justified their worries, in-
cluded some alleged wrongdoing by the CJN elsewhere – influence-peddling 
during cases brought by other groups or individuals, in exchange for favours – 
but were equally unfounded. Clearly, we can see how civil society groups can 
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participate in the instrumentalisation of the war against corruption while pretend-
ing to be supporting it. 
Ethnic and cultural associations could and also did take actions to undermine 
anti-corruption programmes in order to protect one of their own. This is espe-
cially true when they perceive any form of unequal treatment or “selective jus-
tice” on the part of the authorities. The following cases are some examples. The 
first one involved a cultural association known as Imo State Youth Assembly 
(IYA), which published a statement concerning a former Minister of Education 
and an ex-Senate President who was removed in March 2005 following allega-
tions of corruption made by the EFCC (ThisDay, 29 March 2005). The Minister, 
who is an Igbo from Imo State, had allegedly paid N55 million in bribes to some 
federal legislators, including the Senate President, in order to get his Ministry’s 
budget padded. In its statement, the IYA not only condemned the manner in 
which the government had rushed to dismiss the Minister without waiting for the 
outcome of investigations or his conviction by a court of law (the ICPC began 
prosecuting him weeks later in an Abuja High Court); it also condemned the 
government for what it saw as its ethnic or sectional bias against their Igbo 
brothers. For the IYA:  
This is a proven case of marginalisation against the Igbo, it is a calculated attempt to rubbish 
us and it is unacceptable … A thorough investigation should have been carried out before 
condemning Osuji, Wabara and others like that … Why should Osuji, being a frank and hon-
est administrator be fired on radio and television, when Tafa Balogun was caught with bil-
lions of naira and nothing happened? (ibid.) 
The IYA was by no means the only cultural association to voice support for 
these two officials accused of corruption. Another association, Ohaneze d’Igbo, 
the pre-eminent ethnic association of the Igbos of the southeast, had also gone 
public through its general secretary to denounce what it saw as a deliberate at-
tempt to “discredit the Igbos in order to prevent them from taking part in the 
2007 presidential elections” (The Punch, 7 April 2005). This declaration was 
made in spite of the action by the organization’s president, who had earlier ex-
pressed support for the action taken by the government against the two officials. 
The same logic was repeated in several other cases involving highly placed 
public officials accused of corruption. An example was the case of Governor 
Joshua Dariye of the North Central state of Plateau, who continued to enjoy the 
solid support of members and elites of his state despite serious allegations of 
massive corruption made against him and his humiliating arrest by British police 
in London for alleged money-laundering offences in September 2004 (ibid.). 
Similar communal solidarity was also extended to Tafa Balogun, former Inspec-
tor General of Police, who was similarly accused for massive graft. For several 
months, leaders from his community pressed and negotiated unsuccessfully for 
his release. Their efforts collapsed when Tafa Balogun was arraigned and subse-
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quently convicted for corruption. In a not-too-different circumstance, when ex-
Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State was arrested in London and 
subsequently arraigned before a Lagos High Court for corruption, leaders of the 
highly influential Ijaw National Congress, an ethnic association which represents 
his Ijaw ethnic nationality, rose in his defence (ThisDay, 15 October 2005). 
The examples are endless. In 2003, two ministers in the Obasanjo government 
declared that they had been put under pressure by two senators who were de-
manding that they pay bribes of N51 million in order to facilitate their confirma-
tion as ministers. Their accusation was supported by the highly influential north-
ern cultural association, Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF). The action of the 
ACF was quite understandable. The ACF is an organization formed to protect 
and advance the interest of the people of northern Nigeria, and the entire drama-
tis personae in this case were of northern origin. Of course, given the provenance 
of the ACF, which is widely known for its pro-northern positions, it would have 
been highly improbable for the organization to take such a principled stand if the 
accusers were non-northerners. Yet, its position on the issue was criticised by 
some other cultural associations in the north, notably Northern Youths Democ-
ratic Congress (NYDC), which was infuriated by the ACF’s failure to protect the 
interests of the north. According to it, 
[O]ur concern here is that both the accuser and the accused are from the northern part of this 
country, common sense dictates that nobody should make a rush to judgement. Unfortu-
nately for the self-styled Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), an organization largely popu-
lated by those who failed the common people in the north, they shamelessly came out to take 
sides … without incontrovertible evidence … In every sense of the word, the forum (ACF) is 
too primitive and narrow to practically represent the interest of the north. (ThisDay, October 
13, 2003) 
This patronising attitude of ethnic and cultural associations did not succeed in 
procuring freedom for accused persons in all cases, as demonstrated by the con-
viction of Tafa Balogun and the former governor of Bayelsa State, Alamieye-
seigha, despite the protestation and lobbying from their ethnic communities. 
However, what was clear was that the obstructive behaviours of these groups un-
dermined their capacity to promote socio-political change, thereby adding to ex-
isting doubts about the relevance of these associations in the campaign against 
corruption (Shirbon 2005).  
Conclusion 
Clearly, one of the greatest changes arising from the war against corruption initi-
ated by the Obasanjo administration is that henceforth the fight against corrup-
tion is no longer a strictly top-down struggle. Curbing corruption is now also the 
business of civil society organisations and actors. Even though these actors 
played very marginal roles in the development of the anti-corruption policy, 
174 
 
many of them suddenly became key players in its execution by showing them-
selves to be important partners in the anti-corruption project. At the same time, 
however, one should never overestimate the effectiveness of the contributions of 
the non-state actors. As we have just seen, even though their commitment is gen-
erally beyond doubt, their overall capacity and effectiveness remain very limited. 
This, as we have just seen, is explained by several factors. One of them is the 
lack of independent sources of funding, a factor which eroded their autonomy. 
There was also the noticeable absence of friendly legislation and practices, such 
as the one granting free access to information in a state that has elevated official 
secrecy to more or less a religion. Thirdly, these actors were negatively affected 
by their preoccupation with material issues and inability to go beyond primary 
group (ethnic, religious, etc.) solidarity. Fourthly, it was obvious that there has 
been limited capacity on the part of leaders of CSOs, who constantly see them-
selves as rivals instead of partners. When combined with the hostile attitude of 
government and the rent-seeking behaviour of those at the helm of affairs in 
these organisations, these non-state actors easily become appendages of politi-
cians, who do not shy away from instrumentalising them for political gains. 
 
 8 
Conclusions 
In recent years, anti-corruption campaigns have been embraced as a major chal-
lenge in a considerable number of countries, notably in the developing world. In 
Nigeria, this was one of the major policy priorities during the Olusegun Obasanjo 
administration, which came to office on 29 May 1999, after a successful transi-
tion that ended 16 years of corrupt military dictatorship. Under pressure from 
home and abroad, President Obasanjo embarked on a comprehensive anti-
corruption agenda aimed at redressing Nigeria’s economic decline and badly tar-
nished international image. The measures implemented included the following 
policies: Reform of the public services; accelerated privatisation; reform of the 
management of public revenue and expenditures; design and implementation of 
new criteria for employment and remuneration for public service; reform of the 
judiciary; establishment of anti-corruption agencies (the Independent Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)); and a global campaign aimed at check-
ing the diversion of public funds abroad and the recovery of assets already si-
phoned out of the country. Even though these measures are not new in global 
anti-corruption policy circles, they still raised unprecedented interest and atten-
tion abroad for at least two reasons.  
The first reason was because this was the first time a civilian regime took con-
crete action to fight corruption in Nigeria. All previous anti-corruption measures 
were initiated by military rulers, who had dominated politics in Nigeria for a long 
time. Most of these military-inspired anti-corruption campaigns were largely 
adopted to legitimise power or purge political rivals. They were also ad hoc in 
nature and limited in their scope and impact, aiming essentially to identify and 
punish a few corrupt officials, to be followed in some cases with the setting up of 
anti-corruption laws and institutions to calm public anger, only to be abandoned 
as soon as the regime was firmly entrenched. A second and perhaps more perti-
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nent reason why the Obasanjo-led campaign against corruption attracted much 
global interest was because the fight was forged in an international context 
marked by the emergence of a ‘global coalition’ against corruption in all its rami-
fications and in all nations, a context which has produced a major re-orientation 
in the understanding of corruption and anti-corruption measures, with increasing 
emphasis on economic and institutional reforms.  
The aggressive application of these policies by the Obasanjo administration 
and the support it received both at home and abroad raised the prospects of a pos-
sible end to the endemic corruption which had for so long undermined the con-
duct of public affairs and development in Africa’s most populous nation. But by 
the end of Obasanjo’s tenure in 2007, this hope had all but evaporated. Despite 
the huge resources committed, the administration had obtained only modest re-
sults, notably in creating unprecedented awareness around the issue. According 
to public opinion surveys, media reports, and personal interviews conducted in 
the course of several field trips, corruption had subsisted in an endemic manner 
at all levels of government – federal, state, and local. Indeed, there was substan-
tial evidence that corruption had increased at lower levels of government despite 
the elaborate measures put in place since 1999. Furthermore, very few individu-
als have been convicted despite the massive revelations and corruption scandals 
that have enveloped public life in the Fourth Republic.  
While it is true that a considerable number of the reforms introduced by the 
administration – privatisation of public enterprises and reform of the civil service 
and judiciary – are still ongoing and are reforms with long-term benefits (White-
head 2000: 110), the application of several other measures with short-term gesta-
tion periods – for instance, adoption of anti-corruption laws and institutions and 
recovery of public funds held in foreign accounts – has not brought significant 
progress. On the contrary, implementation of these measures has proved ex-
tremely difficult for a number of reasons, three of which are particularly worthy 
of note.  
Weak capacity and inadequate political  
support for anti-corruption institutions 
The establishment of specialised bodies to combat corruption is now generally 
considered as an essential step in all anti-corruption programmes. But at the same 
time, these institutions are expected to possess, particularly in countries where 
corruption is endemic, sufficient capacity (powers, resources, and expertise) and 
independence (Doig et al. 2005). During Obasanjo’s reign the wide powers given 
to anti-corruption agencies were undercut by capacity problems such as chronic 
underfunding and shortage of qualified manpower, as well as systemic problems 
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such as an ineffective criminal justice system and, more importantly, a hostile 
political class.  
Inadequate funding was the first crucial challenge confronted by Nigeria’s 
anti-corruption institutions upon their establishment. The ICPC, which was the 
key anti-corruption agency until 2003 when the EFCC was established, has been 
the most affected by this problem. Between 2000 and 2005, it received an aver-
age of N500 million ($3.8 million) as yearly allocation from the government. In 
comparative terms this represented roughly 50% of the annual allocation to the 
EFCC between 2003 and 2005. Its financial situation was not helped by the fact 
that it was not a major beneficiary of international aid, as was the EFCC, whose 
creation was made possible thanks to pressures from the international commu-
nity. As should be expected, the ICPC’s weak financial base had a direct impact 
on its human resource profile, as it struggled to pay for competent prosecutors or 
lawyers. Thus, in July 2005, it had only 32 investigators and 17 prosecutors, out 
of a total of 271 personnel.  
In contrast, the EFCC retained over 70 lawyers out of a total of 855 personnel 
in August 2006. This level of staffing ensured that it could, in addition to its 
headquarters in Abuja, run two regional offices, in Lagos and Port Harcourt. The 
much older ICPC operated until 2005 exclusively from its Abuja head office. 
Comparing both institutions with similar institutions elsewhere will help us better 
appreciate the extent of the problem. The ICAC in Hong Kong, often considered 
as a reference model, employed some 1,200 people, 70% of whom were investi-
gators. It should be noted that Hong Kong has only six million inhabitants. In 
Tanzania, with some 35 million people, the Prevention of Corruption Bureau 
(PCB) managed 714 personnel, spread out over its headquarters in Dar es Sa-
laam, the country’s capital, and 21 regional and 110 district offices. Even if all 
other factors are ignored, discrepancies in funding and staffing on this scale are 
sufficient to explain why Nigeria’s anti-graft bodies, particularly the ICPC, have 
failed to deliver expected results.  
Of all the challenges that confronted Nigeria’s anti-corruption agencies, the 
inefficiencies of the criminal justice system were among the most serious. Anti-
corruption agencies were frequently undermined by several loopholes in the Ni-
gerian legal system, such as the anachronistic Evidence Act, the constitutional 
immunity against arrest and prosecution granted to the President, Vice-President, 
and the 36 state governors and their deputies, and the snail-speed of court trials. 
In its eight years in office, the Obasanjo government failed to take any concrete 
steps to reform the justice sector. The little progress observed in this area, which 
came through the efforts of the international community (UNODC) and the lead-
ership of the judiciary, proved insufficient to strengthen the capacity, integrity, 
and more importantly the speed of the legal system. As a result, an overwhelming 
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majority of corruption cases brought to court by the anti-corruption agencies 
were buried in endless delays. The consequence was that many accused persons 
roamed the streets freely after having been granted bail or even set free simply on 
technical grounds. The incapacity of these agencies to successfully prosecute a 
considerable number of the nation’s top officials, despite overwhelming evidence 
of corrupt practices on the part of these officials, contributed greatly to the poor 
image of these institutions. 
In the course of this book, we have shown how the problem of weak capacity 
of the anti-corruption agencies was linked in large part to the non-cooperative 
attitude of the political leadership in the country, which was responsible for the 
establishment of these agencies in the first place. The lack of political support 
from the leaders was demonstrated by the constant attacks launched against the 
ICPC by the National Assembly, all in a bid to intimidate the agency and sabo-
tage investigations initiated against some key members of the federal legislature 
who had been implicated in serious corruption scandals. Indeed, when the bill for 
the establishment of the ICPC was submitted to the National Assembly in June 
1999, it took the lawmakers over a year to consider it. The bill was passed only 
in July 2000, following intense lobbying and pressure from the President and 
critical sections of the public. In 2003, conflict between the federal legislature 
and the ICPC culminated in an unsuccessful attempt to pass a new ICPC law, 
which would have drastically reduced the powers of the ICPC and removed its 
then chairman, Justice Mustafa Akanbi. The National Assembly also ignored a 
bill seeking to strengthen the institutional capacity of the ICPC. The bill was pre-
pared by the ICPC with the support of the executive arm of government and sev-
eral civil society groups.  
As for the EFCC, Nigeria’s top political officials did not hide their surprise 
and dismay at the manner in which this institution ‘transformed’ itself into an 
anti-corruption body, contrary to their expectation that it would concern itself 
strictly with the arrest and prosecution of fraudulent bankers and individuals in-
volved in the well-known 419 scam. As the EFCC’s profile rose, the politicians 
resorted to the stigmatisation and politicisation of this institution in a desperate 
attempt to weaken and discredit it. As in the case of the ICPC, the possibility of 
an amendment to the EFCC Act was frequently floated in the National Assembly. 
Similarly, frequent appeals for more budgetary allocations for the work of the 
organization received little or no attention, despite the relative success of the 
EFCC. Indeed, the N1.3 billion proposed by the Executive as the EFCC budget 
for 2005 was reduced to N1.1 billion by the National Assembly, making the 
EFCC the only institution whose budget was revised downwards.  
Thus, while the important role of top political actors in the successful applica-
tion of anti-corruption policies and programmes is usually regarded as a critical 
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condition for success, national anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria have been 
weakened and their powers undermined by national leaders who have refused to 
support them with the necessary financial resources and legal amendments that 
would have strengthened their capacities. Even then, their trajectories have been 
further complicated by Nigeria’s federal structure of government, which has en-
couraged the states and their local authorities to object to Obasanjo’s anti-
corruption policy and programmes.  
The point here is simply that political will is essential. It is a critical starting 
point for sustainable and effective anti-corruption strategies and programmes. No 
legislative or administrative changes can ever be effective unless there is com-
mitment at all levels of government. It is one thing for the Obasanjo administra-
tion to establish anti-corruption agencies; it is quite another for the administration 
to provide the requisite political support (manifest and latent) for the agencies to 
succeed. Political will on the part of the international community is also crucial 
here. As we have seen, participation by the international community in Nigeria’s 
anti-corruption campaign has not been as forceful as should be expected. The 
pressure of the international community on the government of the Obasanjo ad-
ministration in 1999 contributed greatly to the launching of an anti-corruption 
campaign by the administration. However, the same international community re-
fused to offer concrete assistance to the administration in its quest for the repa-
triation of Abacha’s looted funds. 
States’ and local governments’ resistance  
to the anti-corruption project 
Even though many of the reform measures embraced in pursuit of Obasanjo’s 
anti-corruption policy in Nigeria were often presented as ‘national policies’, ap-
plicable across the length and breadth of this vast nation, the reality in many of 
the 36 states and their 774 local governments pointed to the contrary. The little 
progress made in the struggle against corruption under Obasanjo was largely con-
fined to the federal level of government. Some states tried to copy one or more 
aspects of the national anti-corruption policy or reforms which suited them. Oth-
ers even went ahead to design their own unique strategies against corruption, a 
good example being Zamfara and other northern states which adopted Shari’ah 
law. Many of these measures, however, did not yield any tangible results. Even 
then, a great majority of the states, particularly the oil-rich Niger Delta states, 
were indifferent, if not hostile, to any idea of anti-corruption reform, especially 
the one proposed by the federal government. Their relationships with the federal 
anti-corruption bodies (the ICPC and EFCC) were very antagonistic and obstruc-
tive.  
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The attitude of state governments to Obasanjo’s anti-corruption programme 
was first perceived in their reaction to the passage of the bill on the ICPC in July 
2000 and the subsequent establishment of the ICPC in September 2000. As soon 
as the law was passed, 32 of the 36 state governments mounted a challenge be-
fore the Supreme Court seeking to invalidate the law on the grounds that it was 
unconstitutional, having encroached on their constitutional powers and the theory 
and practice of federalism in Nigeria. Even when their case was rejected by the 
Supreme Court, the states continued to obstruct the ICPC and the other national 
anti-corruption agencies. Nigerian states also took similar measures to challenge 
other laws passed by the federal government in its quest to fight corruption. A 
notable example was the Monitoring of Revenue Allocation to Local Govern-
ments Act of 2005, which was invalidated by the Supreme Court on 7 July 2006 
following a legal challenge mounted by three states of the federation. These cases 
showed clearly that the commitment of a central government is insufficient to 
guarantee the success of a public policy in a federal state. The support and com-
mitment of sub-national authorities (states and local governments) are also cru-
cial. 
Weak civil society engagement in the war against corruption 
With the return of democracy in 1999, civil society in Nigeria witnessed consid-
erable growth and dynamism. The sharp increase in the number of NGOs formed 
specifically to help combat corruption and the increased intervention in the do-
main of anti-corruption by other existing associations and movements illustrate 
this evolution. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to exaggerate the impact of 
the intervention of these non-state actors in the anti-corruption campaign. With 
the exception of Nigeria’s independent and indomitable media, many sections of 
the civil society have not gone beyond regular criticism and open call on the 
government to take its anti-corruption campaign more seriously. Some of these 
actors, such as anti-corruption NGOs that took a few concrete steps in the direc-
tion of promoting the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, found their efforts un-
dermined by several internal and institutional challenges. Some of these hin-
drances included government’s unwillingness to adopt policies that could help 
strengthen CSOs (such as adoption of the Freedom of Information Bill), wide-
spread corruption and rent-seeking behaviour within the CSOs themselves, and 
the incapacity of these organizations to go beyond sectional cleavages and ethno-
religious solidarity. We also found that these problems have been compounded 
by unhealthy rivalry among civil society groups, which made networking impos-
sible, and by the hardship of everyday life that has ensured that citizens are too 
concerned with everyday survival and too willing to serve as instruments for cor-
rupt politicians, as we saw in the particular cases of Zamfara and Bayelsa States.  
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Direction for future reforms 
Corruption, especially the misappropriation of public funds, is no doubt an omni-
present phenomenon in many developing countries. However, in Africa the phe-
nomenon is clearly part of the definition of the game of politics. In Nigeria, the 
legitimacy and fortune of regimes have often been shaped by the rise of corrup-
tion and the handling of corruption allegations. Many regimes fell amidst allega-
tions of corruption within their regimes. Yet corruption remains, for Nigeria’s 
political class, a crucial factor in the construction of political power. The utility 
of corruption for the political class derives from its ability to serve both as the 
principal, if not the only, platform for the accumulation of wealth based on pri-
vate appropriation of public resources and as a source of legitimisation of power 
through selective distribution of patronage. These practices are characteristics of 
a neo-patrimonial system, as we emphasised in the opening sections of this book. 
It is precisely because of this that Obasanjo’s anti-corruption campaign clashed 
with political interests, as seen in the collective opposition of the country’s po-
litical class to the anti-corruption policy initiated by the President following the 
inauguration of the Fourth Republic.  
Does this mean that building a less corrupt society is an illusory task in Nige-
ria? How can corruption be curbed in Nigeria’s political system? Most policy 
prescriptions and theoretical perspectives on anti-corruption programmes found 
in contemporary academic literature have tended to emphasise the importance 
and effectiveness of neo-liberal economic reforms (privatisation and deregula-
tion) and public sector reforms (including adoption of anti-corruption regulations 
and institutions, reform of the civil service and judiciary, and strengthening of 
the civil society). The nature of politics and the roles of key political actors in 
recipient countries, that is to say, the potential local resistance to reforms, have 
most often been ignored or underestimated. Well-conceived economic and insti-
tutional reforms are necessary (Leiken 1996: 55; Kaufmann 1999: 89; Pope 
1999: 98), but they can only be successful when and where their implementation 
is favourably received by the key stakeholders. Indeed, as Vendi Nadiz has 
pointed out with Indonesia in mind, in neo-patrimonial states “vested political 
interests have a stake in keeping monitoring institutions weak and in safeguard-
ing conditions which make possible the plundering of state coffers” (Nadiz 2004: 
21). Any successful anti-corruption programme means that this problem must 
first be resolved by those charged with implementing the anti-corruption project.  
One may, therefore, consider the anti-corruption campaign as a political strug-
gle between ‘reformists’, or those who initiate and support an anti-corruption 
policy, and ‘vested political interests’, meaning those who organize and profit 
from the status quo (Whitehead 2000: 127). Nadiz has suggested that real pro-
gress in the struggle against corruption will depend “ultimately … on the ability 
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of (the reformists) to organize coherently in order to capture the mainstream of 
political life” (Nadiz 2004: 21). The idea of a political victory of reformists over 
corrupt anti-reformist networks raises the question of relations of power.  
In our view, any successful campaign against corruption in Nigeria will re-
quire the prior existence or construction of a grand political coalition to support 
that campaign (Haarhuis 2005: 239). To put it differently, all the public bodies 
with responsibility for fighting corruption – prevention, investigation, research, 
education, and enforcement bodies – must work in concert, harmonise their ef-
forts, and complement each other to develop one strategy. The difficulties the 
Obasanjo administration’s anti-corruption team encountered in their attempt to 
promote honesty and transparency in public institutions confirm to a large extent 
the hypothesis that where corruption is endemic, the struggle against corruption 
cannot be left to a small group of reformists. Rather, such a struggle will require 
the existence or construction of a grand coalition in favour of reforms. Unfortu-
nately, up until the end of Obasanjo’s presidency, there was no sign suggesting 
that such a coalition was emerging. Nigeria certainly has a long way to go in its 
struggle against corruption in public life. The emergence of a government with 
strong political will, change in the attitude of the political class, and a more ac-
tive and engaged civil society are required to move the war against corruption 
forward.  
 
 Annex I 
List of commissions of inquiry on corruption  
(1999-2005) 
 
 
 
 
Name of Commission Date established Head Status** 
1. Panel on Contracts, Licences 
    and Appointments 
 
2. Panel on Non-Performing or 
    Failed Contracts 
 
3. Panel for the Investigation of 
    Federal Government Landed 
    Property 
 
4. Judicial Commission on NITEL 
    and M-TEL 
 
5. Judicial Panel on National 
    Fertilizer Company of Nigeria 
    (NAFCON) 
 
6. National Committee on Nigerian 
    Railway Corporation 
 
7. Judicial Commission on Cocoa  
    Export Levy and Cocoa Butter 
    Stock Funds 
 
8. Commission of Inquiry on Abuja 
    Investment and Property 
    Development Company Ltd.  
 
9. Judicial Commission on Nigeria 
    Airways Limited 
 
10. Judicial Commission on Federal 
      Superphosphate Fertilizer 
      Company Ltd., Kaduna 
 
11. Judicial Commission on Niger 
      Dock Nigeria Ltd., Lagos 
 
12. National Youth Service Corps 
      Investigation Committee 
 
13. Tribunal of Inquiry into the 
      Management of African 
      Petroleum PLC, from its 
      Inception Until Privatisation 
 
21 June 1999 
 
 
21 July 1999 
 
 
28 July 1999 
 
 
 
24 August 1999 
 
 
29 August 1999 
 
 
 
18 August 1999 
 
 
January 2000 
 
 
 
4 January 2000 
 
 
 
8 February 2000 
 
 
2001 
 
 
 
2002 
 
 
18 September 2000 
 
 
August 2002 
 
 
 
 
Christopher Kolade 
 
 
T. I. Sali 
 
 
Olu Rotimi 
 
 
 
M. S. Audu 
 
 
M. M. Akambi 
 
 
 
C. S. O. Akande 
 
 
Michael Edem 
 
 
 
Sani Ahmed Daura 
 
 
 
Obiora Nwazota 
 
 
A. A. U. Ekundayo 
 
 
 
Amina Adamu-
Angies 
 
Muhammed Maijir 
 
 
Edet Robert Nkop 
 
 
 
 
Report submitted/ 
application underway 
 
Report submitted/ ap-
plication underway 
 
Report submitted/ 
application underway 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
Report submitted/ 
application underway 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
 
Report submitted/ 
application underway 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
 
 
184 
 
14. Committee on the Investigation 
      of Illegal Siphoning of Foreign 
      Exchange Outside Nigeria 
 
15. Panel of Inquiry for the  
      Investigation of All Cases of 
      Temporary Import Permit Issued 
      between 1984 and 2000  
 
16. Inter-Ministerial Committee on 
      Recovery of Debts Owed to the 
      Federal Urban Mass Transit 
      Agency 
 
17. Management Audit of the Onne 
      Oil and Gas Free Zone Authority 
 
18. Administrative Panel of Inquiry 
      on the Investigation of Illegal 
      Trade/Smuggling of Endangered 
     Species into and out of Nigeria 
 
19. Administrative Panel of Inquiry 
      into the February/March 2003 
      Fuel Shortage in Nigeria 
 
20. Presidential Committee on 
      Cyber Crime in Nigeria 
 
21. The Administrative Panel of 
      Inquiry on the Allegations of 
      Breach of Due Process in the 
      Award of Contracts at the 
      Federal Character Commission 
 
22. Presidential Committee on the 
      Cases of Stolen Radioactive 
      Sources from Nigeria 
 
23.Presidential Committee on Trade 
      Malpractices in Nigeria 
 
24. Panel of Inquiry on the 
      Allegations of Abuse of Office 
      and Embezzlement of Public 
      Funds in the Police Service 
      Commission 
 
25. Administrative Panel of Inquiry 
      on EFCC Report on Alleged con 
      conspiracy, fraudulent conversion
      of funds, corrupt practices and  
      money laundering by some pub- 
      lic officers and other persons* 
20 August 2002 
 
 
 
ND 
 
 
 
 
10 July 2002 
 
 
 
 
2002 
 
 
27 February 2003 
 
 
 
 
4 March 2003 
 
 
 
26 November 2003 
 
 
2003 
 
 
 
 
 
10 February 2004 
 
 
 
13 February 2004 
 
 
7 July 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
August 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
Waziri Mohammed 
 
 
 
F. A. Williams 
 
 
 
 
R. O. Ogunbambi 
 
 
 
 
G. F. Ogunsina 
 
 
John U. Bassey 
 
 
 
 
Nnaemeka U. 
Achebe 
 
 
Aliyu Mohammed 
 
 
S. O. Adekunle 
 
 
 
 
 
Akinlolu Olujinmi 
 
 
 
Waziri K. Moham-
med 
 
Aboki Zhawa 
 
 
 
 
 
Bayo Ojo 
Report submitted 
 
 
 
ND 
 
 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
Report submitted 
 
 
 
 
 
Report submitted/ 
application underway 
 
 
 
*  Source: ThisDay, 8 September 2006.  
**  As per December 2006. 
Source:  Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, “Detailed List of Panels, Com-
missions and Committees from May, 1999 to May, 2005”, Abuja, August 2005.  
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